Balkinization  

Thursday, August 23, 2007

How Many Americans Might Be Under Surveillance?

Marty Lederman

Some press stories about DNI's McConnell's El Paso Times interview, such as this one in the Washington Post, are focusing on the fact that McConnell said the U.S. is "targeting" thousands of foreigners, but fewer than 100 U.S. persons.

This may, in fact, be true, in the sense that there are fewer than 100 U.S. persons whose calls and e-mails are being specifically, i.e., "directly," intercepted (e.g., a particular tap on an American's phone, or its modern-day equivalent).

But this does not mean, as the Post suggests, that there is a "relatively low number of those under surveillance in this country." And it certainly does not mean that the new Protect America Act could only affect such a small number of U.S. persons.

The most important point is that McConnell's "fewer than 100" comment did not include all of the communications of U.S. persons that are intercepted when the surveillance is "directed at" someone overseas. Under the new law, the NSA would have the authority to intercept virtually all communications made by anyone overseas (not only suspected terrorists), as long as it could in some sense say that its surveillance was "directed at" that overseas person. This means, of course, that even if the NSA does not directly tap into every phone and computer in the U.S., the NSA could still intercept and maintain all international communications of U.S. persons, because each of those communications is, of course, with someone overseas -- and the NSA can freely intercept the latter's communications, based on no standard at all.

The key question is what happens when the NSA surveillance of foreigners -- possibly even vast surveillance of huge numbers of overseas communications -- invariably picks up communications that have a U.S. person at one end. Can the NSA listen to (or read) the U.S. person's communications? Can it maintain those? Can it share them with other government agencies? Make particular uses of them (i.e., for criminal investigations)? Does it have to satisfy any standards in order to do any of those things? Does it have to make any showing to a court with respect to any of those uses of U.S.-person communications? Is there congressional oversight? Does the Fourth Amendment impose any limits on such uses? Does the new statute supersede, and render inapposite, the existing internal Executive branch orders (e.g., USSID-18), which at least imposed minimal "minimization" requirements with respect to such foreign-to-domestic communications?

The fact that the NSA might not specifically "target" the international communications of U.S. persons without a court order, in other words -- that only 100 or so Americans are "targeted" -- is small solace if it the agency can obtain, read, use and maintain all such communications anyway, by simply saying that its surveillance is "directed" at the foreign end. And that's what the new statute appears to authorize.

Moreover, it's not even clear that the statute does not authorize warrantless surveillance "directed at" U.S. persons -- e.g., a tap on a U.S. person's phone -- so long as the government can say that such surveillance is also "directed at" the foreign persons with whom the American is communicating. Orin Kerr and others have suggested that a particular interception is necessarily either "directed at" someone overseas, or at someone in the U.S., but can't be "directed at" both. But the statute doesn't say that. The only requirement under section 1805A is that the surveillance be "directed at" someone reasonably believed to be overseas.

If, for example, the government is (genuinely) interested in the way in which a foreign scholar is influencing her American counterparts, and they know that she and I communicate, can the NSA put a tap on my phone, on the theory that the surveillance is at least in part "directed at" the foreigner? Orin thinks not. And I hope he's right. It would be nice if Congress and the Administration could agree on a statutory definition of "directed at" that would foreclose such an interpretation of 1805A. But what in the current statute would prevent such surveillance? Note that, unlike current FISA section 1802, which allows warrantless surveillance "solely directed at" foreign government communications systems here in the U.S. -- and even then, only if there is no "substantial likelihood" that such surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party -- section 1805A of the new law requires only that the surveillance be "directed at" someone overseas, not "solely" directed at them.

Again, however, this is not the main concern. Even assuming arguendo that the new statute would not allow the NSA to tap my phone and computer without court order in order to glean information about my foreign correspondents, it remains the case that under the Act the NSA could intercept all of the communications of that foreign scholar, based on no showing at all -- indeed, could make such interceptions of the foreign scholar because it is interested in the activities of Americans with whom she deals -- and could thereafter read, maintain and use all of the communications she makes with persons here in the U.S. And this is true with respect to the communications of every single person in the world who is "reasonably believed" to be overseas.

Comments:

Prof. Lederman:

Yes, a lot hinges on whether the phrase "directed at" and "targeted" are in fact synonymous under the law, and we've discussed this previously.

