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Wednesday, September 17, 2008
George Will votes for tricameralism
Sandy Levinson
In this morning's column in the Washington Post, entitled "McCain's closing argument," George Will comes down squarely in favor of tricameralism, i.e., giving the Great Decider in the White House equal legislative power with majorities of the 435 members of the House and 100 members of the Senate. Thus he advises McCain to spend the rest of his campaign emphasizing that Congress will undoubtedly be Democratic but that he will use his veto pen to make sure that Congress can't pass any legislation not to his (and Sarah Palins?) liking. Thus Will writes,
Comments:
George Will is presumably not a stupid man; he does, after all, have a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton. But it is quite stupid to say that "voters....prefer divided government" if by that statement one suggests that a majority of Americans in fact prefer tricameralism and gridlock over the effective capacity to govern.
To start, let us see Will's explanation for this preference for divided government: Divided government compels compromises that curb each party's excesses, especially both parties' proclivities for excessive spending when unconstrained by an institution controlled by the other party. William Niskanen, chairman of the libertarian Cato Institute, notes that in the past 50 years, "government spending has increased an average of only 1.73 percent annually during periods of divided government. This number more than triples, to 5.26 percent, for periods of unified government." Sounds reasonable. Sandy, we live in a center-right country. Conservatives do not want the Government to have an "effective capacity to govern" if that means an ever larger government spending ever more of their money unless there is a super majority consensus for the expansion. In hind sight, the worst thing that ever happened to conservatism and the GOP was to give the GOP total control over the government. Absolute power corrupted absolutely and the GOP acted like a bunch of drunken libs. This conservative sort of likes the idea of the Dems nominally controlling Congress with the center-right Blue Dogs holding the balance of power, and a GOP President to run the foreign policy and choose judges. With any luck, we will enjoy gridlock on government growth for the foreseeable future.
The fact that Bart may prefer a divided government is no evidence for the proposition that a significant percentage of the American people share the preference. Divided government is an artifact of our particular form of voting system, not a "preference" of more than a fairly small number of the American people (save in the fairly trivial sense that most Democrats faced with a McCain presidency would prefer a Democratic Congress and most Republicans would have the contrary preference).
I think the defense that I'd make of Will is this: let's say that 75% of voters aren't ticket-splitters. It's probable that these voters are more ideologically committed than the rest, and that their minds in this election are already made up. The voters who are responsible for divided government are, then, disproportionately undecided or "swing" voters. So, while an appeal to gridlock might not resonate with most of the electorate, it would resonate with the voters whose votes are still on the table. Now that's a ton of supposition, but there's a certain intuitive logic to it. Though I think the big problematic assumption in that argument is that ticket-splitters split their ticket because they like gridlock. More likely, they split their ticket because they don't have strong policy preferences, but they like this Republican and that Democrat, and hence you have a split ticket.
sandy levinson said...
The fact that Bart may prefer a divided government is no evidence for the proposition that a significant percentage of the American people share the preference. Divided government is an artifact of our particular form of voting system, not a "preference" of more than a fairly small number of the American people (save in the fairly trivial sense that most Democrats faced with a McCain presidency would prefer a Democratic Congress and most Republicans would have the contrary preference). Based on the electoral evidence, it does indeed appear that the majorities of the voters who elect divided governments do share a preference - to punish excesses in governance. 1980 - Reagan election in reaction to Government growth run amok in the 70s. 1988 - Bush election was a continuation of the 80s divided government. 1994 - After a brief flirtation with unified Dem government, voters put GOP in control of Congress in reaction to tax and spending increases and the attempt to impose Hillary-care. 2006 - After a slightly longer flirtation with unified GOP government, voters returned the Blue Dog Dems to power after Bush and the GOP Congress increased spending by a third. I agree with you that folks do not vote for divided government for the sake of divided government as a positive act. Rather, installation of divided government is a negative reaction to the excesses of current governance. Then, when divided government restores a more agreeable governance, the practical voters of this country stick with the status quo because it works. Divided government is allowed under the structure of our Republic, unlike the parliamentary system that you appear to prefer, but is not a consequence of that structure. Divided government is a consequence of a fairly consistent majority of our electorate which prefers it.
Oh Bart's just concerned with the Republicans holding on to as much influence as they can by hook or by crook.
All I know is that Republican Party is a criminal organization and should be dealt with as such.
I would be curious to see any evidence that Bart might supply for the proposition that a "fairly consistent majority of our electorate" prefers it. If that were the case,then one would expect them to vote that way (i.e., split their tickets) or, at least, to engage in highly sophisticated activities,such as making contributions to some candidates of the opposite party, in order to assure that result. I know of no such evidence, though, of course, I may simply be ignorant of it.
Sandy:
I understand your point that there are partisans at each end of the spectrum who vote straight party line and want their party in control of everything. However, they do not make up electoral majorities. The electoral majorities entrenching the different parts of divided government are made up of one set of partisans and the swing voters. The proof that these ad hoc majorities prefer divided government is based on the federal election outcomes going back to the 50s.
"Bart" DePalma:
The proof that these ad hoc majorities prefer divided government is based on the federal election outcomes going back to the 50s. cum hoc ergo propter hoc at best. I think that Prof. Levinson was asking for actual cites, analysis, and reasoning. Cheers,
Something like this might be a start to an actual response to Prof. Levinson. And just a Google away, but perhaps too much 'research' for our eminently bust "Bartster"....
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It's not like the question hasn't been asked. See, for instance, this. Cheers,
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