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Balkinization Symposiums: A Continuing List                                                                E-mail: Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu David Luban david.luban at gmail.com Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu Compendium of posts on Hobby Lobby and related cases The Anti-Torture Memos: Balkinization Posts on Torture, Interrogation, Detention, War Powers, and OLC The Anti-Torture Memos (arranged by topic) Recent Posts On "authority" (as distinguished from power), and does George W. Bush have any
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Wednesday, September 24, 2008
On "authority" (as distinguished from power), and does George W. Bush have any
Sandy Levinson
I did not bother watching George W. Bush's speech to the nation this evening (which I also have intention of reading), because I do not take him seriously as really knowing anything about the economy. "Authority" requires such confidence. Ben Bernanke has "authority," whether or not one agrees with him in all details. Washington Post columnist Robert Samuelson or NYTimes columnist Paul Krugman have authority. Perhaps Henry Paulson amassed authority along with $38 million/year while running Goldman Sachs. But would any serious person--defined as someone worried about his/her pension and the future of his/her children/grandchildren-- really be give credence to anything Mr. Bush said about the economy and what is required to resolve the present "crisis"? If one says, "Well, he's talked to Paulson and Bernanke and really believes them," then to give any "authority" to Bush is simply to double-count any "authority" one might already have assigned to Paulson and Bernanke. I do not gain "authority" as a physicist because I can quote Steve Weinberg on the Higgs Boson, about which I know, in terms of any deep understanding, absolutely nothing, nor do I display authority about golf, which I do not play, by quoting Tiger Woods. What makes Bush any different?
Comments:
"If one says, 'Well, he's talked to Paulson and Bernanke and really believes them,' then to give any 'authority' to Bush is simply to double-count any 'authority' one might already have assigned to Paulson and Bernanke."
I don't think this fits with how we usually think of authority in the law. A case that cites the right earlier authorities itself has authority, I think, just in virtue of relying on the right authorities.
If 0% of recently polled people think that the economy is improving, and Bush is at 19% approval levels, I think very few people think of him as an authority at anything in this crisis, except, perhaps, of how to get into it.
Now this is just a silly rant. You listen to his speech because it matters politically, not to get an economics lesson from the guy. Besides, he didn't write the speech. Maybe his speechwriters do have some authority on these matters. I thought it was a respectable little speech; I particularly liked that he devoted some time to explaining the causes of the crisis. He did that pretty well (unlike McCain, whose "educated guess," apparently, as to what caused all this is that Obama voted against reform of Fannie Mae). Anyway, this part of your post is especially egregious:
he has, notoriously and flagrantly, throughout his Administration, been almost totally uninterested in what genuine "authorities" think about all sorts of issues, ranging from how many troops might be necessary effectively to occupy Iraq--goodbye, Gen. Shinseki because you're not fitting the party line--to global warming to........So why now is Bush suddenly willing to listen to "authorities" [then you go on to blithely speculate as to why he's willing to listen] It seems to me that nothing has "suddenly" changed here. Bush is listening to his Treasury Secretary and Chairman of the Fed on the economy. In the past, he listened to his Defense Secretary, Secretary of State, National Security Adviser, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Wolfowitz) and Vice President on Iraq. What's the difference between now and then? Nothing, unless you think Wolfowitz, Rice and Powell don't qualify as authorities. The real on-point criticism here is that now, as was the case then, he's failing to consult outside authorities. Every economist outside of Bernanke seems to think this bailout's a bad idea. I see no evidence that Bush has consulted with any outside economists.
Tray:
What you find economists to be saying depends on where you do your reading. Generally, Obama has more ecomomists on his side than does McCain - see Ecomonists for Obama. There must be some economists still alive who (if they too have not succumbed to Alzheimers) who still support Reaganomics - see here The Concise Encylopaedia of Economics - Reaganomics (the author is the present Chairman of the Cato Institute, I think). But you have to remember that most of Reagan's economic advisers jumped ship as their theories were abandoned by the Administration - see this 1982 Time article: Reagan's Vanishing Advisers But, what economists think ought to be done can only be modelled on a rational (at least to them) basis. The problem is that markets very frequently do not behave rationally. Fears may be wholly irrational - yet they will drive the market. So treasury ministers and central bankers have to be in no small way psychologists as well as having an understanding of economics - there is even an element of witchdoctoring involved, so I would not suggest involving Governor Palin's Witch-Hunting Pastor Obviously, any US Administration is somewhat hampered by not having the same quality of high level professional and politically neutral civil servants as one finds in most other developed countries - thanks to the pernicious doctrine of "to the winner go the spoils" But central bankers have their own mafia and I would credit Bernanke with having consulted widely with his opposite numbers in the G-8 countries. As it happens, the two world financial markets are essentially New York and London with the Asian markets being largely reactive so at least the major consultations will be relatively easy - and since the Bank of England has an institutional memory going back to its foundation in 1694, it's "been there and done that" ever since the prototype modern market collapse, the 1720 The South Sea Bubble.