The fact remains that the law as written doesn't just allow for the surveillance of foreign-to-foreign communications (under the apparent theory that there might be some liability for unintentional acquisition of foreign-to-domestic communications because of technological limitations). Had they wished to clarify that and remove liability for such unintentional acquisitions (assuming that appropriate minimisation measures were in place, reviewed, and followed), they could have done so. This 'rationale' was the major thrust of the 'justifications' for the rewrite. But the rewrite did far more than that, and we have to assume that there is no limitation on at least the acquisition (and retention) of foreign-to-domestic communications without warrant. And AFAICT, that expanded ability doesn't depend on who is being "targeted" (or more specifically, whose phone number, IP address, or RADIUS login is being tapped). I suspect the concept of "targeted" has disappeared.

Cheers,
 

I asked somewhere (not sure if was here, or Volokh, or elsewhere) whether a surveillance regime could be simultaneously "targeting a US person" and "directed at a person outside the US."

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That is, probing the effect of FISA-1007 section 105A on FISA-1978's section 1801(f)(1).

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I would think that a surveillance regime that is directed at foreign persons could well capture a communication to or from a targeted person, so the two surveillance regimes have a possibility of overlap.

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A surveillance regime that aims to acquire the communications of a single identifiable person in the US will obtain the domestic and foreign communications of that person. But a surveillance regime that looks only at US--foreign communications, while it may well capture some of the communications of that person, will not capture all of the communications of that person.
 

The DNI (in the recent interview) said: "Now the second part of the issue was under the president's program, the terrorist surveillance program, the private sector had assisted us. Because if you're going to get access you've got to have a partner and they were being sued. Now if you play out the suits at the value they're claimed, it would bankrupt these companies. So my position was we have to provide liability protection to these private sector entities. So that was part of the request."

Does anyone want to comment on how this comment will effect the state secrets privilege claims in Hepting (issue recently argued before the 9th Cir.) and in the consolidated state cases (summary judgement in N.D. Cal. recently deferred pending outcome of Hepting)?

It seems likely that the state secrets claim will be weakened by an admission by a government official that not only did some private companies assist with the surveillance, but apparantly some of the specific defendants in these suits assisted. Even before this disclosure, the panel in the 9th Cir. oral argument already seemed to be leaning toward a conclusion that public disclosures about this program had limited the applicability of the state secrets or Totten docrines. In fact, one could argue that the Totten docrine (subject of suit is secret espionage agreement) is now totally inapplicable.

Is the DNI perhaps trying to force Congress to grant retroactive immunity by sabotaging the ongoing suits?
 

Sorry for the typos. Please read as "doctrine".
 

-- Is the DNI perhaps trying to force Congress to grant retroactive immunity by sabotaging the ongoing suits? --
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This isn't the first time the administration has sought a political/legislative solution to a legal problem.
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What gets under my skin is less the loss of privacy than the two-faced "you have privacy, but the bad guys don't" baloney. If the government wants to institute the modern day equivalent of censorship, where all communications are open to inspection and subsequent action, just say so and get on with it.
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Another thing that gets under my skin is that the civil penalties for invasion of privacy are to be rendered inoperative. So what other laws are "to be rendered inoperative?" at some convenient time in the future? IOW, why should anybody believe ANY so-called "limitation" that appears in a statute?
 

cboldt:

A surveillance regime that aims to acquire the communications of a single identifiable person in the US will obtain the domestic and foreign communications of that person. But a surveillance regime that looks only at US--foreign communications, while it may well capture some of the communications of that person, will not capture all of the communications of that person.

Technically, it's easier to "target" a single number than to capture all (and only) communications of a certain type (i.e., domestic-to-foreign). While a Hoover snoop on cables running under the sea might get mostly international traffic, it is nonetheless not very discriminatory.

To properly identify communications "directed at" a specific person of interest, you'd have to specify a specific 'targets' (a specific MDN as the wiretap target), and then further filter the call stream to weed out purely domestic communications, and leave only international destinations. Well and fine; you might do this through the number of the other party called, using rules about international numberign plans, but that hardly ends he inquiry in this day of telephone number portability, cell phones, and roaming. Regardless, even simple first-pass filtering is a bit more complicated than just a single number lookup and match. CALEA-compliant equipment doesn't have such advanced filtering (no legal requirement for such, and no necessity).

