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Tuesday, September 30, 2008

How the Financial Crisis is Reshaping Democratic Politics: Term Limits Reconsidered (written with Elizabeth Garrett)

Rick Pildes

The financial crisis is already reshaping electoral politics even in the short term. The crisis appears to have transformed the presidential race, with Sen. Obama apparently moving ahead substantially during the last two weeks, at least for now, directly as a result. Now, we are seeing another consequence: the crisis appears to be the final catalyst in the decision of New York’s Mayor Bloomberg to attempt to seek a third term in office and to get the city to modify the term-limits law that would otherwise prohibit him from doing so. Although Mayor Bloomberg has been contemplating this action for some time, the crisis is suddenly providing enough support from those who had been principal proponents of the term-limit law (such as Ronald Lauder) to conclude that the times require modifying the law. The seriousness of the current economic situation is thus prompting a re-assessment of thought about how to organize government. Mayor Bloomberg is betting that voters will now prefer the values of stability and experience over the desire for fresh blood, turnover, and change that characterized the term limit movements of the 1990s.

With respect to the specific issue of term limits, then, this is a good time to take stock of what we have learned from the last decade’s experience. A term-limits movement swept the country in the early 1990s, when 21 states adopted term limits for state legislators. Some local governments, including New York City, rode this wave. In a 1993 referendum, voters changed the New York City Charter to bar officials, including the mayor, from serving more than eight consecutive years. One of the primary goals, according to the new Charter, was the return of “citizen representatives” who would be responsive to the “needs of the people and not career politicians.”

One conclusion is clear: term limits have not ushered in the era of the citizen-politician, the romantic figure who would serve in government briefly, then return to private life. Instead, politics is now a game of musical chairs played by political careerists, not amateurs, who move from office to office. These careerists are more likely to be women or under-represented minorities than before, but term limits only accelerated changes that were inevitable in light of demographic shifts. Regardless of their gender or background, term-limited officials are still ambitious politicians who hope to move from local to state to federal government over the course of a long career.

Knowing that they will have to move to different jobs in just a few years affects the way term-limited politicians approach their current jobs. Term-limited officials are particularly eager to single themselves out immediately to ensure they have a brand name when they have to run as a newcomer for a different office. Thus, term-limited legislators push to enact laws quickly; they are unwilling to spend their early years learning the ropes; and they are impatient with time-consuming negotiation and compromise necessary to craft comprehensive and considered reform. As political scientists Thad Kousser and Bruce Cain found in their study of the California legislature under term limits, “[n]ew legislators must learn faster, take more responsibility sooner, and operate with fewer personal relationships than legislators in the past.”

One area profoundly affected by legislative term limits has been the budget process. Constructing the budget of a large city or a state is a complicated matter of both substance and political give-and-take. Success requires compromise within the legislature and between the legislative and executive branches. Term-limited officials lack the time to develop either the expertise or the connections to other political actors that budgeting demands. Moreover, a shortened time horizon feeds the tendency of politicians to cope with fiscal challenges with short-term fixes rather than structural change.

On the other hand, one potentially beneficial change in legislative behavior is that term-limited legislators may spend less time working to secure pork for their constituents, particularly toward the end of their terms in a particular office. Instead, legislators spend that time in “position-taking and legislative showboating” designed to position them for their next political office, according to a study by Professors Carey, Niemi and Powell. It’s not clear that voters are more enthusiastic about this legislative behavior than they were about pork-barrel politics.

In short, the consensus view is that while the disasters some opponents of term limits predicted have not occurred, there is little evidence of improved policymaking. Term limits exacerbate some of the pathologies of the political process, such as overly quick policy responses and insufficient deliberation on difficult problems, as well as discourage politicians from considering long time horizons when evaluating policy. There may be new faces and renewed energy in institutions with term limits, but that seems to come at the cost of effectiveness and a transfer of power to more experienced lobbyists and staffers. In the 2000s, two states repealed the term-limit laws they had adopted a decade earlier. Four state supreme courts held their states’ term limits unconstitutional. No new state term limits have been adopted since 2000.

