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Sunday, June 15, 2008
Tom Wicker on choosing vice presidents
Sandy Levinson
Sunday's New York Times reprints a "classic" column by Tom Wicker not only bewailing the choice of Dan Quayle as Bush's veep, but also, and more importantly, suggesting that it is a fundamental flaw of our political system that we allow vice presidents to be picked as we do. Wicker notes that the Constitution in fact provides a perfect solution: Candidates simply don't pick veeps until after they are elected. As they are inaugurated on Jan. 20, the vice presidency will be vacant. Under the 25th Amendment, the newly inaugurated President would be authorized/required to nominate a vice president, who would be confirmed by a majority of both the House and Senate. This would presumably assure that the choice be a plausible successor to the President and not someone like Dan Quayle (or, for that matter, Geraldine Ferraro).
Comments:
So the theory is that the person who wins his or her party's nomination isn't qualified enough to pick a running mate?
It seems by definition that the winner knows more about the political winds than anyone else in their party. The idea of allowing Congress okay the first pick seems destined to disaster. You might have the opposition party in control of one or both houses, or at least powerful enough to cause trouble. Most of the constitutional corrections that I read about here seem to be based on the assumption that everyone will stop playing politics under the new scheme. We know the problems with the current arrangement, but correcting those problems doesn't necessarily produce a better system, just a different one with different problems to exploit. This is something like abolishing the electoral college. Nothing is ever said about what would happen in the event that one candidate failed to get a majority of the votes, or if the winning candidate died after election, but before taking office, or God forbid, if the winning candidate was found involved in some very questionable scandal before the electors make their final vote.
Under the 12th amendment, wouldn't electors have the right and the duty to elect a VP even if the voters of their state did not elect one? And wouldn't the Senate have the authority and duty to elect a VP if the electors failed to give any candidate a majority?
Besides that, I agree with rmadilo. Why would one assume that a VP nominated by the just elected president would be any more "qualified" than the one selected before the election? The president would still have to consider how the choice would affect his or her re-election, plus all the political factors involved in getting the person confirmed. Perhaps Quayle and Ferraro would not have been nominated under Wicker's system, but that doesn't prove that the person actually nominated would have been any better. I suspect that Quayle and Ferraro, being members of Congress, could in fact have been confirmed if they had been nominated. Certainly Cheney would have been. Finally, I would note that by the standards of "qualification" that you are apparently applying to Jindal (he has only been governor a short time, and served a few years in Congress), Obama is not qualified either.
Why would a Vice President elected by the People need approval by the Senate?
Furthermore, what makes anyone think that a Congress belonging to the other party will limit their conformation decision making to the qualifications of the VP nominee when they do not do so for judicial nominees? Indeed, perhaps a Dem Senate would rather keep McCain's VP slot open in case McCain dies and the Presidency falls to Pelosi.
the indefensibly mal-apportioned Senate
What if a state's congressional representation was tied to the number of votes cast over the previous x election cycles? Would it not be a powerful incentive for people to vote?
What if a state's congressional representation was tied to the number of votes cast over the previous x election cycles?
Would it not be a powerful incentive for people to vote? Probably not, because people who don't vote usually don't care who wins, and, if they don't care who wins, they won't care about an esoteric matter such as how many representatives their state has. The more fundamental question is why we should want to encourage people to vote. If a person doesn't care, then he is probably uninformed, and, though uninformed people have the right to vote, there is no reason to encourage them to vote.
The more fundamental question is why we should want to encourage people to vote.
Pardon me, but if you believe in the idea of democracy, or to put it another way, if you believe that people ought to be encouraged to govern themselves then I guess the answer to your question would be rather obvious. Add to that, as it is today people who do vote are not necessarily very well informed. If they were then I don't think GWB would have come close in either 2000 or 2004. But in my view this is mostly a function of our profit driven media. A for-profit news media has a limited incentive to provide actual politically relevant information to the public. What they care about is selling advertising.
If you consider voting for Bush because he seems like a guy you'd like to have a beer with, or voting against Obama because you think he's a Muslim, to constitute governing yourself, then I have no reply.
And, unless we switch to a state-run media, the media's main concern is of course going to be selling advertising, and the more viewers they get, the more advertising they will be able to sell. Nothing will change, therefore, until the public becomes dissatisfied with t.v. personalities (I won't call them "journalists") who ask candidates why they are not wearing flag pins, and stops watching them. But it is unlikely that people will become dissatisfied with the media, because the media keeps them stupid. It's a vicious circle.
Putting aside some of the EC comments, I'm largely on board with the first comment, including the value of various proposed "improvements."
