Party Discipline and Congressional Rules

Gerard N. Magliocca

I'll be part of a Symposium at Notre Dame on Gridlock this Fall, which gives me an opportunity to revisit my interest in the internal procedures of Congress. If you start with the premise that gridlock is a problem that should be fixed (not an assumption everyone shares, of course), then there are a couple of options. The first would be a reform of the Senate filibuster, which I've written about before. Another involves weakening party discipline in Congress to make bipartisanship easier. This is the issue that I want to explore as part of the Constitution-in-practice.

There are two ways to think about party discipline. One is that it is enforced by voters. If an elected official reaches across the aisle too often or on the wrong things, then she loses in a primary or in a general election due to lack of enthusiasm from her political base. Electoral rules shape this force (primaries could be open to all voters, for example), but on this issue public opinion must largely be convinced that cooperation is worthwhile. The strength of the party whip, though, is also a product of congressional rules. How easy is to punish members who stray from the party line? That depends on a couple of factors. First, how transparent are the actions of members? If the party leadership does not know that someone is working with the other side, then only carrots can be used to induce loyalty from those who visibly cooperate. Second, who has the power to dole out rewards or punishments? For decades, the answer was committee chairmen, not the party leadership, and their goals were often different.

Right now we are in a period where the party leadership is quite powerful. This occurred because the parties became more ideologically homogenous, but also because of rule changes that diminished the committees and strengthened the leadership. Are we better off because of this development? I'm not sure. Moreover, rules changes can reverse this process if we think that the answer is no. Consider that until 1845 Senate Committee Chairs were elected by a secret ballot of the entire Senate. This meant that party discipline could not be enforced and members of the minority party could be chairs. Congress rarely votes by secret ballot today, even though it can so long as more than 4/5 of a House agrees to do so (Article I, Section 5, Clause 3)). There are a slew of other practices that could be examined along these lines (why should party leaders get to appoint members of the conference committee, should the prerogatives of the Senate majority leader or the Speaker be curtailed?). I hope to expand on these themes in other posts.
Posted 9:55 AM by Gerard N. Magliocca [link]