I'm not talking about Obama and McCain; I'm talking about how many economists think Paulson's bailout - buying up mortgage-based-securities at prices above market price - is the best way to address the problem. I haven't seen many.
Sandy is right. Although Bush has "listened" to experts in the past, such activity has generally consisted in using them to further a pre-cooked agenda and/or take advantage of a political opportunity.
GEORGE W'S "THE SKY IS FALLING" SPEECH REPLACES JIMMY CARTER'S "MALAISE IN AMERICA" SPEECH
At least Carter called for sacrifice other than merely financial bailouts. Bush is still for "GUNS, BUTTER & TAX CUTS" rather than taking blame. His Ma and Pa must be proud of him. And note that he seemed to primarily place the blame on Freddie and Fannie going way back in time rather than his soon to be concluded 8-ball years. Perhaps he sees this as his last neo-con-job.
Here's another thought on why the double-counting idea seems wrong to me: think of Paulson's expertise or authority as like the expertise of an agent. A principal who uses his agent's expertise is properly credited or blamed for it, on qui-facit-per-alium-facit-per-se grounds. See this at 154ff. for more on the same basic idea.
Gee Sandy, I'm tempted to say "welcome to my world". Like what's your evidence that anyone in this nation has any authority or credibility at all?
Eight years of the Bush / Cheney gangster administration? Lawyers like David Addington, John Yoo, and Bart De Palma perhaps? What the evidence shows is a nation of greedy hypocrites, posers, and fools -- with a government that's virtually brain-dead for all practical purposes. But don't mind me: I'm just a ten year old kid who decided he'd better think for himself in 1962 (during a certain little crisis in Cuba), and has been self-educating himself ever since. Let me add: institutional inertia, misdirection, and dysfunction aside, I do respect certain people as individuals -- you, Jack, and Marty for example. The problem is that we're in this up to our necks, and even now, people just don't get how deep that really is.
I think you are confusing two different things here. Bush’s lack of “authority” has nothing to do with a lack of intellect or knowledge of economics. It has to do with the fact that he has lost the trust of the American people. Therefore, he is unable to provide the political legitimacy that is necessary for the Paulson plan (or some alternative thereto) to pass Congress and to generate the needed confidence in the financial markets.
This is what I think you are missing in your criticism of McCain’s insistence that he and Obama take the lead in agreeing on a plan and pushing it through. It is not that anybody believes that either McCain or Obama can provide unique insight on economic or financial matters. But now is the time that a fateful decision for the future of our economy is going to be made and it is essential that the next president assume the responsibility for making that decision. Due to the peculiar circumstances, that means a joint decision by McCain and Obama. Presumably this is the reality that Obama recognized when he proposed a joint statement of principles to be put forth by the two candidates. Normally, one would expect that the candidates would put forth competing proposals and let the people decide which one is best. But by the time the next president is sworn in, it will be too late. Unfortunately, none of us, including the so-called experts, really knows what to do here. Paulson and Bernanke are warning of cataclysmic consequences if the plan is not adopted, but there might be such consequences even if, or because, the plan is enacted. Maybe the best thing to do is nothing, or to adopt a much more limited plan to tide us over until the next administration is sworn in. But one way or another, a decision must be made. Only McCain and Obama have the political legitimacy to make it.
I agree that "legitimacy" is an important consideration, and it may be the case that only Obama and/or McCain can supply it. But, as Weber pointed out, there are various bases for legitimacy. One of them is because we believe that the "leader" is actually an "authority." Another is to invest belief in "charismatic" figures, which, by some accounts, Obama is. Another is to rely on tribal elders, which McCain is. But the elder may be a witch-doctor, of course, whom it is irrational to rely on to counter the epidemic caused by the introduction of new diseases perhaps brought by foreign invaders.
As for Chris's initial point, what he is capturing is the "authoritarian" anti-rational side of legal argument, well described by Bentham in his castigation of precedent-based reasoning. Another form of this "authoritarianism," which is also equivalent to tradition-based notions of legitimacy, is "originalism," particularly of the non-Balkinian non-dynamic variety. Anyone not caught up in its coils simply regards it as a crazy way of trying to decide what we should be doing today. I agree with Tray that Bush didn't write the speech. This does not reassure me. One difference between Obama and McCain is that Obama in fact wrote his own books and has demonstrated a remarkable quality of mind. McCain has relied almost completely on a ghostwriter, and it is unclear that McCain can, without a ghost, put any sort of logical argument together.
Whether Bush wrote the speech or not seems rather beside the point:
Mr. Bush is a criminal, indeed, a mass murderer and a war criminal, among so many other crimes large and small. Mr. Bush leads and administration of criminals and is supported by a party of criminals, including torture victim McCain who aids and abets torture because it is politically expedient to do so. This conversation is surreal: these people have no authority nor any just claim to authority. The kindest thing you can say for any Republican is that they are INSANE, but that doesn't redress the suffering of their victims nor mitigate the damage their eight year crime spree has inflicted on the nation and the world.
