Balkinization  

Monday, October 29, 2007

More on "constitutional dictatorship"

Sandy Levinson

I have earlier noted that Clinton Rossiter wrote a superb, even if disquieting, book titled Constitutional Dictatorship, very much still in print. I was also interested to discover that Carl J. Friedrich, Harvard's senior political theorist in the 1950s and '60s (indeed, I took a course from him my first year in graduate school) included a chapter on "Constitutional Dictatorship and Emergency Powers" in his widely used textbook, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practicein Europe and America. My point is that there was once a time, even within my own lifetime, when serious political scientists believed that it was as important to analyze the concepts, behaviors, and institutions linked with "constitutional dictatorship" as, say, to discuss the concepts, behaviors, and instituitons of "totalitarianism" (see, e.g., Hannah Arendt) or of "authoritarianism" (see, e.g., Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who won her job at the UN precisely by virtue of distinguishing "authoritarian" regimes from "totalitarian" ones). There is very little such discussion going on today, Perhaps this is because some of us trying to evoke the notion are (rightly) accused of being rabidly anti-Bush, but I think it's more complicated--and ominous--than that.

Both parties are now committed to "presidentialism," especially with regard to foreign and military policy, even if they have different visions of what they would have the President do. (I wonder how many political liberals are having second thoughts about Jimmy Carter's unilateral abrogation of our treaty with Taiwan, let alone Bill Clinton's unilateral warmaking in Serbia.) Only Ron Paul among the Republican candidates has any respect for what used to be traditional conservative "Whiggism" re the powers of the president relative to Congress. Rudolph Giuliani, on the other hand, is basically an out-and-out authoritarian in his conception of presidential power (which he calls "leadership"). And I really doubt that Hillary Clinton has a modest conception of presidential power with regard to foreign and military policy.

As to Makasey: Jeb Rubinfeld quotes a passage from his testimony suggesting that "what goes outside the statute nonetheless lies within the president's authority to defend the country." This, of course, brings up the primary question: must a conscientious president ever conclude that something important, perhaps even "necessary" "to defend the country" would nevertheless be unconstitutional. Or is it just the case that whatever the President believes is, what, "useful," "important," ""necessary," "absolutely necessary," to "defend the country" is, by virtue of that belief, constitutional? In such case, should we amend the oath of office to say that "I will always do whatever I believe necessary to defend the country," or is Mike Paulsen correct that this is what the oath, correctly interpreted, already means? I agree with Jed that this is a discussion very much worth having, beginning with the would-be Attorney General (and close friend of Rudy Giuliani).

Comments:

Bill Clinton's unilateral warmaking in Serbia

I think this is an unfortunate phrase in two respects. First, it was not "unilateral" in the international sense. It was a NATO operation. Second, as Prof. Lederman has argued here, Clinton complied with the OLC interpretation of the WPA.

The first issue is merely an ambiguity. The second does implicate the issues you have been discussing, but does so in what I will say for Prof. Lederman's sake is a much more nuanced way.
 

Mark,

It was unilateral because it was mostly if not solely American force and it violated international law to promote American interests. (Whether those interests were charitable is neither here nor there.)
 

It was unilateral because it was mostly if not solely American force

Putting aside the accuracy of this statement, I've yet to see this standard applied to Iraq.

it violated international law to promote American interests

You'll have to elaborate on this. Standing alone, it can't possibly be true. Also, I'm trying to imagine how this standard would apply to Iraq or even Afghanistan.
 

Wasn't the shame of the Serbian crisis that European allies of the US did not act until Clinton nudged? Europe had the direct history of WWI and WWII to heed.
 

I'm glad that someone has pointed out that among all of the presidential candidates, only Ron Paul subscribes to a fundamentally different view of the proper scope of executive authority. While the other republican and democratic candidates argue exclusively about how to apply expansive executive authority, only Ron Paul consistently states that the proper federal response to many concerns might be to do nothing. While this idea might not have appeared particularly novel to the framers, I think that it is a radical departure from the current system by which power seems to accumulate within the executive by sheer political inertia. This may be why Ron Paul appeals to so many voters who do not necessarily agree with all of his policy choices: the voters know that Ron Paul intends to make the policy preferences of the President more or less irrelevant.
 

I'm not sure that there is a penumbra of power that emanates from the commander-in-chief clause. It's not a "defend the country" clause.

From Federalist #69:

It [being CinC] would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy ...

Nothing more than being the top general. Nothing more.
 

