Re "the corps of compassion"

Sandy Levinson

As I arrived at Carrefour, a Marine officer in charge of civilian relations was convening the first meeting of community activists, nongovernmental organizations and local officials -- a group that will gather every day to assess the needs of eight sectors of the city. The officer explained to me the complex Haitian class dynamics that determine local leadership. American Marines of Haitian background were speaking a rapid Creole -- one of the benefits of a multicultural military. The goal was to begin handing out food through community institutions instead of distribution sites or coupons, so Haitians could begin taking ownership of the effort. The Marines are practicing a kind of noninvasive surgery -- providing structure and security, but cultivating community institutions that must continue to stand after America leaves.

Where in the world did U.S. Marines learn this kind of cultural sensitivity? Lt. Col. Rob Fulford, in charge of the Carrefour operation, answers: "In Iraq and Afghanistan, where the equivalent was dealing with tribal sheiks. . . . There is a maturity level inside our Marines that didn't exist in 2003 when we invaded Iraq. A cultural awareness. An ability to leverage relationships."

Another officer on Fulford's staff adds: "It is very similar to Iraq and Afghanistan, except that here there is no bad guy. We're helping the populace, winning their trust. This is right up our alley. All of us are products of the COIN manual."

He is referring to the counterinsurgency field manual authored by Gen. David Petraeus, which involved a dramatic shift in military thinking -- increasing the focus on population security, cultivating indigenous capabilities and isolating the enemy by improving the lives of the locals. This strategy helped save the American mission in Iraq. Its reach and benefits can now be seen on a Haitian beach.

Major military deployments such as Haiti involve a paradox. They put a tremendous strain on military equipment. Traveling from ship to ship off Haiti's shore, I was told of clean-water condensers that had broken down, of scavenging for essential parts, of preventive maintenance postponed.

But the people of the military gain skill and experience -- moving supplies, treating trauma cases, dealing with complex cultural challenges. Despite many hardships, those who train for a mission love performing their mission.

No empire of history could boast such tenderhearted legions....

I have no desire at all to criticize the work being done by the Marines in Haiti. They deserve the plaudits that Gerson gives them. But it is absolutely eerie to read this column in the context of Col. Dunlap's scenario for the 2012 military coup as presented in a 1993 (!) article by Tom Ricks in the Atlantic, for a major theme of the article is precisely the switch in the military from a traditional "war-fighting" machine to one that indeed takes on "community development" as one of its missions, and then comes to the conclusion that they can do a better job of it than the corrupt politicians who are trapped in a gridlocked system. Might not this be the message in 2012 of a candidate Petraeus, the decidedly "new-style" celebrity general committed (unlike Colin Powell) to the new religion of counter-insurgency as community building. And what community is in greater need of efficacious rebuilding than the United States? I suppose it wouldn't count as a "coup" if we simply vote into office our 21st century version of the "general on horseback," running as the candidate of the Republican Party while claiming, of course, to be "above" politics and "ready to make the tough decisions that need to be made." Who knows, perhaps he'll promise us "change we can believe in."