Sandy Levinson said...
One of them is because we believe that the "leader" is actually an "authority." Another is to invest belief in "charismatic" figures, which, by some accounts, Obama is. Another is to rely on tribal elders, which McCain is. These three seem similar enough to be variants on a theme, rather than deeper distinctions. They all involve in people accepting someone's word based on a face value more than a track record. It seems that Bush's track record has ruined his face value. No amount of authority can cover for the string of foibles, blunders, and outright misdeeds that characterize his administrations.
Sorry, while I agree that everything the Bush Administration does has to be regarded with suspicion, the world-wide crisis in the financial services sector is real enough, interbank lending has dried up, there is a credit crunch not just in the USA but in other financial sectors too.
If the song were being sung by a lone central banker, I would hesitate - but on the existence of the crisis there can be no doubt. On the best form of remedy there is room for vast debate, but maybe insufficient time to have that debate. Sometimes emergency action is required.
Levinson: "Another form of this 'authoritarianism,' which is also equivalent to tradition-based notions of legitimacy, is 'originalism,' particularly of the non-Balkinian non-dynamic variety."
I'm confused here. I would have thought that David Strauss's common-law constitutionalism was the paradigm of tradition-based legitimacy. And you say you don't like that, for Bentham's reasons. But you also say that it's equivalent to non-dynamic originalism. But Strauss's view is based on a rejection of the Bentham-Hobbes law-as-command-from-sovereign view, which he takes to underlie originalism. I mean, saying that we should obey the Constitution because the Founders had legitimate authority, and dead-hand problems don't matter, is the antithesis of tradition-based legitimacy, right? And isn't that what non-dynamic originalists tend to do? (FWIW, I've got my own present-Article-VI-oath-based brand of semi-dynamic semi-originalism, not that anyone around here hasn't heard about that already.)
Not only is there no reason to believe that Bush, Harvard MBA though he may be, knows more about the economy that the rest of us do; it is also the case that he has, notoriously and flagrantly, throughout his Administration, been almost totally uninterested in what genuine "authorities" think about all sorts of issues, ranging from how many troops might be necessary effectively to occupy Iraq--goodbye, Gen. Shinseki because you're not fitting the party line--to global warming to.....
I would suggest that you give too much credence to citations to authority, especially since many of the "authorities" to which you cite ended up being wrong. Your citation to certain military brass is a great illustration of the logical fallacy of citation to authority. To start, you need to understand that the military is a bureaucracy and its officer corps largely careerist bureaucrats. There is a truism among military historians that generals are a conservative lot who often refight the last war, even when circumstances have changed. This was the case in Afghanistan and Iraq. Much of the brass argued that the SF and the Northern Alliance with air support could not take down the Taliban in Afghanistan where the British and Russians failed before. They were wrong. The Taliban fell within weeks. Much of the brass argued that we could not take down Saddam and then win the occupation with less than 500,000 troops and even then we would suffer tens of thousands of KIA doing so. They were wrong. We took down Saddam with around 100.000 troops and a couple dozen KIA and won the war against the insurgency with around 165,000 troops and around 3400 KIA. The brass prior to Petreus argued that we needed to keep our troops off the Iraqi streets and withdraw from Iraq in order to win the war. They were wrong. The result of that strategy was the 2006 al Qaeda Tet style offensive. In fact, as General Petreaus has demonstrated, we needed more US troops on the street protecting he citizenry from al Qaeda and the Shia militias. Yesterday, Professor Mack Owens offered an excellent op-ed where he argues how the brass to which you approvingly cite almost lost the Iraq War. The moral is that you should not park your own ability to rationally discern the truth in a citation to some authority. Look at the evidence and make up your own mind.
The thing is Mourad, this crisis didn't just pop out of clear bluue sky, and I haven't seen anything that would lead me to believe that anything we do in the short term is gauranteed to accomplish anything real.
Meanwhile, the one thing I know for sure is that the Bush administration isn't a solution to anything, and no matter how the elections turn out, both the new administration AND the 111th Congress stand to be a substantial improvement over the status quo.
After reading the comments, I'm confused. Are we talking about intellectual authority? In which case, the answer is a resounding no!
If it's political authority, obviously the answer again is no, because it appears that even the people in his own party aren't paying any attention to Bush (or his VP, or his speechwriters, or his congressional liaisons.) If it's moral authority, the speech didn't seem to claim any -- it basically consisted of another "be afraid! give us your support or die!" rant. As for legal authority, heaven help us if anything granting more legal authority to this incompetent, power-grabbing bunch of mayberry machiavellis passes. It seems the more authority they obtain, the more catastrophic the result they achieve.
Look at the evidence and make up your own mind.
