Balkinization   |
Balkinization
Balkinization Symposiums: A Continuing List                                                                E-mail: Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu David Luban david.luban at gmail.com Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu Compendium of posts on Hobby Lobby and related cases The Anti-Torture Memos: Balkinization Posts on Torture, Interrogation, Detention, War Powers, and OLC The Anti-Torture Memos (arranged by topic) Recent Posts Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Contempt of Congress . . .
|
Tuesday, July 24, 2007
Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Contempt of Congress . . .
Marty Lederman
Just in time for the House's move toward contempt of Congress proceedings, the invaluable Congressional Research Service today issued a report entitled "Congress’s Contempt Power: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure."
Comments:
The CRS brief dedicated to DOJ's position is interesting in the way Congress' attorneys avoid addressing the assertion of DOJ that Congress has no constitutional or statutory authority to exercise its contempt powers against executive branch officials for declining to provide evidence which falls under Executive Privilege.
Instead of addressing the issue about whether Congress has the power in the first instance to punish executive branch officials with contempt for declining to provide evidence which falls under Executive Privilege, Congress attorneys assume that Congress has such a power and question whether the President may immunize or pardon such officials subject to congressional contempt proceedings. Congress would be acting unconstitutionally by demanding that executive branch officials provide evidence which in fact falls under executive privilege. Thus, it follows that Congress would again be acting unconstitutionally by punishing such officials for not providing evidence to which Congress has no right in the first instance. The following section on bringing civil contempt actions in the courts sets forth the proper course for resolving whether the requested evidence is or is not privileged rather than these ham handed threats of Congress to deputize the Executive in the person of the AG, a US Attorney or even a special prosecutor to harass the President in lieu of bringing a civil court case.
"Bart DePalma loves to assume his conclusions:
The CRS brief dedicated to DOJ's position is interesting in the way Congress' attorneys avoid addressing the assertion of DOJ that Congress has no constitutional or statutory authority to exercise its contempt powers against executive branch officials for declining to provide evidence which falls under Executive Privilege. Huh?!?!? The threshold question is as to what extent "executive privilege" exists, if any. For the executive to simply assert it is not sufficient for it to exist. Cheers,
Garth said...
Bart is under the mistaken assumption that Herr Busch is the sole "decider" on the scope and application of executive privilege. He is sorely mistaken. What part of my post that the proper route for Congress is to file a civil contempt suit with the courts and allow the courts to decide what is privileged did you not understand? The President can exercise his privilege, but neither he or Congress gets the final word. Looking back, I'm proud of what a Democratic Congress has been able to accomplish in 7 months. Hearings, contempt citations, AG on the ropes... war votes highlighting obstructionists... That is what you call accomplishment? Amazing. Utterly amazing. I guess you are among the 14% who think that the Dem Congress is doing a good job.
arne:
Until a court says otherwise, it is sufficient for the President to exercise the privilege. Congress does not have the power to make that determination. In any case, Congress cannot make that determination without having access to the evidence. Given that the privilege is being exercised against Congress, they cannot have access to the documents to make the determination without rendering the privilege a nullity. This is a matter for the courts to determine.
I guess you are among the 14% who think that the Dem Congress is doing a good job.
# posted by Bart DePalma : 2:50 PM It's better than being with the clowns who think the idiotic invasion of Iraq was a good idea.
the wheels of justice grind slowly, but exceedingly fine. - ?
"Though the mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small." Friedrich von Logau.
