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Asked and Answered: The Take Care Clause issue in U.S. v. Texas
Guest Blogger
Neil Kinkopf
As Marty has noted,
yesterday the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the DAPA case, and
generated headlines by adding an additional question: “Whether the
Guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.” Texas's constitutional
argument is that: (i) the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security's DAPA Guidance--and the work authorization conferred upon DAPA
aliens, in particular--exceeds the authority granted in the relevant
immigration statutes; (ii) A President who exceeds his constitutional
authority violates the constitutional duty to “take care that the laws
be faithfully executed”; and thus, (iii) a President who exceeds his
statutory powers violates the Constitution.
Putting
aside the fact that the Guidance was not issued by the President, this
argument would appear, at first glance, to be a forceful one. I used to
think it true, in fact. But Marty's right: There's no distinct
constitutional question here--it's merely an ordinary dispute about the
interpretation of statutory law. And what no one seems to have noticed
is that the Supreme Court has already held as much.
In Dalton v. Specter,
the Supreme Court held that President George H.W. Bush’s order closing a
military base was not subject to judicial review. Senator Arlen
Specter and others challenging the order claimed that the President had
exceeded his statutory authority. The Supreme Court held that the
President’s order was not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure
Act because the President is not an agency for APA purposes. The case
establishing this proposition, Franklin v. Massachusetts, had recognized a sort of exception: judicial review would be available when presidential actions are challenged as unconstitutional.
Senator Specter argued that President Bush’s base closure order was
issued outside his legitimate statutory authority and therefore was
unconstitutional. Sound familiar? This is precisely the argument that
Texas is making that the DAPA Guidance is unconstitutional: Because it
allegedly goes beyond what Congress has authorized the Secretary to do,
it is said to violate the Take Care Clause. Here is what Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the Court in Dalton, in response to the argument when Senator Specter raised it:
…
[C]laims simply alleging that the President has exceeded his statutory
authority are not "constitutional" claims, subject to judicial review
under the exception recognized in Franklin.[n.6] As this case
demonstrates, if every claim alleging that the President exceeded his
statutory authority were considered a constitutional claim, the
exception identified in Franklin would be broadened beyond
recognition. The distinction between claims that an official exceeded
his statutory authority, on the one hand, and claims that he acted in
violation of the Constitution, on the other, is too well established to
permit this sort of evisceration.
Footnote
6 reads: “As one commentator has observed, in cases in which the
President concedes, either implicitly or explicitly, that the only
source of his authority is statutory, no ‘constitutional question
whatever’ is raised. J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National
Political Process 316 (1980). Rather, ‘the cases concern only issues of
statutory interpretation.’ Ibid.”
United States v. Texas
is just such a case. It involves the question whether the DAPA order
exceeds the limits of the authorities that the immigration statutes vest
in the Secretary of Homeland Security. Neither the Take Care Clause
nor any other constitutional provision tells us anything about what the
content of those limits might be. Dalton teaches that the
President has not violated the Constitution, even if it turns out that
he, or one of his appointees, was mistaken about the extent of statutory
power.
Neil Kinkopf is Professor of Law at Georgia State University College of Law. You can reach him by e-mail at nkinkopf at gsu.edu