# posted by Bart DePalma : 10:52 AM Indeed. There was no WMD. There was no Iraq connection with Al Qaeda. We have now pissed away thousand of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars for nothing. Your claims of victory in Iraq are absurd.
Mr. DePalma,
SEN. LEVIN: General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war? GEN. SHINSEKI: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think -- SEN. LEVIN: How about a range? GEN. SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point -- something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground- force presence. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Shinseki you are lying. Shinseki said the occupation force would have to be several hundred thousand soldiers. These soldiers were required to hold territory and protect against ethnic tensions flaming up. far from wrong, Shinseki was prescient. arguably, we have since secured the stability in Iraq. however, no one can honestly say it would not have been easier if a larger force had been there to occupy the country, and hopefully wouldn't have taken five years of stupidity. after all the blood that has been shed, both American and Iraqi, it takes an especially repugnant person to pretend like the right decisions were made, and Shinseki was wrong. do you seriously contend more troops wouldn't have been better, or potentially completed the mission quicker? do you seriously think that the half-assed, incompetent occupation, that has cost us 4032 lives (the invasion up to "Mission Accomplished" only cost us 139 lives), would not have been cheaper in blood and treasure had we not followed Shinseki's advice? if you want to argue the merits of this war, feel free. but to claim that the authorities cited by Prof Levinson were wrong is simply dishonest and despicable. History has already demonstrated we would have been better off had we followed Shinseki's opinions. you should be ashamed of yourself.
Charles Gitting wrote:-
"The thing is Mourad, this crisis didn't just pop out of clear bluue sky, and I haven't seen anything that would lead me to believe that anything we do in the short term is gauranteed to accomplish anything real.", Charles, I think we share a broadly similar attitude to the Administration. If you have followed anything I have said about this crisis, one of the points I have been making is that the signs of impending collapse have been there for anyone reasonably well-informed for quite some months. I very much believe there is a case to be made that the Administration well knew this was coming, believed its onset could be delayed until after the election and deliberately delayed in the hope that it would be a poison pill for the next administration. The Toxic Texan is in my book quite mean and petty minded enough to want to do that to McSame just as much as he would to Obama. However, legislation is for the Administration to request and the Congress to write and there is no constitutional mechanism in place to circumvent that. The Congress seems to be showing a healthy degree of scepticism - a working draft of a compromise bill drafted on the Hill appeared briefly on one of the blogs I look at but, has sadly been taken down again, but it looked as if real progress was being made. What matters for the purpose of the "witch doctoring" of the world markets is that a bill becomes law. I don't imagine for one moment that a whole lot of money will need to be spent in the 40 days before the election - or indeed during the transition - and given the tenure of Senior Senators, I strongly suspect the same leadership will be in place on the Hill after the election as before - the generic down-ticket lead for Democrats on Real Clear Politics is a straight 10 points. Further Paulson and Bernanke would not dare make statements too out of line with what other treasury ministers and central bankers are saying and thinking. There will be a life after Bush and their credibility is on the line too.
you should be ashamed of yourself.
# posted by nerpzillicus : 11:59 AM Good luck with that. This scumbag appears to have no shame.
nerpzillicus:
Try reading for comprehension before you call me a liar. I stated: Much of the brass argued that we could not take down Saddam and then win the occupation with less than 500,000 troops... In fact, the CENTCOM OPLAN 1003-98 to invade Iraq offered to the Sec Def required an order of battle of 500,000 troops. My post did not refer to Gen. Shinseki's claim that "several hundred thousand soldiers" would be required to successfully occupy Iraq. However, Gen. Petreaus' success has since shown Shinseki's estimate to be grossly overstated and wrong. do you seriously contend more troops wouldn't have been better, or potentially completed the mission quicker? Yes. 1) 500,000 or more troops would have committed nearly all of our world wide combat forces. There would have been no rotations out to rest and refit. As a result, our troops would have been degraded after the 15 months or so of war. This does not even reach the problem that we would not be able to react to any other world crisis. 2) Gen. Petreaus demonstrated that he could do the job in about a year with less than a third of the troops. do you seriously think that the half-assed, incompetent occupation, that has cost us 4032 lives (the invasion up to "Mission Accomplished" only cost us 139 lives), would not have been cheaper in blood and treasure had we not followed Shinseki's advice? No. The problem was far more that the military had forgotten how to fight and win a counter insurgency war than it was a lack of troops. If we had moved 500,000 troops into more US bases and continued the failed strategy of keeping them out of the Iraqi neighborhoods, we still would have lost as we were losing in 2006. Gen. Petreaus literally rewrote the book on counter insurgency and showed that the US can win a counter insurgency in fairly short order by applying classic counter insurgency precepts to deny the enemy the shelter of the population.
We face a financial crisis. Where is Obama? Holed up in a hotel room cramming for an exam on foreign affairs. Would he have "authority" in late January were he elected? If so, why doesn't he have it now? If he has it now, why doesn't he use it? Why is he running to McCain, trying to get McCain to agree to a deal. Why are the Democrats insisting that they won't vote for a deal unless McCain votes for it, but not saying they won't vote for a deal unless Obama votes for it? Does McCain have "authority"?