Cheers,
 

The smart terrorists can get around anything the NSA can throw at them. Using IP address masking and JPEG encryption. They're only going to catch the stupid ones.
 

NAL:


The smart terrorists can get around anything the NSA can throw at them. Using IP address masking and JPEG encryption. They're only going to catch the stupid ones.


This is true, and it makes the complaint that they can't tell for sure who's in the United States ring rather hollow; if they can't tell for sure even the identity of the person(s), then, well, they'll just have to tap everyone, JIC....

But FWIW, I think that the likes of al Qaeda have taken to more pedestrian counter-counter-intelligence means, using couriers, drop-outs, etc., and just assuming that the snoops (and keep in mind that the snoops in other countries, including ours) are not limited by American law) can and will tap electronic communications. No need to go as hi-tech as possible and hope for the best, when there's simple solutions to simple problems.

Cheers,
 

Arne,

I believe you are correct on the low tech solutions. IIRC, the first opfor commander in the wargaming for the Iraq invasion realized that his electronic communications would be compromised and countered, and so turned to motorcycle couriers for communications, causing no end of problems for the invading force. He did so well that they reran it using a less intelligent opfor commander.
 

Professor Lederman:

Even assuming arguendo that the new statute would not allow the NSA to tap my phone and computer without court order in order to glean information about my foreign correspondents, it remains the case that under the Act the NSA could intercept all of the communications of that foreign scholar, based on no showing at all -- indeed, could make such interceptions of the foreign scholar because it is interested in the activities of Americans with whom she deals -- and could thereafter read, maintain and use all of the communications she makes with persons here in the U.S. And this is true with respect to the communications of every single person in the world who is "reasonably believed" to be overseas

To the extent that the NSA would have any interest in such correspondence, it has always been perfectly legal to gather intelligence from foreign citizens overseas without a warrant. Foreign citizens overseas have no 4th Amendment rights and you have no reasonable expectation of privacy as an incidental correspondent with the targeted foreign citizen.

Requiring a FISC warrant to gather intelligence from foreign citizens whenever they might telecommunicate with US persons would be completely unworkable because it would preclude nearly all surveillance against the TSP's primary targets - foreign enemy commanders like KSM communicating with unidentified invading enemy terrorist cells in the US.
 

because it would preclude nearly all surveillance against the TSP's primary targets - foreign enemy commanders like KSM communicating with unidentified invading enemy terrorist cells in the US.

Because the FISC wouldn't approve a warrant to eavesdrop on an al-Qaeda commander's communications?
 

The odious position we find ourselves in, unfortunately, implicates forces which, 'once loosed, are not easily cabinned'. Even nice Democrats won't be motivated to unwind this hold the government has acquired over us.

Could the piecemeal way that this is occuring actually alter the determination of one's 'reasonable expectations' of privacy? Regardless of the objective risks, how does our partially witting compliance change the nature of our protectablerights?
 

Cboldt's skin and mine are suffering from the same itches.

Another "elephant in the room" is whether it is likely for the next administration and the one after that to a) not roll back the excesses of the current administration or b) reach for further power -- no matter which political brand is in Congress or the White House.
 

anderson:

Because the FISC wouldn't approve a warrant to eavesdrop on an al-Qaeda commander's communications?

Not without a very elaborate presentation of evidence. Providing that the NSA can even offer probable cause that the foreign target without 4th Amendment rights is an al Qaeda commander without first performing the requested surveillance, the FISC ends up with a backlog of applications for warrants which in the past reduced the intelligence gathering against foreign targets by 75%.

You simply cannot gather real time actionable intelligence to fight a war in this way.
 

Marty: Does the new statute supersede, and render inapposite, the existing internal Executive branch orders (e.g., USSID-18), which at least imposed minimal "minimization" requirements with respect to such foreign-to-domestic communications?

Are these executive-branch orders public, and if so do you have a link to them?

Minimization is often cited as a safeguard on foreign-to-domestic surveillance generally. But AFAIK there is no statutory requirement for minimization at all if the communications are deemed to fall outside FISA's scope, and thus are surveilled purely under inherent presidential authority. Do the executive orders you mention above require minimization in such circumstances?
 

JaO: Link added to USSID-18
 

... you have no reasonable expectation of privacy as an incidental correspondent with the targeted foreign citizen.