The studies have focused on term limits for legislators. But it seems fair to conclude that executives limited to one or two terms will also have less time to develop policy and procedural expertise. New executives must quickly develop the relationships that enable compromise; the risk exists that they will focus on their next political race to the detriment of their constituents in the office they hold. The question is whether these losses in institutional memory and skill are counterbalanced by some advantage unique to term limits for executives.
Although 37 states limit gubernatorial terms, many large cities do not impose term limits on mayors: Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, Baltimore, Milwaukee, Seattle, Cleveland, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Miami and others. But some large cities were caught up in the general term-limits wave of the early 1990s and adopted these mayoral limits. In addition to New York, these large cities include Los Angeles, San Diego, Dallas, Phoenix, and Denver (some cities, like San Francisco and Kansas City, had imposed term limits for mayor before the 1990s). Arguably, distinct reasons exist to favor term limits for executives, even if not for legislators. Executives often have the power to make decisions unilaterally, unlike a single lawmaker, and term limits may operate in this context to combat the corruption that can go hand-in-hand with that kind of power. If the power of incumbency is strong, term limitations may be the only way to ensure periodic turnover in the jurisdiction’s chief executive.

One final surprising lesson can be drawn from experience with state term limits. Politicians who break a promise to serve limited terms or who vote to repeal term limits tend not to face electoral backlash. Many federal legislators who reneged on their promises to return to private life were reelected to Congress. And few state lawmakers in Idaho who voted to eliminate legislative term limits felt the ire of voters, who had adopted the reform through the initiative. Thus, while experience suggests less enthusiasm for term limits now than in the early 1990s, and debate continues about the costs and benefits of limited terms for different offices, the most realistic effect of term limits may be to raise the bar for officials seeking to serve beyond a pre-set number of terms: they must be well-regarded enough to overcome the partial hit they take for changing a term-limits law, but if they are, voters are unlikely to punish them on Election Day.

Mayor Bloomberg is calculating that serious times will lead voters to value experience more today than they did in the early 1990s. Even in just two weeks, the financial crisis is already having ramifications for how voters think about democracy. This is surely just the beginning.

Comments:

To what extent are the pathologies you note a function of term limits which are simply too short? What if there were limits such as 18 or 20 years?
 

I think it's interesting that the House members not running for re-election (and not running for the Senate) voted for the bailout 23-1. That suggests to me that relatively impartial observers think it is, in fact, desperately needed. Term limits would increase the number of such representatives. There are risks, too, though (see, e.g., questions about Clinton's last-day pardons; one could imagine a story about retiring Reps currying favor with future i-bank employers or something like that).
 

I think this resonates with Mark's question: Mightn't it be too soon to call the term limits experiment? Stipulate the plausible contention that term limits were successfully pushed by opportunistic elements looking to unseat incumbents rather than as a substantive commitment to the principles espoused in the rhetoric under which term limits came to exist. What might the experiment look like if embraced substantively rather than simply being a politically expedient gimmick?
 

In response to comments, I should note that Mayor Bloomberg does not want to repeal term limits, but to modify them so that a Mayor would be able to serve three terms (12 years) rather than the current two terms. In response to Chris, my tentative understanding is that there is a general correlation between length of time in Congress and support for the bailout bill: the longer a member has served, the greater the likelihood he or she voted for the bill.
 

"One final surprising lesson can be drawn from experience with state term limits. Politicians who break a promise to serve limited terms or who vote to repeal term limits tend not to face electoral backlash."

This is surprising? The whole motivation behind term limits was the perception that incumbents had become so institutionally entrenched as to render elections nearly futile. So the perception was right...
 

Yeah what Brett said.

Look, the advocates of term limits oversold their worth. But I would also add that the talent pool for government is very deep, and there's no particular reason why, say, Henry Waxman is the only person in all of West Los Angeles who is qualified to represent the area in Congress.

The point is, term limits probably do no harm and force people who have been in their seats too long to vacate them and make room for others. That's reason enough to have them.
 

