Balkinization: Singer on Blackwater

Singer on Blackwater

David Luban

P. W. Singer, one of the leading experts on private military contractors, has this excellent article on Blackwater and PMCs' role. One point he highlights is how politically convenient it has been to outsource governmental functions - including military functions. It means fewer troops, therefore less public indignation; less need to mobilize National Guard and Reserves; fewer military casualties (and contractor casualties simply don't draw the same kind of public ire as military casualties; according to Singer, an estimated 1,000 contractors have been killed and 13,000 wounded). Not only does all this help civilian politicians, it also makes life easier on generals who don't have to request as many troops. Outsourcing was politically crucial in the early days of the war, because it meant that the administration didn't have to admit error in force-sizing by asking for more troops. Although Singer doesn't emphasize it, the crony capitalism aspects of the private contracts - going to such politically-connected outfits as Blackwater and Halliburton - simply adds to the attraction. Singer writes:

the amount paid to Halliburton-KBR is roughly three times what the U.S.
government paid to fight the entire 1991 Persian Gulf War. When putting other
wars into current dollar amounts, the U.S. government paid just this one firm
about $7 billion more than it cost the United States to fight the American
Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War and the Spanish American
War combined.

Posted 11:42 AM by David Luban [link]

Comments:

Outsourcing was politically crucial in the early days of the war, because it meant that the administration didn't have to admit error in force-sizing by asking for more troops.

There were no substantial number of contractors on the ground during the initial days of the conventional war. They arrived later after the removal of the Baathist dictatorship to provide static defensive security for the Coalition Provisional Authority.

To the extent that contractors were necessary to relieve regular troops of guard duty, look to both aisles of Congress which cut the Army and Marines in half after the Persian Gulf War. No matter how much you asked, the extra troops simply did not exist. Thus, whether you like it or not, the need for private contractors.

Singer writes: the amount paid to Halliburton-KBR is roughly three times what the U.S.
government paid to fight the entire 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Halliburton is not a private security firm like Blackwater, so the comparison is inapposite.

Indeed, this is a pretty silly comparison even if it was made to Blackwater. In the Persian Gulf War, our government paid only a small fraction of the operational costs of the war because other countries who contributed little or no troops paid our soldiers to fight. One could argue with a straight face that our troops (including this infantry platoon leader) were acting as "mercenaries" for the Saudis and Japanese.

the U.S. government paid just this one firm
about $7 billion more than it cost the United States to fight the American
Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War and the Spanish American
War combined.

This has gone from the silly to the outright moronic. There is no comparison between the size of these US economies and the value of the US currencies some one to two centuries ago and what it is today.

Methinks that Mr. Singer protests too much.

# posted by

Bart DePalma : 1:31 PM

This comment has been removed by the author.

# posted by

PMS_CC : 3:18 PM

Bart writes: Halliburton is not a private security firm like Blackwater, so the comparison is inapposite.

In all fairness, the scope of both the post and the article goes beyond private security firms.

This has gone from the silly to the outright moronic.

While I agree that such a comparison doesn't really make any sense, the article raises some interesting points, and why war is increasingly outsourced is more interesting than cheap flings. Should we aggressively boost the size of the military, or try harder to illicit cooperation from other countries? How effective is it to have an increasingly larger portion of a fighting force composed of groups with different operational methods, different chains of command, and possible different larger objectives fighting alongside real troops?

# posted by

John : 3:31 PM

"Bart" DePalma:

To the extent that contractors were necessary to relieve regular troops of guard duty, look to both aisles of Congress which cut the Army and Marines in half after the Persian Gulf War. No matter how much you asked, the extra troops simply did not exist. Thus, whether you like it or not, the need for private contractors.

Or alternatively (assuming arguendo "Bart"'s claim about lack of troops), the wisdom of the "cakewalk" people and the wisdom of actually starting the war....

Who's the freakin' eedjit? Right, us. For even allowing this travesty to happen. Then again, the Imperial Preznit may have done it even if we had objected. See the next thread....

Cheers,

# posted by

Arne Langsetmo : 5:52 PM

It was immediately apparent that they they slept through English class. It quickly became apparent that they slept through civics class, too. Now we learn that they slept through history class as well. We know this because anyone who's paid a modicum of attention to the past is well aware of the millenia-long and lugubrious record of mercenary soldiers.

# posted by

Unknown : 11:48 AM