Well, that would make sense if the gummint would be nice enough to tell us which foreign citizens are being targetted. Absent that, when I call my cousin in Selbu, why shouldn't I reasonably expect that the gummint isn't listening in? Now if the maladministration would just tell me whether my cousin's being snooped, I can set my expectations appropriately.....

Hint for the slow-on-the-uptake, BTW: The gummint can't just barge in and ransack your house, and then claim after the fact that you have no "reasonable expectation of privacy" because they can do that ... and that of course they can do that because you have "no reasonable expectation of privacy". That would be circulus in demonstrando....

Cheers,
 

To the perfessres:

Would it be unreasonable to not only request that posters try t stay on topic, but also, in the interest of furthering discussion, provide appropriate cites to support assertions that are not already generally agreed to as being true? I don't want to be reduced to saying "I don't believe you; show me the evidence", but in many cases that is the only appropriate response. At the very least, some minimal requirement that people conform to a standard of argumentation that approaches standard rhetorical practises might be in order, even if we can't insist that all comments here read like briefs or law review articles....

Cheers,
 

I wanted to highlight one excerpt from the El Paso Times interview with McConnell (via Marcy Wheeler at TNH):

So I walked over to the chamber and as I walked into the office just off the chamber, it's the vice president's office, somebody gave me a copy. So I looked at the version and said, 'Can't do it. The same language was back in there.'

Q: What was it?

A: Just let me leave it, not too much detail, there were things with regard to our authorities some language around minimization.

 

Arne Langsetmo said...

BD: ... you have no reasonable expectation of privacy as an incidental correspondent with the targeted foreign citizen.

Well, that would make sense if the gummint would be nice enough to tell us which foreign citizens are being targetted. Absent that, when I call my cousin in Selbu, why shouldn't I reasonably expect that the gummint isn't listening in? Now if the maladministration would just tell me whether my cousin's being snooped, I can set my expectations appropriately.....


:::shakes head in amazement and rereads post:::

That is one brilliant suggestion!

The NSA can tell James Risen every week which foreign al Qaeda they are surveilling and the NYT can publish the information so that the al Qaeda target, their al Qaeda contacts and whoever else may be in contact with them have fair notice their conversations are being tapped.

Surreal.
 

As to showing probable cause.

IIRC, this is the lowest possible hurdle among the tiers of evidence required for legal action. Not knowing what FISC has accepted as probable cause, I have been told by different attorneys, including a prosecutor, that this is a very easy test to pass, and the published record of FISA warrant approvals tends to lead credence to this, unless it was internal controls among requestors that led to this incredible success rating.
 

The full (original) quote:

"[presumably all] Foreign citizens overseas have no 4th Amendment rights and you have no reasonable expectation of privacy as an incidental correspondent with the targeted foreign citizen [regardless of whether they're al Qaeda; they're "targeted", that oughtta be enough for you]."

Hope that places things in perspective.

Cheers,
 

Useful rule of thumb: If there is a plausible argument for this administration to read a statute as to authorize behavior, they will act as if they have the authority (without inquiry), hide the fact they are using that authority, and assert a right to do that authority (while asserting that nobody has the right to review that determination).

Note that the contrapositive (relating to when no plausible arguments exist) does not necessarily apply.
 

Arne Langsetmo said...

The full (original) quote: "[presumably all] Foreign citizens overseas have no 4th Amendment rights and you have no reasonable expectation of privacy as an incidental correspondent with the targeted foreign citizen [regardless of whether they're al Qaeda; they're "targeted", that oughtta be enough for you]."

Professor Lederman, I apologize in advance for going off topic, but this is too rich to pass on...

arne, only you can claim with a straight face to be offering a "full (original) quote" of my posts where your inserted snarks and misinformation make up almost half of the "quote."
 

The entire 4th Circuit has decided to review the split panel al Marri decision.
 

I want to pick up on Marty's reference to 1802. I think it opens an important door. I'll make two points.

