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In an elegant
piece published yesterday, Ross Douthat asks himself some questions about
the current conflict between religious freedom and equality for LGBT citizens.
He wryly identifies himself as a “semi-reasonable Christian” and then gives clear answers concerning issues like whether wedding vendors should have to serve everyone
and whether there are differences between declining to serve same-sex weddings
and interracial weddings. Below the fold, I pose several additional questions
for Douthat. Like him, I’m genuinely
interested in the answers.
Douthat’s basic position seems to be that legal accommodations
for religious organizations and businesses from civil rights laws respond to
theological convictions that are sincere and longstanding. Moreover, such
accommodations will be limited in impact. In particular, they 1) should be
available only for services related to weddings, not discrimination on the
basis of identity, and 2) ought to be allowed only for objections to same-sex
marriage, not for objections to interracial marriage.
But Douthat doesn’t ask himself some other hard questions
about these positions. I would be interested to know his answers to these as
well. My concern here is legal, while Douthat’s broader focus includes policy
and morality, but there is enough overlap that I think these questions are fair.
1. It’s one thing to
say that racial discrimination has a special place in American law and history,
and that objections to same-sex weddings are distinguishable. But civil rights
law provides equally strong protection against discrimination on the basis of
religion and, in many jurisdictions, marital status. A commercial wedding
vendor who declined for religious reasons to serve an interfaith wedding or a
remarriage would not receive an exemption—a result that I take to be relatively
uncontroversial. How is a decision not to serve a same-sex wedding different
from a decision not to serve an interfaith wedding or a remarriage?
2. Douthat says that
accommodations would be limited to weddings, but what is the principled
distinction between a wedding and a marriage? Weddings are momentary, while marriages are
designed to last years. Presumably they implicate similar theological
objections. Under his approach, should a religious employer be allowed to deny
spousal benefits to an employee’s same-sex husband or wife?
3. That is probably
the most pressing next case, but there are many more situations where religious
providers could decline to promote or support a same-sex marriage: joint
adoption for same-sex spouses, retreat centers for married couples, married
student housing, visitation rights at hospitals, renting event spaces for
anniversary parties, leasing apartments to married couples, etc. And these
examples are not imaginary—exemptions similar to some of these have already
been granted by state
marriage equality statutes. How would he address these scenarios?
4. Even as to weddings
themselves, would all religious
objectors be accommodated? Should public officials be able to decline to
process same-sex marriage licenses or to solemnize same-sex wedding
celebrations, assuming they have a theological objection to doing so? No state
has passed such a measure yet—Utah’s recent law is
somewhat unclear on the point—but some
states are considering outright exemptions for public officials. Would that
be proper under public service laws or the Equal Protection Clause?