E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Because Brown v Board of Education made "separate but equal" unconstitutional and inadequate, it's tempting to use the phrase to challenge domestic partnerships in states that ban same-sex marriage. Calling it "separate but equal status" for intimate partners is a way of saying it is an unacceptable second best.
Yet in some ways, it is odd to apply the "separate but equal" locution here where integration--mixing of people in one setting--is not the goal; organizing the official recognition for intimate partnerships is.
Nonetheless, in other ways, the invocation of Brown v. Board is just right: redressing status differentials enforced by exclusion can best be accomplished through inclusion. Where the symbolic communication of status is at issue, even starting from scratch, it is difficult to ensure equal status and regard for parallel distinct institutions. Where we are not starting from scratch but dealing with an historic practice--marriage, whose origins reach back too early in human history even to name a starting date--the creation of a distinct alternative and refusal of access to the long-established rite carries a less-than-equal message. So did the after-thought creation of a separate law school for black students in the shadow of the long established all-white University of Texas Law School; so did separate elementary schools for black students.
Are there any circumstances where separate can be equal? Gender-based separate schools do come to mind, and I will explore that topic in my next post.