First, it seems clear to me that 1805A authorizes reverse-targeting. In addition to 1802's "solely," consider all the points at which FISA uses the phrase "each of the [facilities, phones, places] at which electronic surveillance is directed." (These are 1804(a)(4)(B), 1804(b), 1805(a)(3)(B), 1805(c)(1)(B), 1805(c), and 1805(d).) The resulting set, together with 1805A, comprises all of the points at which FISA uses "directed at" in connection with surveillance. What this set makes abundantly clear is that surveillance can be aimed at more than one "directee." And it throws 1805A into relief in this regard. For there alone FISA fails to capture all the directees of a given act of surveillance within its compass and declare how they must be treated.

This astonishing pattern leaves me with something other than the wish that "directed at" had been explicitly defined. It shows the phrase already has been defined, contextually (in Bertrand Russell's sense), and that 1805A permits reverse-targeting. It takes no visionary to see the words in the OLC memo: "The drafters of FISA well knew how to limit directees when they meant to."

Second, 1802 is a template for the Protect America Act as it's been spun to the media, Congress, and the intelligentsia. Had the administration wanted a law in keeping with this spin, it could have marked up 1802 to produce a duplicate provision in fewer than 11 pages and with fewer than 20 lawyers. In addition to eliminating concerns – now, I think, fairly clear – about (1) reverse-targeting, the mark-up would have precluded:

(2) an end-run around 1805B by way of 1805A [since 1802 works in terms of "electronic surveillance," not the carve-out over which we and Anonymous Liberal have been scratching our heads];

(3) deferral of judicial review [compare 1802's "shall immediately transmit" with 1805B's "as soon as practicable" (read with allusion to our DNI drowning in paperwork half-written in Farsi)];

(4) the issuance of warrants where a US person is "inadvertently" picked up [h/t JaO in the thread just below: an 1801(h)(4) FISA warrant easily drops out of 1805B's "mini-minimization" procedures]; and

(5) reports to the intelligence committees (at least 30 days before procedures go into effect), in contrast with the position in which Congress now finds itself.

To add to it, 1802 provides for directing service providers and compensating them at the prevailing rate. And if one pursues the highways and byways of FISA, one gets to a richer panoply of necessary findings under 1805, by comparison with which 1805C proves wanting in far more than its "clearly erroneous" standard.

Of course any bells and whistles, relaxed schedules, or transition mechanics could have been dickered with Congress using 1802 as the gold standard. They could easily have been woven into the amendment.
But there can be little doubt that the administration would have found itself on the wrong side of its public rhetoric at all of the turns just listed.

Plainly its intent was to take the newly authorized surveillance off the rails of FISA. Or, to put it more accurately, to derail FISA itself. To see it otherwise is to kid ourselves. What we are looking at is a deliberate train wreck.
 

dm,

On the effect of the DNI interview on the telecom cases, see:
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/spy-chief-torpe.html

Wired's Threat Level blog is good on the 9th Circuit cases. They give for instance a blow-by-blow description of the 8/15 hearing.
 

"Bart" says:

arne, only you can claim with a straight face to be offering a "full (original) quote" of my posts where your inserted snarks and misinformation make up almost half of the "quote."

I give the full quote. As is standard practise, the parts in square brackets were not in the quote. Anyone confused by the usage of square brackets -- and who has difficulty with who said what -- need only scroll up. If you wish to dispute my characterisation of your quote, "Bart", please explain how you would limit (and on what justification) the lack of foreigners that have no Fourth Amendment protections to something less than "presumably all". And then explain why anyone so "targeted" must be al Qaeda, so that I don't have to worry about gummint snooping when I call my cousin in Selbu.

The answer, of course. is to seek a warrant, based on probable cause, for any "targets", so that if they happen to listen in on my calls, such is consistent with listening in on calls I might make to my bookie, who has a legitimate Title III warrant out on him, so that my privacy rights aren't violated.

Cheers,
 

The reason for the modifications to FISA are exactly to legalize the fishing expedition, in numerous ways. For instance, the NSA could decide to direct their focus on foreigners communicating with a certain reporter. Now, if they had to have some reason to listen to a particular foreigner, they would have to know in advance who the reporter is talking to, and particularize their reasons for listening in. But if they use the new protocol, they use the reporter as the way to target their surveillance. So the big thing is removing the need a specific showing of potential criminality by the foreigner, or even knowledge of who the foreigner is.
 

rmadilo:

The reason for the modifications to FISA are exactly to legalize the fishing expedition, in numerous ways. For instance, the NSA could decide to direct their focus on foreigners communicating with a certain reporter. Now, if they had to have some reason to listen to a particular foreigner, they would have to know in advance who the reporter is talking to, and particularize their reasons for listening in. But if they use the new protocol, they use the reporter as the way to target their surveillance. So the big thing is removing the need a specific showing of potential criminality by the foreigner, or even knowledge of who the foreigner is.

