E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
I wanted to add an observation to Jack's post from the other day about the need for Senate reform and the evolution of parliamentary parties in a presidential system.
My proposal, which is in this forthcoming Essay, is that the filibuster should be reduced from an absolute to a suspensive veto. In other words, forty-one Senators should have the power only to delay legislation or nominations for up to one year within a Congress. When I present this idea, the most common response I get is that the current system is worth retaining because it forces both parties to work together. Of course, forcing the parties to work together often means that nothing gets done, especially when they are so polarized. Proponents of current Senate practice, though, would generally prefer nothing over something bad supported by a slim majority.
I think the elevation of bipartisanship into a small c constitutional principle is wrong. There is no Bipartisanship Clause in the Constitution. Nor is it true that bipartisan initiatives are better as an empirical matter than ones passed on a party-line vote. (Or, at least, I am not aware of any support for that proposition.) Most important, professional politicians are bipartisan only when it is in their partisan interest. That may be because the measure under consideration is popular. It may be because they want political cover for something controversial. These are extraordinary circumstances. Turning that into standard operating procedure, as the modern interpretation of the Senate rules does, is simply unsustainable.