E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
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Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
So,
constitutionally speaking, how bad could it be?
I will divide my answer into three parts: creative ways in which Trump
could exercise the formal powers of the presidency; what recent experience
tells us about how he could exercise the presidency’s informal capacities; and the
relation of politics to the exercise of constitutional power. In general, I think the answer turns on how
we understand what the Constitution is and (my favorite topic) the process of constitutional
change. I’m going to start in the
middle, with what could happen on the informal front. One more distinction – I’m focusing on the possibility of questionable
constitutional means, not ends.
Some
scholars have voiced the opinion that a Trump presidency wouldn’t be that
bad. Although Trump may have an
authoritarian style, the thinking goes that he is no Hitler and, in any case,
has to work under the same constitutional structure as every president. One thinks of the Truman-Eisenhower anecdote,
the one in which as he is leaving office, Truman remarks that Eisenhower will
get frustrated at his orders not being followed. It’s certainly a fair point that the
executive branch is not the military writ large.
Nonetheless
I beg to differ with the “no big deal” position, but on what non-armchair basis? Consider that theories of the “small-c”
constitution are popular these days. Our
Constitution is said to have a significant small-c component, which works much like
the British “unwritten constitution” model, riding alongside the more familiar
“big-C” text.
But
consider the implications of having a “small-c” or practice-based Constitution for Trump's case. If the Constitution has a significant
“small-c” component, it becomes much harder to claim that Trump could not change the constitution, that he has to work under the same structure as any
president. For one thing, anything he
does potentially constitutes a new “precedent,” a new moment for constitutional
law. Normally I’m against thinking about
these issues in terms of “practice,” (a pretty vague notion!) but I’ll leave
that aside. My present point is that the
reality that we have a Constitution of practice means that Trump’s choice of
possible means goes well beyond what Article II says. In fact, in terms of history, we’ve had a lot
of experience along this line. Presidents
who operate outside the box show us that constitutional norms and institutions people
of the time thought were fixed in fact have hidden fault lines that can produce
rapid change. We can all think of
examples – I assume Jackson, Polk, Lincoln, and both Roosevelts would qualify.
In fact, Trump’s
campaign has recently encouraged a Nixon 1968 analogy. As probably many readers appreciate, this is
not a normatively attractive comparison. Still, constitutionally, what's the issue? Well, perhaps you were thinking that Watergate came in Nixon’s second term? As I argue in my book Long Wars (it’s standard stuff with historians of Vietnam),
Watergate in fact grew out of Nixon’s first term vision of himself as a
beleaguered war president surrounded by domestic unrest that amounted to
terrorism. That is disturbingly
relevant to how Trump sees the world today.
But let's get more specific. In
terms of the constitution of practice, what could happen?
Assume
that Trump wants to pursue Policy X in foreign affairs. I use a foreign affairs example because
presidents have more leeway there as a historical matter. Imagine further that Policy X is opposed by
the State Department, the Defense Department, and the military. Trump (and any other president) has the
alternative of turning to the intelligence community, especially the CIA. In a way, the CIA was set up to facilitate
this possibility, in that it was created not
to be independent, but rather to be responsive to the president. Now you may recall that Nixon was rebuffed
when he turned to the CIA after the Watergate burglary (although Richard Helms
and the agency paid a price as a result).
But Nixon had already invented the alternative means of having the White
House staff “go operational” in terms of the Plumbers. That’s also roughly what happened during
Iran-contra in terms of the ability of the NSC staff to go around the
established bureaucracy. If the
president so wishes, the White House and NSC can function to an extent to
parallel the operations of the regular line agencies in foreign affairs.
To
be sure, there are things the White House cannot do on its own. I assume, for example, it can’t run a massive
technically complex surveillance operation of its assumed enemies. But of course the NSA can and I think we’ve
learned quite a bit from the Bush II administration about the forces that can
be brought to bear on the relatively fragile legal structures that currently
preserve a level of agency independence from a misguided president. I don’t think intelligence agency officials
would be in a robust position to disobey presidential orders unless they were directly
contrary to law. They could resign of
course, that’s what nearly happened in the confrontation between President Bush
and James Comey when AG Ashcroft was in the hospital. So quite a bit depends on who Trump appoints
to the AG’s office. Yet even so, there
are always theories of necessity, emergency and so on. There’s a lot of bad that could happen before
the whistle blowers sprang up.
Some
scholars believe the executive branch has fairly robust internal checks. I tend to agree with them in ordinary times,
but experience shows these checks can fold when presidential power is applied
directly. And in any case, the president
always has the option of evading the checks by having the White House staff go
operational. The possibilities here for
mischief in the general area of military action and intelligence surveillance
are just endless. We do have an informal
Constitution, but it is not necessarily a tame and compliant partner to its
formal counterpart. Experience has shown
that the informal constitution can be in considerable tension with its “big-C”
counterpart. That’s a theoretical point,
but I hope you can see how this theory has big implications for what Trump
could do to and with the presidency.