"Bart" DePalma:
Instead of addressing the issue about whether Congress has the power in the first instance to punish executive branch officials with contempt for declining to provide evidence which falls under Executive Privilege, Congress attorneys assume that Congress has such a power and question whether the President may immunize or pardon such officials subject to congressional contempt proceedings. Not true. See the report, pages CRS-27 et seq.. See, in particular, CRS-32 as well. Cheers,
"Bart" DePalma:
What part of my post that the proper route for Congress is to file a civil contempt suit with the courts and allow the courts to decide what is privileged did you not understand? As the paper pointed out, there's three routes available, inherent contempt, statutory criminal contempt, and civil contempt. You may prefer that Congress use the third, but that is their decision to make, and nothign compels them to go this route. Cheers,
"Bart" DePalma:
Until a court says otherwise, it is sufficient for the President to exercise the privilege. Unless a court says otherwise, it is "sufficient" for Dubya to clap his hands together and bark like a seal too. But it is of no legal effect. The time for the assertion of executive privilege is when the question is asked. There is not blanket "executive privilege" that says that a witness may not be compelled to testify, period (see, e.g., U.S. v. Nixon). Executive privilege is (properly) limited to certain information and under certan circumstances, and until they occur, the privilege may not be invoked. As the document points out, objections to questions should be made at the time of questioning, and then Congress should rule on the objection (or in the case of a referral for criminal contempt, the defence should be raised in the criminal contempt trial and ruled on by a judge). Cheers,
"Bart" DePama:
In any case, Congress cannot make that determination without having access to the evidence. Says who? (in particular, in the case of an inherent contempt proceeding). Cheers,
"Bart" DePalma is a Joseph Heller aficionado:
Given that the privilege is being exercised against Congress, they cannot have access to the documents to make the determination without rendering the privilege a nullity.... Strangely enough, I think the courts are more rational (and more practical), and figgered out how to deal with this conundrum (in the U.S. v. Nixon case). Cheers,
Arne Langsetmo said...
BD: Instead of addressing the issue about whether Congress has the power in the first instance to punish executive branch officials with contempt for declining to provide evidence which falls under Executive Privilege, Congress attorneys assume that Congress has such a power and question whether the President may immunize or pardon such officials subject to congressional contempt proceedings. Not true. See the report, pages CRS-27 et seq.. See, in particular, CRS-32 as well. Simply summarizing the OLC position is not providing CRS' own opinion to Congress. CRS' commentary on the OLC opinions is offered on pages 30 and 31, which I accurately describe above. The time for the assertion of executive privilege is when the question is asked. There is not blanket "executive privilege" that says that a witness may not be compelled to testify, period (see, e.g., U.S. v. Nixon). Executive privilege is (properly) limited to certain information and under certan circumstances, and until they occur, the privilege may not be invoked. As the document points out, objections to questions should be made at the time of questioning, and then Congress should rule on the objection (or in the case of a referral for criminal contempt, the defence should be raised in the criminal contempt trial and ruled on by a judge). Executive privilege is derived from the Constitution. Congress has no power to interpret the extent of that constitutional privilege. That is a matter for the judiciary. Furthermore, Congress has no power to deputize members of the Executive to criminally prosecute the President or other members of the Executive. The Dem Congress has three choices: 1) Attempt to have its own personnel take custody of the members of the Executive and hold them hostage. 2) File suit with the courts. 3) Drop this silly witch hunt and start governing for the first time since they were elected. BD: In any case, Congress cannot make that determination without having access to the evidence. Says who? (in particular, in the case of an inherent contempt proceeding). How is Congress or anyone else going to determine whether the sought after evidence is covered by executive privilege without actually examining the evidence. The Supremes in US v. Nixon did not assume the requested evidence was not covered under Executive Privilege without even seeing the evidence. They ordered the lower court to review the evidence in camera to determine if any of it was relevant to a criminal charge and thus outside the Executive Privilege. BD: As I noted above, Congress cannot perform this function because the privilege is being exercised against them and to allow them to view the documents would nullify the privilege.Given that the privilege is being exercised against Congress, they cannot have access to the documents to make the determination without rendering the privilege a nullity.... Strangely enough, I think the courts are more rational (and more practical), and figgered out how to deal with this conundrum (in the U.S. v. Nixon case). The courts are a neutral body and can make this determination in camera, which is what the Nixon Court held. The Nixon Court did not hold that the President had to give all subpoenaed documents to the prosecutor for him to decide what was privileged.
The section of the report that discusses the role of executive privilege in contempt proceedings is extremely informative and well-written. The discussion of the explicit intent of Congress to consider cabinet members appropriate targets of such proceedings is probably germane to the discussion of originalism (and particularly original expected application) in other threads.
I found the discussion of the President's pardon power marking the reach of executive privilege very interesting, because in a way it suggests the opposite of the Court's recent position that criminal investigations would be favored over other sorts of inquiries when denying the protection of executive privilege Following the logic given in the report, the President's claim to executive privilege would be strongest in the context of a criminal contempt, and would be non-existent in contexts where criminal behavior was not alleged. I'm still poking through it, but this is a fantastic resource, especially for a duffer like myself. --- A quick off-topic jab: BDP:I guess you are among the 14% who think that the Dem Congress is doing a good job. You might want to see the most recent Gallup poll before continuing to use that number. Congress' overall approval is up to 27% at the moment; when broken into parties, the Democrats have a 32% approval rating, while their Republican colleagues have dipped to an 18% approval rating. By comparison, Bush has a 31% approval rating, giving him slightly less loyal fans than the "Dem Congress."