I think the issue of political authority is a complex, dynamic process. A candidate has to develop a relationship with the citizens in which they generally come to trust him/her to know what s/he's doing and to supervise a solution to the problem. Once in office, the officeholder has to prove a managerial competence as issues arise. This does NOT mean the officeholder has to be an expert on each crisis; that's impossible. It does mean that s/he has to understand the crisis, not just mouth words given by someone else. The ability to grasp a crisis and manage it is what creates political authority.
Unelected officials such as Bernanke and Paulson have no political authority. They only have expertise. The body politic has never entered into a relationship of trust with them. Their only possible political authority is derivative (exactly the right word in this case) of the trust in George W. Bush. Prof. Levinson is right that Bush has no political authority left. It doesn't matter that Bernanke, say, is "really" in charge. People generally don't know Bernanke and certainly never voted for him. To the extent the majority trusts him (assuming they do), it's only because Bush says they should do so. Bush having demonstrated repeatedly that he personally does not know what he's talking about, and having a track record of failure when it comes to his agents (Rumsfeld, Brownie, scads of others), can't give Bernanke or Paulson any political authority. That's the only authority which counts in this situation.
Where is Obama?
You gotta love the wingnuts. When Obama went to Europe earlier this year, he got accused of being "uppity". Now that everyone can see that the Republicans have fucked up the financial system, they're screaming for Obama and the Dems to bail them out. Perfectly captures the Catch-22 nature of the Republican "mind".
Mourad wrote:
There will be a life after Bush and their credibility is on the line too. Their credibility is on the line, but with respect to life after bush, maybe and maybe not. Given the nonstop failure train the bush admin has been, in particular with respect to appointees, one is left to wonder what their life expectancy might be. After failing at Katrina, Iraq, and now the economy, even if they manage to pull off a save, the sheer weight of bush's failures my prove to political cement galoshes for them.
On the subject of Mr. McCain's authority on this subject, Bob Shieffer on CBS News reports:
I am told, Maggie, that the way McCain got involved in this in the first place, the Treasury Secretary was briefing Republicans in the House yesterday, the Republican conference, asked how many were ready to support the bailout plan. Only four of them held up their hands. Paulson then called, according to my sources, Senator Lindsey Graham, who is very close to John McCain, and told him: you’ve got to get the people in the McCain campaign, you’ve got to convince John McCain to give these Republicans some political cover. If you don’t do that, this whole bailout plan is going to fail. So that’s how, McCain, apparently, became involved. He has gotten what he wants, he’s going to have this meeting, kind of a summit today with the president and Barack Obama. I’m told that the leaders of both parties are getting close to having some kind of a bill. The question, though, is whether rank-and-file Republicans, especially, are going to vote for this. Remember that this is the same CBS News division which published forged documents against Bush before the 2004 vote. These are hardly friends of the GOP.
On the subject of the relative authority on the subject of Bush, McCain and their critics, Fox News is offering this timeline with video statements by the players on each side.
Oh Mourad, there's no question that I'm generally pretty sympathetic to your views.
But this is just another case where I'm not willing to give the Republicans any credit at all. These are folks who pretend to believe in things like "free markets", "competition", and "risk-taking", when in fact they are thieves, murderers, torturers, racists, religious bigots, and pathological liars. If in fact they want a bi-partisan compromise here, my suggestion would be that they all resign their offices right now and let care-taker President Pelosi work one out. If they were really sincere about any of this, that would be pretty much automatic, but all we're seeing here are the usual excuses, scams, and political spin. There simply is no reason to trust these people or to cooperate with them: they are nothing but enemies of the United States and humanity as a whole -- the only difference between them and Al Qaeda is that they are a lot more dangerous than Al Qaeda is. * Aside: Anyone who thinks the "occupation" (i.e. RAPE) of Iraq is a "success" even now is simply an idiot or a liar.
Much of the brass argued that the SF and the Northern Alliance with air support could not take down the Taliban in Afghanistan where the British and Russians failed before. They were wrong. The Taliban fell within weeks.
... and the Taliban are the de facto power in a large portion of Afghanistan and bin Laden escaped. Not to say that a full-scale invasion, not done "on the cheap" paying off people who will readily be paid off, wouldn't have been a blood-bath ... or even that such would have been more successful than Britain or the USSR. But to call Afghanistan a "success" is to defy reality..... Cheers,
Thomas:
We face a financial crisis. Where is Obama? Holed up in a hotel room cramming for an exam on foreign affairs.... Back away from the AM radio slooooowwllllyy. This is RW lies (yeah, I know, "Bart" claimed this he other day, but he's a dishonest eedjit too). Cheers,
bitswapper:
Their credibility is on the line, but with respect to life after bush, maybe and maybe not. Given the nonstop failure train the bush admin has been, in particular with respect to appointees, one is left to wonder what their life expectancy might be. After failing at Katrina, Iraq, and now the economy, even if they manage to pull off a save, the sheer weight of bush's failures my prove to political cement galoshes for them. The Heritage Foundation and the AEI have scads of money (well, maybe, not so much any more?), and lots of "positions" open. Then there's "lobbyist" jobs. What counts is not performance here, but access and money. Cheers,
Arne Langsetmo said...