As to MF's question, this calls to mind this aspect of this post:

Term-limited officials lack the time to develop either the expertise or the connections to other political actors that budgeting demands. Moreover, a shortened time horizon feeds the tendency of politicians to cope with fiscal challenges with short-term fixes rather than structural change.

Again, if term limits are 18-20 years, or there was some rotation in office requirement, would this be a problem?

The latter is important, since I do wonder if a House term limit would be that long. Likewise, again, if Obama let's say served eight years and then ran again in twelve (rotation), how bad would something like this be?

This also points to Dilan's "too long." As to Bloomberg, I'm no fan of term limits, but such a hypocritical (he was against even modification) self-interested action bothers me. I also think he thinks too much of himself if he thinks only he can save the city's bacon.

If nothing else, we saw how the old guard worked things out. Thus, the fact business supports him only impresses so much.
 

I suggest 18 years would work pretty well. According to studies I've read, it takes roughly 10 years in a profession to develop real expertise. We then want to take advantage of that training period for a reasonable period of time; recouping our investment, as it were. At the same time, we don't want permanent seats like we have today. 18 years seems like a reasonable compromise between those two poles.
 

Oh, and of course it equals 3 Senate terms, thus making both Houses of Congress subject to the same limit.
 

Though I don't know if having the same limit for both the Senate and House is a good idea, I am open to that time period being sensible. Interestingly, some also think that is about a good limit for federal judges.

I just question if a term limit law would set up such a long period for House members. As I recall, 6-12 years was popular to various limit supporters.
 

Though I don't know if having the same limit for both the Senate and House is a good idea, I am open to that time period being sensible. Interestingly, some also think that is about a good limit for federal judges.

I just question if a term limit law would set up such a long period for House members. As I recall, 6-12 years was popular to various limit supporters.


I'd favor 18 years for federal judges also. We could stagger the SCOTUS terms so that a new judge gets appointed every 2 years. That way, no single president could make appointments which dominate the Court.

Six years is too little if we want the Representatives to develop some expertise. I think we do want that. Here in CA, where we have very short limits, the result has been that the legislators become overly dependent on lobbyists and don't have the time to develop their own understanding.

Twelve years might work. I'm a little more conservative, so I go with 18, but I can see an argument for 12.
 

Three other advantages of term limits:

1) They lessen the effect of special interests on the process. Though some have questioned this, special interests/PACS have been among the loudest in opposing term limits. There must be a reason for that and the most plausible is that term limits increase their cost in capturing the loyalty of incumbents.

2) They prevent specific persons who are situated in gatekeeper roles from endlessly preventing action on their pet issues. As the population of the legislature rotates, new personnel will occupy the same gatekeeper roles and are unlikely to have the same sensitivities as the folks they replaced. In this sense, term limits for legislatures are similar to those for executives, though the scope of their gatekeeping role might be narrower in the legislature. This is a particular problem when seniority plays the dominant role in determining who fills the gatekeeper roles.

[A real life example of the second point: Rep. John Dingell (D-MI) has singlehandedly prevented a raise in CAFE standards for decades because he chairs the House Energy & Commerce Committee when the Dems are in the majority. Dingell opposes them because his district includes U.S. automakers and their suppliers and he must do so to get reelected. While there are good reasons not to raise the CAFE standards, surely the parochial interests of one congressman are not among them.]

3. They avoid putting individual voters into a Hobson's choice of having to vote for an incumbent to preserve seniority when they otherwise desperately want to throw the bum out.
 

Thus, term-limited legislators push to enact laws quickly; they are unwilling to spend their early years learning the ropes; and they are impatient with time-consuming negotiation and compromise necessary to craft comprehensive and considered reform.

This is a feature of term limits, not a bug.

Seems to me the problem of not having term limits is the temptation to wait and see if the next session produces a majority that will get you closer to the desired contours of your bill, rather then compromise now. And then when the next session gets you no closer, you decide to wait even longer.

With term limits, you know there is a finite amount of time you can wait and still have a voice in the solution (and therefore get some credit for it).

Yes, you lose some institutional knowledge as a result. But the tradeoff is that you actually get some action, even if it is less experienced action. Isn't that preferable to more experienced dithering and procrastination?
 

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