E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
On SSRN, I've published a draft of Republicanism and the Constitution of Opportunity.
The article is part of a symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality that will appear in Texas Law Review. Here is the abstract:
This essay explains the constitutional basis of Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath's recent call for an “Anti-Oligarchy Constitution” and a “Constitution of Opportunity.” Fishkin and Forbath correctly argue that one cannot separate democracy and political freedom from a nation's political economy. They contend that public officials have a political duty to promote an inclusive and broad-based middle class, because economic independence is crucial to preserve democratic self-government.
These claims are modern-day versions of a very old idea in the American constitutional tradition. This is the requirement of republican government, a basic principle of American constitutionalism that not only undergirds several different parts of the constitutional text but also has deep roots in the ideals of the founding generation.
I describe several key features of republicanism and how a commitment to a republican political economy flows from them. Republican ideals like equal citizenship and opposition to oligarchy and aristocracy remain important and relevant in the twenty-first century, but inevitably they must take new forms. Because of what I have called "ideological drift," opponents of oligarchy and aristocracy in one generation are often co-opted into becoming the defenders of new forms in later years. And because of ideological drift, older versions of anti-oligarchy rhetoric can be captured by new aristocracies and oligarchies to defend and entrench their interests.
As time goes on, corruption finds ever-new ways of entering the political system, weakening the institutions and practices that secure civic equality and representative democracy. The causes of corruption are not simply human frailty and fallenness. They also arise from social, demographic, and technological changes. These alter the meanings and practical effects of older social arrangements, offering ever-new opportunities for attaining and entrenching power. Hence republicanism, if it is to have a coherent and enduring set of political commitments, cannot be identified with a fixed set of social and economic arrangements. Instead, every generation must reconsider the terms of the nation's political economy, and remain vigilant to deal with new threats to self-rule. Posted
7:26 AM
by JB [link]