The Heritage Foundation and the AEI have scads of money (well, maybe, not so much any more?), and lots of "positions" open. Then there's "lobbyist" jobs. What counts is not performance here, but access and money. I was thinking in terms of keeping their jobs post-bush. It just seems as if the bush stench of failures from Iraq to Katrina would politically stick to them, since Jr. appointed them. All he would need to do to seal their political fate is any folksy utterance about how good a job they're doing. And given bush's complete lack of ability to learn, I wouldn't really be surprised. But yeah, I would think they could pay the bills as lobbyists or tank thinkers. Hell, they could even write books on how to 'fix' an economy. Not only is there no reason to believe that Bush, Harvard MBA though he may be, knows more about the economy that the rest of us do; it is also the case that he has, notoriously and flagrantly, throughout his Administration, been almost totally uninterested in what genuine "authorities" think about all sorts of issues, ranging from how many troops might be necessary effectively to occupy Iraq--goodbye, Gen. Shinseki because you're not fitting the party line--to global warming to..... Bart DePalma said: ... I would suggest that you give too much credence to citations to authority, especially since many of the "authorities" to which you cite ended up being wrong. Your citation to certain military brass is a great illustration of the logical fallacy of citation to authority. ... My post did not refer to Gen. Shinseki's claim that "several hundred thousand soldiers" would be required to successfully occupy Iraq. However, Gen. Petreaus' success has since shown Shinseki's estimate to be grossly overstated and wrong. what other military authority did Prof Levinson cite to other than Shinseki? I only see his name there. Where did CENTCOM come from, you didn't mention them in your post and neither did Levinson? Now you are really being dishonest. 1) 500,000 or more troops would have committed nearly all of our world wide combat forces. There would have been no rotations out to rest and refit. As a result, our troops would have been degraded after the 15 months or so of war. This does not even reach the problem that we would not be able to react to any other world crisis. 2) Gen. Petreaus demonstrated that he could do the job in about a year with less than a third of the troops. 1 - then we didn't have enough troops to do it in the first place. this statement does not address whether the occupation would have been smoother, but only whether we should have done it. an interesting debate, but not the point. 2 - only after the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad, the Sons of Iraq, power outages, sunni/shia violence and the looting. But yeah, Iraq December 2006 was exactly the same as Iraq, May 2003. That doesn't prove anything except that Petreaus has handled the situation he was given very well. But that certainly doesn't show that on May 1, 2003, 300,000 troops wouldn't have produced a better and less costly occupation than the one we have had. Come on, that's simple logic. Petraus' success does not, one iota, negate the correct opinions of Shinseki. The problem was far more that the military had forgotten how to fight and win a counter insurgency war than it was a lack of troops. If we had moved 500,000 troops into more US bases and continued the failed strategy of keeping them out of the Iraqi neighborhoods, we still would have lost as we were losing in 2006. Gen. Petreaus literally rewrote the book on counter insurgency and showed that the US can win a counter insurgency in fairly short order by applying classic counter insurgency precepts to deny the enemy the shelter of the population. a fair enough and debatable point. but the issue that putting 300,000 troops on the ground addresses is perhaps it prevents the insurgency. If we had security and service back up quickly, the people may have been more responsive. the sooner we can put their lives back together, the sooner we can get out. the Iraqis were genuinely happy to see Saddam gone, but then we overstayed our welcome by not getting life back to normal for them, and that can almost be completely attributed to a lack of personnel (and incompetence and idealogical blinders by the Bush Admin). when people have food, power, trash services, and jobs, they are less likely to get angry and create an insurgency (for at least a time). i still think the war was a bad idea and should not have been done. that being said, if you are gonna do it, do it right. a much larger force would almost certainly created better conditions for success (though that could have always been overcome by Bushian incompetence).
nerpzillicus said...
