E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
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Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
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Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
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Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
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Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
I just posted my APSA paper on SSRN. The central theme is that, to quote John Brigham and lots of other people, we have been looking for law in all the wrong places. Political scientists fail to appreciate the influence of law on constitutional decision making because they focus on judicial disagreements. The paper suggests that constitutional law has a substantial effect explaining legal agreements in the face of policy disagreements (would Sandy Levinson's polemics against the constitution make sense in a world in which constitutions meant anything) and explaining why constitutional conflicts are over some matters and not others. The abstract is below. As always, comments welcomed.
"Looking Off the Ball" details how and why constitutional law influences both judicial and public decision making. Treating justices as free to express their partisan commitments may seem to explain Bush v. Gore, but not the judicial failure to intervene in the other numerous presidential elections in which the candidate favored by most members of the Supreme Court lost. Constitutional norms and standards generate legal agreements among persons who dispute the underlying merits of particular policies under constitutional attack. These norms and standards explain constitutional criticism, why only a small proportion of the political questions that occupy Americans are normally resolved into constitutional questions, and how legislatures by making constitutionally "safe" choices may immunize their decisions from judicial scrutiny. Constitutional law structures those constitutional controversies that do take place. Constitutional debates are often quite different from other political debates because constitutional norms and standards require constitutional decision makers to treat as important phenomena that are of less interest to policy makers and attach little significance to those phenomena crucial to the underlying policy decision. Political scientists who neatly divide the justificatory world into legal norms and policy norms implicitly take sides in hotly contested interpretive debates and overlook the most important differences between elected officials and justices as constitutional decision makers.