E-mail:
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Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
One thing that stood out from this
horror show of civic failure was that the targets of the city’s policies were a
majority of Ferguson’s
population. The African-Americans
against whom the police showed animus are a super-majority of the city’s population. And Ferguson issued more citations and
summons for code violations per year than it has people, balancing its budget
through what was in effect a bizarrely inefficient set of taxes levied against
a majority of its population.
How does a super-majority of the
population become the target of biased government policy from a democratically
elected city government? And has anything changed about local politics in the
last year such that Ferguson and cities like it will not resume their predation
of the majority?
Only one year after the shooting
and standing far away from the on-the-ground political developments, it is hard
to tell whether anything has fundamentally changed about Ferguson’s
politics. To be sure, the first
elections after the Michael Brown shooting were different from prior elections:
turnout
increased somewhat and minority candidates won a few races, with African-Americans
now holding 3 out of 6 seats on the City Council.
But
elections right after major news stories are often quite different from
elections after the buzz has faded. For
lasting change, political institutions must develop that can provide ordinary
voters with clear information about candidates to facilitate popular
participation. Some such institutions seem to have
popped up in the wake of the Ferguson protests.
Whether local organizations can survive and succeed in making
participation in municipal politics easier for ordinary voters will be key to whether
there is long-term change in how and for whom local policy works, in Ferguson
and beyond.
Popular images of local elections –
town hall meetings, politicians “close to the people” – and their reality are
often at odds. As the economist Bill
Fischel has argued, the key
players in local politics, particularly outside of big cities, are “home voters,”
or homeowners who vote in ways that serve to protect the value of their homes. Most homeowners’ investment in their homes
constitutes a huge percentage of their wealth, and they use their influence
over local policies to insure their undiversified portfolios against risk. And their longer tenure in a jurisdiction gives
homeowners’ greater capacity to learn about local politicians. As a result, home voters have both the
incentives and ability to dominate local politics, particularly outside of big
cities.
In suburbs where a large majority
of residents are home voters, this can result in very responsive politics. (The ordinary worries about politics in these
places are about excessive majoritarianism and refusals to bear a fair share of
regional burdens.) But unlike some
suburbs, only 59%
of Ferguson’s population lives in owner-occupied units. And many
homes in Ferguson were underwater following the housing bubble crash,
reducing their owners’ incentives to invest in local politics. Due to general patterns of white flight and plus
some odd policies,
the racial disparity in homeownership and tenure rates are particularly
extreme. The general population and the
population of home voters in Ferguson are very different.
Theory thus predicts minority rule
in Ferguson. Home voters will invest in
politics, while other residents will ignore local elections. Policies like pursuing fine revenue at all
costs to fund services that benefit homeowners follow pretty directly from the
structure of its politics.
The legal structure of Ferguson’s
elections (which is far from unusual) plays into home voter dominance. As a matter of state law, local elections are
held in April of odd-years, meaning that casual
voters who show up to vote for President or Governor do not take part. The municipal election before the Michael
Brown shooting saw about 11% turnout,
and had a majority white electorate in a city that is 67% African-American,
despite the fact that voters
of all races turn out at roughly the same rate in Presidential elections. Further, the city uses a “council-manager”
system, where power is wielded by the city council and a professional city
manager. Ordinary voters may be able make judgments about one local official,
crediting or blaming a Mayor for a city’s successes or failures. But under a council-manager system, they are
forced to make judgments about a bunch of legislators to whom it is difficult
to tie policies. Home voters have both the capacity and incentives to overcome
these information problems; most transients and renters do not.
These problems are not unique to
poor suburbs like Ferguson. Even in big
cities, majorities rarely make their voices heard in local politics. From school board races to zoning hearings,
from District Attorney elections to city council primaries, there is just very
little evidence that the opinions of majorities matter much at all in local
politics.
This is a
product of the low-information nature of local politics. In national politics, voters use party labels
– Democrats and Republicans – to overcome a lack of information about
candidates. As long as you have opinions
about President Obama or President Bush, you can vote for Congress
substantially as if you were informed. But most local elections, including those in
Ferguson, are non-partisan, leaving voters without party cues to give them
information when making selections in low-profile races. Further, even where partisan elections are
held, party labels provide only a little information in local elections. Voters ally with parties on national issues,
and the correlation between preferences about national issues (e.g. income
taxes, war) and the issues that dominate local politics (zoning, policing,
educational methods) is weak. Further,
almost all big cities with partisan elections are dominated by one party, and
minority parties find it difficult (for both informational and legal reasons)
to rebrand themselves at the local level. This pushes political competition
into primaries, which lack party labels to differentiate the candidates. The result is that many local elections are
low-turnout, low-information affairs. Only heavily involved homeowners and
organized local interest groups have much in the way of influence. Some elections stand outside of this—in the highest profile Mayoral races,
ordinary voters can develop independent assessments of candidates. But most
of the officials of most local governments are chosen by home voters and
squeaky wheels and without much in the way of general interest or influence.
The absence of competitive
elections translates directly into local policy. When big cities consider zoning changes, they
listen heavily to nearby homeowners but little to the needs of renters citywide
who would like more housing to be constructed.
When liquor licenses are considered, the neighbors who show up for
meetings and vote in primaries win out against the interests of far-flung
patrons. And so forth.
Can local politics be any other
way? To overcome the burdens created by a lack of information about local
politicians, the only answer is to create better tools for getting voters
information. One way to do this is to
make local elections high profile. In
elections following big news events, voters do in fact pay attention; the
election following the Michael Brown shooting is one such event. But
usually attention fades and the ordinary home voter politics returns.
In order to avoid returning to the
pre-Michael Brown shooting political status quo, Ferguson will need
organizational developments devoted to making politics easier for ordinary
voters to understand. The success of
such developments locally will determine how well Ferguson’s politics works
once attention fades.
David Schleicher is Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School. You can reach him by e-mail at david.schleicher at yale.edu