what other military authority did Prof Levinson cite to other than Shinseki? Once again, re-read my post. I addressed several brass errors on multiple topics beyond the Shinseki testimony. The purpose of this was two-fold: 1) to point out the hazards of relying upon the logical fallacy of citation to authority and 2) as a back hand slap at Sandy's claim without evidence of "two disastrous wars." If I meant to address the Shinseki errors in particular, I would have done so as I did in my response to your original post. BD: 1) 500,000 or more troops would have committed nearly all of our world wide combat forces. There would have been no rotations out to rest and refit. As a result, our troops would have been degraded after the 15 months or so of war. This does not even reach the problem that we would not be able to react to any other world crisis. 1 - then we didn't have enough troops to do it in the first place. this statement does not address whether the occupation would have been smoother, but only whether we should have done it. an interesting debate, but not the point. If the troops are degraded for lack of rest and refit, then by definition the occupation would not have gone smoother. I am sorry I did not spell that out for you. BD: 2) Gen. Petreaus demonstrated that he could do the job in about a year with less than a third of the troops. 2 - only after the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad, the Sons of Iraq, power outages, sunni/shia violence and the looting. But yeah, Iraq December 2006 was exactly the same as Iraq, May 2003. That doesn't prove anything except that Petreaus has handled the situation he was given very well. But that certainly doesn't show that on May 1, 2003, 300,000 troops wouldn't have produced a better and less costly occupation than the one we have had. Come on, that's simple logic. Petraus' success does not, one iota, negate the correct opinions of Shinseki. You are tap dancing now. 1) Shinseki claimed the several hundred thousand soldiers would be "required" for victory. Petreaus won with less than one third of the "required" troops. By definition then, Shinseki was wrong. 2) There is no evidence that additional troops beyond the 160,000 would have brought victory any sooner. Indeed, as I pointed out to you, overloading the troops would have degraded their effectiveness. You are subscribing to the Russian way of war where the strategy is to win through numbers even though the Russian troops are largely rendered ineffective in the process. This is not the US way of war and i dare say that we have a better track record than Russia of cost effectively winning wars.
You are tap dancing now.
# posted by Bart DePalma : 3:32 PM Only if by "tap dancing" you mean "debunking my idiocy".
You are subscribing to the Russian way of war where the strategy is to win through numbers even though the Russian troops are largely rendered ineffective in the process.
Speaking of tap dancing... This was an occupation, not a war, you asshole. nerpzillicus said... what other military authority did Prof Levinson cite to other than Shinseki? Once again, re-read my post... i have read your post - re-read Prof Levinson's. you criticize his reliance on "authorities" but the only one he cites is Shinseki. So either you are unfairly attributing other authorities to him, or you need to re-read his post. BD: 1) 500,000 or more troops would have committed nearly all of our world wide combat forces. There would have been no rotations out to rest and refit. As a result, our troops would have been degraded after the 15 months or so of war. This does not even reach the problem that we would not be able to react to any other world crisis. 1 - then we didn't have enough troops to do it in the first place. this statement does not address whether the occupation would have been smoother, but only whether we should have done it. an interesting debate, but not the point. If the troops are degraded for lack of rest and refit, then by definition the occupation would not have gone smoother. I am sorry I did not spell that out for you. Again, your real point is that you couldn't do an occupation if your assumption is correct. that means we should not have done it. Further, if the occupation was completed in 15 months, then by definition, the troops could have return for rest permanently. moreover, perhaps the force could have been reduced quicker. no matter what, your argument is silly and misleading, and assumes the antithesis of the point made by a larger occupation force - we wouldn't have to be there for five years. BD: 2) Gen. Petreaus demonstrated that he could do the job in about a year with less than a third of the troops. 2 - only after the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad, the Sons of Iraq, power outages, sunni/shia violence and the looting. But yeah, Iraq December 2006 was exactly the same as Iraq, May 2003. That doesn't prove anything except that Petreaus has handled the situation he was given very well. But that certainly doesn't show that on May 1, 2003, 300,000 troops wouldn't have produced a better and less costly occupation than the one we have had. Come on, that's simple logic. Petraus' success does not, one iota, negate the correct opinions of Shinseki. You are tap dancing now. 1) Shinseki claimed the several hundred thousand soldiers would be "required" for victory. Petreaus won with less than one third of the "required" troops. By definition then, Shinseki was wrong. me tapdancing? seriously? answer one question - was Iraq, Dec 2006 the same situation as Iraq, May 2003? If no, then Patreaus' success is inapposite to the potential of a Shinseki occupation force (and, while I give a great deal of credit to Petreaus, I refuse to call it "victory" yet. much like your prognostications on the 2006 and this year's elections, it would probably be wiser to not count your chickens until they hatch). if you say yes, then I have some AIG stock to sell you. trust me, its the same today as it was three and a half years ago. 2) There is no evidence that additional troops beyond the 160,000 would have brought victory any sooner. Indeed, as I pointed out to you, overloading the troops would have degraded their effectiveness. if there is no evidence that it would have succeeded, then how can you claim Shinseki is wrong? (and avoid the fallacious "Petreaus proved him wrong" schtick. Unless you are taking me up on the AIG stock, that argument is gone). if you are arguing lack of evidence, than you, by definition, are recognizing your initial assertion is incorrect. You are subscribing to the Russian way of war where the strategy is to win through numbers even though the Russian troops are largely rendered ineffective in the process. This is not the US way of war and i dare say that we have a better track record than Russia of cost effectively winning wars. in Germany, WWII occupation, Ike had 1,622,000 troops for occupation, one for every 40 Germans. So yes, the US has a history of high numbers soldier occupation. further, this is an argument about the proper number of troops for a successful occupation, not winning the war. that is what Shinseki was asked, and ignoring him is the second colossal mistake the admin made (going in was the first).