Under the current regime, states could provide the people a real chance to vote for the v.p. Tying the president and v.p. together is in no way compelled. Either way, at least now the people have some direct say. Under this proposal, Congress, with all its flaws, would. Why is this better? And, it is done after the P. is elected. Who knows who s/he will pick? Likewise, if the people don't really care who the v.p. is, why would Congress, who look to their wants and desires? If the choice is so bad, and they cared, the people would vote for the other person or demand their states make the v.p. a freestanding vote as is allowed by the 12A. They do not. This is not really a flaw, if one, compelled by the Constitution.
Once again, I am im(de)pressed by the sheer complacency of my fellow Americans about the perfection of our system. For the record, I don't doubt the political sagacity of Obama or Bush (though G.H.W. Bush's pick of Quayle challenges the premise); the point is that they have every incentive at this moment to be thinking only of who will help them win the election. Picking somebody actually fit to take over the presidency is a distinctly secondary consideration, at least historically. It's all about the perverse incentives generated by our truly perverse electoral college system.
Incidentally, I think that mls is probably right that the electors would have the right to pick a vice president even in the absence of someone who actually ran for the office. What this would mean in practice is that the winning candidate would announce his/her preference after the election, and the electors would presumably faithfululy follow that preference. That might well be preferable to what we have now inasmuch as it would remove the perverse "battle-ground" or "pander to a key interest group" incentives and instead lead the president-elect to pick someone actually capable of taking over the office. And it obviously removes the problem of an opposition-controlled Congress having a say (though, if the American people have voted for a divided government, I'm not sure that it's such a bad thing that Congress could force the president to pick someone (from his/her own party) who is at least tolerable to the opposition.
I've posted this suggestion before and I'll repeat it here.
In my view, the solution to the problem of the vice-president is, pace Henry, more democracy. I propose a national vote which would work like this: 1. The vice-presidential contest would operate like a national primary, in the sense that candidates would be free to declare and to run as candidates of a particular party. 2. Those registered to vote as members of a party could vote for any candidate of their own party. Independents could vote for 1 candidate of their choosing regardless of party. 3. The ultimate VP would be the winner (plurality) of the same party as the winning President. JMHO, but this system has a number of advantages. First, it selects the VP much more democratically than the current process. Second, allowing Independents to vote minimizes the potential for the selection of party extremists. Third, limiting the winner to the same party as the winning President assures continuity if something happens to the President.
It's a vicious circle.
We agree. But Henry, your casual comments imply that you don't have any use for democracy. Good luck installing your Philosopher King. I don't think we need to switch to state run media. That would be a big mistake. We need a much better funded public media to co-exist side-by-side with commercial media. More choices, more competition for viewers, better for all of us.
Sandy:
Your critiques of the Constitution generally appear to argue for injecting more democracy into our system of government. Maybe I am slow on the uptake today, but I am having a hard time then understanding this switch concerning the choice of a vice president from our present system where the choice is submitted to a direct election to one where the choice is taken from the voters. Perhaps you would like to expand on your reasoning.
Mattski, I said nothing to imply that I would favor a philosopher-king over democracy, and I would not. All I said was that I don't see a virtue in encouraging people to vote if they are not inclined to do so. I would favor the media's educating people so that they appreciate that the outcome of elections matter; rather than focus on candidates' pastors or flag pins, the media might, for example, explain how the candidates' nominations to the federal courts and federal agencies could make a difference. Such an approach would provide an incentive to vote based on informed opinion. I see no virtue, however, in having a large voter turnout for its own sake.
Henry, voting is a habit of democracy. If you believe in democracy then let's agree to cultivate the habits of democracy. We have to crawl before we can walk.
I've heard the argument made by establishment pundits that voter apathy is a sign of contentment. I think that is a noxious load of crap. Alienation and the feeling of helplessness is not healthy and not 'contentment.' And for every person willing to vote there is a politician interested in gaining that vote. It obviously doesn't always work out for the best, but that dynamic at least offers the potential for responsive gov't.
With regard to Bart's question, it is basically fallacious to view the VP as "chosen" by the people inasmuch as almost all political scientists agree that the VP choice, at most, explains about 2% of the vote. Most people (properly) focus on the presidential candidates. So what "we the people" are doing is ratifying a basically dictatorial choice by the presidential nominee. (One might even call it a "caesarist plebiscite," a form of democracy that has little to be said for it.)