"Bart" DePalma:
["Bart"]: Instead of addressing the issue about whether Congress has the power in the first instance to punish executive branch officials with contempt for declining to provide evidence which falls under Executive Privilege, Congress attorneys assume that Congress has such a power and question whether the President may immunize or pardon such officials subject to congressional contempt proceedings. [Arne]: Not true. See the report, pages CRS-27 et seq.. See, in particular, CRS-32 as well. Simply summarizing the OLC position is not providing CRS' own opinion to Congress.... Not did they merely do that. All you other folks, just go read it. "Bart"'s an eedjit or a liar. ... CRS' commentary on the OLC opinions is offered on pages 30 and 31, which I accurately describe above. Nope. You characterise it wrongly. Amongst other blatant blunders, they at no place insist that the "proper course" for resolution is "bringing civil contempt actions". [Arne]: The time for the assertion of executive privilege is when the question is asked. There is not blanket "executive privilege" that says that a witness may not be compelled to testify, period (see, e.g., U.S. v. Nixon). Executive privilege is (properly) limited to certain information and under certan circumstances, and until they occur, the privilege may not be invoked. As the document points out, objections to questions should be made at the time of questioning, and then Congress should rule on the objection (or in the case of a referral for criminal contempt, the defence should be raised in the criminal contempt trial and ruled on by a judge). Executive privilege is derived from the Constitution. Congress has no power to interpret the extent of that constitutional privilege. That is a matter for the judiciary. Wrong (in particular, in the case of inherent contempt). Congress sets its own rules. But I'd note that this is in no way responsive to my point. Furthermore, Congress has no power to deputize members of the Executive to criminally prosecute the President or other members of the Executive. The CRS Report goes into that. And it doesn't say what you're claiming here. The Dem Congress has three choices: 1) Attempt to have its own personnel take custody of the members of the Executive and hold them hostage. True (although "hostage" is a misnomer"). This, as the report spells out, is "inherent contempt". 2) File suit with the courts. True. This is "civil contempt". 3) Drop this silly witch hunt and start governing for the first time since they were elected. <*BZZZZT*> No ducky for you. The third option is statutory criminal contempt. As the report mentions, there might be an issue here with "immunization" (but such immunization from prosecution hardly voids the contempt charge; it simply quashes any action on it). See CRS-30. As the report details on page CRS-31, though, this doesn't affect inherent contempt. But the issue even in the case of statutory contempt is hardly resolved; even the Burford issue never reached the courts as the documents in question were released and the matter dropped. ["Bart"]: : In any case, Congress cannot make that determination without having access to the evidence. [Arne]: Says who? (in particular, in the case of an inherent contempt proceeding). How is Congress or anyone else going to determine whether the sought after evidence is covered by executive privilege without actually examining the evidence. By knowing what it is they're asking (or asking for)? The Supremes in US v. Nixon did not assume the requested evidence was not covered under Executive Privilege without even seeing the evidence. They ordered the lower court to review the evidence in camera to determine if any of it was relevant to a criminal charge and thus outside the Executive Privilege. True, but perhaps better phrased: "they ordered the courts to review the evidence to see if any of it was covered by 'executive privilege' in the context of a criminal investigation." ["Bart"]: As I noted above, Congress cannot perform this function because the privilege is being exercised against them and to allow them to view the documents would nullify the privilege.Given that the privilege is being exercised against Congress, they cannot have access to the documents to make the determination without rendering the privilege a nullity.... [Arne]: Strangely enough, I think the courts are more rational (and more practical), and figgered out how to deal with this conundrum (in the U.S. v. Nixon case). The courts are a neutral body and can make this determination in camera, which is what the Nixon Court held. The Nixon Court did not hold that the President had to give all subpoenaed documents to the prosecutor for him to decide what was privileged. True. But they did look to see what was privileged and what wasn't (and, as it turns out, nothing there [IIRC] was privileged). Which shoots to hell your cockamamie idea that the preznit gets to decide beforehand. Cheers,
"Bart" spins --
Until a court says otherwise, it is sufficient for the President to exercise the privilege. Congress does not have the power to make that determination. In any case, Congress cannot make that determination without having access to the evidence. Given that the privilege is being exercised against Congress, they cannot have access to the documents to make the determination without rendering the privilege a nullity. This is a matter for the courts to determine. # posted by Bart DePalma : 2:57 PM Really? If the Executive can raid a Congressman's office, in the Congress, and confiscate all his records and computers and stuff, then Congress can do exactly the same in reverse. Difference is that "inherent contempt" is an established legal principle; by contrast, the dumb-ass breaking-and-entering into the Congressman's office in effort to preclude fair trial by ransacking the defendant's confidential information had the practical result of causing court reviews of that action which delayed the Executive's desire to prosecute and lynch a Democrat for partisan ends. I'll trust Congress for reason before I'll credit the Bushit criminal enterprise with brains, ethics, morals, values -- "family" or otherwise -- competence, integrity, intellectual honesty, and -- most of all -- not hating Constitution and rule of law, and our country. Of course, being a liar, "Bart," your mileage will doubtless vary; and if it doesn't you'll lie to make it appear so.