nerpzillicus said...
answer one question - was Iraq, Dec 2006 the same situation as Iraq, May 2003? If no, then Patreaus' success is inapposite to the potential of a Shinseki occupation force (and, while I give a great deal of credit to Petreaus My friend, in deference to Sandy's desire to keep to his topic, let's make this the last post on this side topic. Think about what you are arguing here for a moment. We both know that December 2006 was far worse than December 2003. It took 165,000 troops to achieve victory in 2007. Thus, if the situation was more favorable in December 2003, it should have taken the same number of 165,000 or fewer troops using the same counter insurgency strategy to achieve victory in 2004. It certainly would not have taken more troops to win in 2004 than it did in 2007. BD: You are subscribing to the Russian way of war where the strategy is to win through numbers even though the Russian troops are largely rendered ineffective in the process. This is not the US way of war and i dare say that we have a better track record than Russia of cost effectively winning wars. in Germany, WWII occupation, Ike had 1,622,000 troops for occupation, one for every 40 Germans. So yes, the US has a history of high numbers soldier occupation. We had 1,622,000 troops in Germany in 1945 because that is how many it took to defeat the Wehrmacht and a far smaller permanent force to hold Germany against the Soviets, not because that is how many troops it took to occupy the country. You can continue this on your own if you want. This is my last post on the subject.
Bart,
Are you saying that you are suspending your posting? Which thread will you focus on until that issue is settled? Thank you, Fraud Guy
"Shinseki said the occupation force would have to be several hundred thousand soldiers. These soldiers were required to hold territory and protect against ethnic tensions flaming up. far from wrong, Shinseki was prescient."
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Absolutely right. Shinseki knew what he was talking about. Bart with his sole active duty military experience being (he says) a short tour in Desert Storm in the rank of chinless wonder should well know the Desert Sabre ground offensive defeated the Iraqi Army in a mere 100 hours. But the objective was not to overthrow the régime nor to occupy the country. The British Army has institutional memories of Iraq going back to the battles against the Turks in WW1, the inter-war occupation, WW2 and garrisoning right up to the 1950's. See this page about refurbishment of the War Graves Commonwealth War Graves Commission - Iraq Few now remember that the occupation burden was largely borne by the Army of British India - to the extent that the Rupee was the official currency of Iraq until 1932. It initially took nearly a million men to keep Iraq under any semblance of proper order, say 500,000 these days given improvements in mobility since then. The problem is that Bart has absolutely no experience of occupation, peace enforcement or peacekeeping, but on the strength of his very limited active service he considers himself entitled to pontificate about all matters military with all the dogmatism of ignorance. Frankly, as someone who used to train young officers for peacekeeping and peace enforcement in urban areas, if I had had the misfortune to participate in Bart's training, I think I would have been compelled to recommend his reassignment to a logistics depot somewhere as remote as possible - say, the North of Scotland (or the Falkland Islands) and preferably in charge of counting railway sleepers or sheep, or something of that nature - nothing critical. With his attitudes I think he would have been a walking disaster on active foot patrols in potentially unfriendly urban areas. Still, I am gratified we have at least obtained from him a commitment not to post further on the subject of the Iraq War. Reverting to Professor Levinson's subject - I wonder precisely in what sense the word "authority" is being used. If my memory serves me correctly "auctoritas" was in Roman law the power of the senate or a praetor to confirm a proposal placed before the approving instance. In that sense it is surely the case that a president has the "authority" to sign into law a bill proposed by the senate, whereas I suppose executive orders would equate to the exercise of "potestas" or "imperium" because they are in theory self-originating rather than being proposed by another. But in the modern usage, "authority" can be used firstly in a legal sense eg: "taking away a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner or other lawful authority" [the charge for a petty crime referred to in British Magistrates' Courts as "twocing" as in Clerk of Court to the Bench: "The next matter for Your Worships is a young man who is charged with 3 counts of twocing" - Chairman: "Why can't these people get wheels of their own? Very well put him up, let's see if he has anything novel to say on the subject." or in references to precedent - "Has Your Lordship had the opportunity to glance through my bundle of Authorities - I'm sure Your Lordship will be utterly familiar with most of them...-thinks, "some hope!"]. Is there not also a wider sense of moral "authority"? The Encylopedia of Social Sciences defines "authority" as "the capacity, innate or acquired for exercising ascendancy over a group", although, for me, that definition is so woolly as to be meaningless. But insofar as there is that other meaning, that the President of the United States has the authority (auctoritas - imperium) pertaining to that office, but the individual George W. Bush has wholly forfeited the right to exercise any moral authority he might once have had.
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