As for Garth's proposal, it is important that the VP be someone that the President is comfortable with (as well as Congress). Perhaps the solution is for the President to nominate someone for VP, subject to gaining the approval of 50% of the electorate. In any event, I continue to think there is almost nothing to be said for the current method of choosing VPs in terms of assuring that the person "a heartbeat away from the office" is someone we would be confident of having as a president (even if he/she were not a member of our particular particular party). As to Obama's experience, even his strongest supporters (of whom I am one) would not offer that as his strongest point. One might comment that John McCain, too, has not a single day's experience actually running anything. He's been a bloviating senator for many years now, which requires him to take positions, but surely not to execute anything. (Executive experience was Mitt Romney's strong suit, but it obviously didn't sell. On the Democratic side, Bill Richardson was probably the most "experienced" candidate. I leave it to others to draw what inferences they wish from this facet of the 2008 campaign season.)
I'm absolutely astounded that anybody could argue this:
As they are inaugurated on Jan. 20, the vice presidency will be vacant. Under the 25th Amendment, the newly inaugurated President would be authorized/required to nominate a vice president, who would be confirmed by a majority of both the House and Senate. This would presumably assure that the choice be a plausible successor to the President and not someone like Dan Quayle (or, for that matter, Geraldine Ferraro). The experience of the only two times this part of the amendment has been used tell you exactly what will happen. The difference between Ford's confirmation and Rockefeller's is telling. It took 4 months of very contentious hearings to confirm Rockefeller. Ford, as a long time U.S. Rep., sailed through his hearings. It really seems like a incredibly stupid idea to start the presidency with this kind of confrontation. New Presidents would be faced with taking on a "safe" choice (i.e. some prominent member of Congress) or risk having their Administration held in abeyance until the matter was settled. I'm all for making serious changes to the Constitution, but this one is just nuts. It's demonstrably worse than what we have now.
I am somewhat impressed that SL thinks his distaste for the current system is somehow mainly tied to the bare terms of the text (or how things are done) as compared to how things work in practice.
His critics here are not idealists about the possible "perfection" of our system, nor the general public. Some, like Brett, find the text supplies less wiggle room them others. Many realize amendment is less likely than tweaking the system in other ways. See what is currently the EC. But, blind idealists we are not. He does us a disserve. I'm unclear a bit about Mark Field's proposal. It seems to open up a possibility the winner will have less votes (if tied to the party of the presidential winner). I also think that if a indie v.p. wins the most votes, s/he could be the v.p. in the end. The ultimate problem is the office, not the election. Oh, and what we think of it. This is why SL's proposal is a bit besides the point. Sure enough presidents left office enough to make the v.p. matter. But, LBJ was a credible candidate for President. Ford was a leader of his party. If Reagan died, Bush senior was a credible choice. Truman turned out okay. One wonders why people trust fate? Anyway, who wants a job that only matters if tragedy strikes? Since Quayle, efforts were made to make the job matter. Cheney had the background that made many think him a credible v.p. An official bigger role for the v.p. would be useful, but again, we have worked w/i the system fairly well, the bad choices easily possible by some other system.
Obviously every single person who comments here has already made up his or her mind about whom to vote for, and obviously most of the posters here would vote for a yellow dog if it were running on the Democratic line (the others would be voting for Nader), but I have to correct Prof. Levinson's misstatement: McCain was a naval officer and had various commands, so he does in fact have a fair amount of managerial/executive experience.
I'm unclear a bit about Mark Field's proposal. It seems to open up a possibility the winner will have less votes (if tied to the party of the presidential winner).
The winner will be the person in the same party as the winning President who receives the most votes within that party. It's possible that the other party VP winner will receive more votes, but I sacrificed strict democracy for the policy of keeping the VP and President in the same party. Reasonable people can, of course, disagree about this. The reason I did it is that here in CA the Lt. Gov. can be of a different party (the candidates run separately) and that has caused problems in the past. I also think that if a indie v.p. wins the most votes, s/he could be the v.p. in the end. I didn't actually mean that Independents would be a separate category in the election. I meant only that voters who don't indicate partisan affiliation could vote in one of the party elections. This would have the beneficial effect of moderating the choices so we don't end up with party extremists in the VP role.
McCain was a naval officer and had various commands, so he does in fact have a fair amount of managerial/executive experience.
Wiki is not the most reliable of sources, but it lists only one command (as head of a flight training squadron) for a period of roughly 1 year.
I would note that by the standards of "qualification" that you are apparently applying to Jindal (he has only been governor a short time, and served a few years in Congress), Obama is not qualified either.
Hear, hear. Jindal's a Rhodes Scholar, ran the state's healthcare system, the state universities, the state itself, served in Congress, and was the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services. The man's twice as qualified as Obama.
"Jindal also apparently ran exorcisms"
Shouldn't that be a mandatory qualification for taking over Cheney's office ?
Shouldn't that be a mandatory qualification for taking over Cheney's office ?
I don't know -- I saw that movie and even the priest died.
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