I think that Shaq is correct that Europe certainly had nothing to be proud of with regard to the way it responded to the crisis in the South Balkans (beginning with Germany's hasty recognition of Croatia). I don't see how that entails supporting, at least without a great deal of ambivalence, Clinton's going to war without gaining prior congressional authorization. If the argument is that our commitments to NATO provided such authorization, then we should concede that opponents of multi-national security agreements in the '50s were correct in suggesting that they operated as a giant allocation of new powers to the executive. I believe that Sen. Taft opposed NATO on such grounds. (And, of course, Truman's quick entry into Korea, on grounds of obligations to the UN, reinforced such fears.)

I'm not sure that Clinton's "compliance with the OLC interpretation of the WPA" defeats the point that he behaved unilaterally, i.e., without prior authorization.
 

I'm not sure that Clinton's "compliance with the OLC interpretation of the WPA" defeats the point that he behaved unilaterally, i.e., without prior authorization.

The WPA permits Presidential use of force for a limited period of time without Congressional authorization. Thus, Clinton did not need prior authorization as long as he met the statutory requirements. Which, says OLC, he did.
 

If Clinton had sought congressional approval for Serbian action, how might Taft-like congressmen have voted? Consider the results if Clinton did not intervene because of lack of congressional approval. Certain European countries supported various factions based upon ethnic, religious, historical, etc, ties, except for the muslim communities of the former Yugoslavia. Russia had strong ties with the Serbs but was not a member of NATO. The UN was not prepared to act, what with Russia's available veto. The NATO approach by Clinton was the only means to avoid further slaughter, first of the muslims, and then .... The UN recognized its failure as the crisis was being brought under control. Again, what might have happened with the Balkans breaking apart, keeping in mind Balkan events preceding WWI and WWII. Sometimes the law can indeed "be a ass."
 

Mark Field said...

Bill Clinton's unilateral warmaking in Serbia

I think this is an unfortunate phrase in two respects. First, it was not "unilateral" in the international sense. It was a NATO operation. Second, as Prof. Lederman has argued here, Clinton complied with the OLC interpretation of the WPA.


In the context of separation of powers between the branches, Mr. Clinton pretty clearly started a war without the required declaration of war or its equivalent. While I have argued in the past that a President does not need Congress's permission to start a war when the enemy has already done so and is waging war against the United States, Serbia had never waged war against the United States or any of its allies.

Complying with the WPA is irrelevant to this question given that the WPA is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires anything more or less than a declaration of war.
 

I am pleased to see that Sandy is now applying his critiques of Presidential power beyond Mr. Bush to prior presidents of both parties. In fact, the debate of the proper line between the powers of Congress and the President has been going on since the inception of the Republic and applies to the Presidents of both parties.

While I disagree with Sandy's advocacy of an "imperial Congress," I am glad that he is adding some historical perspective to the debate.
 

This, of course, brings up the primary question whether a conscientious president must ever concluded that something important, perhaps even "necessary" "to defend the country" would nevertheless be unconstitutional. Or is it just the case that whatever the President believes is, what, "useful," "important," ""necessary," "absolutely necessary," to "defend the country" is, by virtue of that belief, constitutional?

Why, in general, is there this assumption of moral cowardice in our leadership? To believe that if something is morally/politically necessary, it must then be legal/constitutional/pre-approved in order to motivate the actor to take such an action involves the presumption that the actor lacks the fortitude to take the "necessary" illegal act, and afterwards defend herself before her peers.

It's the same assumption as in the "ticking timebomb". The promulgators of that straw-man assume that the members of our intelligence services are such fearful children, that without a warrant pre-approving torture, they would sit inactive in the face of mass-murder.

I doubt that, in general. A moral and brave individual (and aren't we all??) would take the "necessary" but unapproved action, then promptly present himself to the court and the nation to be judged. I would hope that we wouldn't elect the kind of men and women who would be afraid to face the judgement of their peers - the citizens of the nation - and if necessary go to prison, quietly and humbly, if their conscience demanded it of them.

If we expect a man to face the court for murder and justify himself before his peers when he kills another in defense of a third-party, how much more must we demand that our leadership does the same when they take radical actions in our name. And if we morally expect a man to take that risk when taking such radical actions, why would we give pre-approval, a waiver, to our political leadership?

Why do we assume that all our leaders are such sniveling cowards?
 

Prof. Levinson:

This, of course, brings up the primary question: must a conscientious president ever conclude that something important, perhaps even "necessary" "to defend the country" would nevertheless be unconstitutional[?]

I touch a bit on this general issue (is the Constitution a "suicide pact"?) in a comment on this thread, and more specifically on the precise topic of what the Constitution and the laws require (and should require) in this old post of mine. The solution is pretty easy, to be honest.

Cheers,
 

I love to see a young girl go out and grab the world by the lapels. Life's a bitch. You've got to go out and kick ass.
Agen Judi Online Terpercaya
 

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