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Announcing Broken Trust: Why I Wrote a Book on Dysfunctional Government and Constitutional Reform
Stephen Griffin
I can’t count the number of book reviews
I’ve read of works advocating constitutional and political reform which
conclude along these lines: “the author’s suggested remedies are interesting,
but unlikely to be enacted.” Well, that’s
a downer! In a way, one of my objectives
in writing Broken Trustwas to
deliberately get under the skin of people who write such reviews. I wanted to approach the issue of fundamental
constitutional reform from these angles: how would you motivate people toward reform
in a country with an old and revered Constitution? How could we make the possibility of reform
more persuasive and imaginable? What
sort of reforms should we be interested in, especially if we think the
political system is clotted and unlikely to change? And, as implied by the title, I put the
decline of trust in government at the center of these discussions.
I suggest that in most books of this
kind, motivation is supposed to flow from pointing out that our government is
dysfunctional, without necessarily considering the reality that some people are
always opposed to proposed policy changes.
For these people, dysfunction works.
“Dysfunction” is often simply another way of pointing out that our
system of government has many veto points, perhaps more than most
countries. So what sort of justification
might appeal to everyone? Perhaps
justifications resting on abstract values but, then again, people do disagree
about how to implement such values, even if they agree on them in their
abstract form. In Broken Trust, I therefore develop an alternative. This is an argument that links “policy
disasters” – policy outcomes that are in
no one’s interest – to the Constitution and our “constitutional order,” the
way the Constitution is implemented in a practical sense in a particular
historical period. I discuss how four
policy disasters are linked to the Constitution: (1) the terrorist attacks of
9/11; (2) the flooding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina ten years ago;
(3) the 2008 financial crisis; and (4) the growth of inequality of income and
wealth in America. If you want to avoid
such disasters in the future, I argue, we need to increase trust in government
through fundamental constitutional reform.
How to do this? Again, a tall order! I make this scenario more plausible by
consulting history. I explore the
reasons political scientists have given for the decline in trust and show how,
in our western states, a decline in trust in the progressive period in the
early twentieth century indeed led to fundamental reform, the adoption of
direct democracy. As far as I can tell,
direct democracy has never been very popular with constitutional scholars and
although I acknowledge its shortcomings, I build a case that it has been successful
to an important degree in responding to the felt need for popular influence in
government. The distrust Americans have,
particularly toward their own legislatures, is a real phenomenon that goes back
decades, and has to be acknowledged more openly and dealt with more successfully
if we are to address the problem of dysfunctional government.
So
fundamental constitutional reform is more feasible than many suppose because it
has already happened on the state level.
And it continues to happen, especially now that the Supreme Court has
sanctioned redistricting reform by commission (in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission). But the reforms I think we should concentrate
on are those that operate like direct democracy. In themselves, they do not necessarily lead
in any particular policy direction. But
they operate as gridlock-busters, thus creating an opening for
reform. California and other western
states like Arizona have had that potential and opportunity for decades. They just started exercising that option fairly
recently and no, I don’t believe you can show direct democracy has been
uniquely harmful to their policies or politics.
There’s one
more point I make in the book that I would like you to think about, especially
if you have your doubts about the desirability and possibility of fundamental
reform. How about that President
Trump? Or President Lessig? Or the success Bernie Sanders has
enjoyed? Do you feel the genuine
populist anger at the current state of our politics? Part of that anger derives from the lack of
practical policy accomplishment, to be sure.
But another part, I am convinced, derives from the “radical middle” –
people who don’t hold extreme policy positions but are understandably
frustrated about why nothing is happening and do favor some exploration of constitutional reform. And that's why the argument of this book will only seem more plausible as time goes on. Or so I hope!