Well, as long as their intentions (or at least a non-negligible fraction of them) were good ... as in "a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence"....

Given the seriousness of our parlous and precarious current situation WRT Terra-ism, it's a bit unseemly to ask what other motivations or rationales might be at play as well, dontcha think? And don't bother even thinking about asking whether the chosen methods and the individuals selected are actually likely to produce such. We can't bother with efficiencies WRT our civil liberties when Freedom itself is at stake.

Cheers,
 

As far as "minimization" goes, the devil really is in the details. Thanks to the link Marty helpfully provided, we have some but not all of those details. (To the uninitiated, "minimization" refers to the set of rules governing how information about U.S. persons can be collected, processed, retained and disseminated.)

Having explored that link and its associated documents, some of which are redacted, I have a somewhat clearer picture of what the new legislation does and does not require. But there is much I still don't know, and I doubt that members of Congress who passed the PAA know either.

* As we already knew, the new section 105B calls for minimization that conforms to the same general definitions as that used for FISA court orders. Those definitions are "under" the definition codified as 50 USC 1801(h). (I don't think 50 USC 1801(h)(4) is applicable.)

However, those general statutory definitions allow for a lot of interpretation. For FISA court orders, the court must approve detailed minimization procedures, which are much more rigorously specified. We now know from Marty's documentary research what the boilerplate template for most such court-approved procedures looks like. See ANNEX A, APPENDIX 1 of USSID-18.

Since under the PAA, the FISA court never has to approve the actual minimization procedures used by the special category of "not electronic surveillance" that section 105B might be used to regulate, we still don't know -- and the court need not know or determine -- how closely the actual procedures will conform to the traditional FISA procedures.

* I still believe that because of the sweeping change to FISA's definition in section 105A, invoking 105B is effectively optional. If communications providers cooperate voluntarily it is in the government's interest not to use the procedures described above for 105B. Instead, the government would rely on its inherent authority to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance outside FISA's scope.

One advantage for the government in doing so is the lack of any statutory requirement for minimization. It turns out that under longstanding executive branch policy, there is some "minimization" traditionally required even for that category of surveillance. But we don't know much about what that entails, except that it generally is much more permissive than the minimization required under FISA.

That category would fall under "PROCEDURE 5. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, PART3: SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES" of the following DoD policy: PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS, promulgated in 1982. It states:

1. This procedure governs the conduct by the United States Signals Intelligence System of signals intelligence activities that involve the collection, retention, and dissemination of foreign communications and military tactical communications. Such activities may incidentally involve the collection of information concerning United States persons without their consent, or may involve communications originated or intended for receipt in the United States, without the consent of a party thereto.

2. ... Any information collected incidentally about United States persons shall be subjected to minimization procedures approved by the Attorney General.


The detailed rules for collecting, processing, retaining and disseminating such information are contained in SECTION 4 through SECTION 7 of USSID-18. Much of what seems to be key language there is redacted, but in general the requirements appear to be much more permissive and less detailed than those employed for FISA minimization above.

(All the above is just my reading of the executive documents, which I am only assuming to be current.)
 

I have asimple question regarding the TSP and warrants. Suppose teh NSA is monitoring KNOWN terrorist A and A calls a KNOWN US citizen, B, within the US. Immediately after the call citizen B calls citizen C within the US and tells citizen C to proceed with the plan.

Now: does ANYONE believe that the NSA or FBI is going to wait for a warrant to monitor citizen's B domestic calls?
 

clkwalker:

I have asimple question regarding the TSP and warrants. Suppose teh NSA is monitoring KNOWN terrorist A and A calls a KNOWN US citizen, B, within the US. Immediately after the call citizen B calls citizen C within the US and tells citizen C to proceed with the plan.

Now: does ANYONE believe that the NSA or FBI is going to wait for a warrant to monitor citizen's B domestic calls?


The old FISA gave them 72 hours "free bite of the apple" (and provided what should be done if no FISA court warrant was forthcoming at the end of the 'grace period' as well).

Cheers,
 

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