There's a fine line between genius and insanity. I have erased this line.
Post a Comment
Agen Judi Online Terpercaya
|
Books by Balkinization Bloggers Linda C. McClain and Aziza Ahmed, The Routledge Companion to Gender and COVID-19 (Routledge, 2024) David Pozen, The Constitution of the War on Drugs (Oxford University Press, 2024) Jack M. Balkin, Memory and Authority: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation (Yale University Press, 2024) Mark A. Graber, Punish Treason, Reward Loyalty: The Forgotten Goals of Constitutional Reform after the Civil War (University of Kansas Press, 2023) Jack M. Balkin, What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Most Controversial Decision - Revised Edition (NYU Press, 2023) Andrew Koppelman, Burning Down the House: How Libertarian Philosophy Was Corrupted by Delusion and Greed (St. Martin’s Press, 2022) Gerard N. Magliocca, Washington's Heir: The Life of Justice Bushrod Washington (Oxford University Press, 2022) Joseph Fishkin and William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution: Reconstructing the Economic Foundations of American Democracy (Harvard University Press, 2022) Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric, Power to the People: Constitutionalism in the Age of Populism (Oxford University Press 2021). Mark Philip Bradley and Mary L. Dudziak, eds., Making the Forever War: Marilyn B. Young on the Culture and Politics of American Militarism Culture and Politics in the Cold War and Beyond (University of Massachusetts Press, 2021). Jack M. Balkin, What Obergefell v. Hodges Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Same-Sex Marriage Decision (Yale University Press, 2020) Frank Pasquale, New Laws of Robotics: Defending Human Expertise in the Age of AI (Belknap Press, 2020) Jack M. Balkin, The Cycles of Constitutional Time (Oxford University Press, 2020) Mark Tushnet, Taking Back the Constitution: Activist Judges and the Next Age of American Law (Yale University Press 2020). Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights vs. Religious Liberty?: The Unnecessary Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2020) Ezekiel J Emanuel and Abbe R. Gluck, The Trillion Dollar Revolution: How the Affordable Care Act Transformed Politics, Law, and Health Care in America (PublicAffairs, 2020) Linda C. McClain, Who's the Bigot?: Learning from Conflicts over Marriage and Civil Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2020) Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction (University of Chicago Press, 2019) Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies (Duke University Press 2018) Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet, eds., Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (Oxford University Press 2018) Gerard Magliocca, The Heart of the Constitution: How the Bill of Rights became the Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, 2018) Cynthia Levinson and Sanford Levinson, Fault Lines in the Constitution: The Framers, Their Fights, and the Flaws that Affect Us Today (Peachtree Publishers, 2017) Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) Sanford Levinson, Nullification and Secession in Modern Constitutional Thought (University Press of Kansas 2016) Sanford Levinson, An Argument Open to All: Reading The Federalist in the 21st Century (Yale University Press 2015) Stephen M. Griffin, Broken Trust: Dysfunctional Government and Constitutional Reform (University Press of Kansas, 2015) Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Harvard University Press, 2015) Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution (Harvard University Press, 2014) Balkinization Symposium on We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution Joseph Fishkin, Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity (Oxford University Press, 2014) Mark A. Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2013) John Mikhail, Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment (Cambridge University Press, 2013) Gerard N. Magliocca, American Founding Son: John Bingham and the Invention of the Fourteenth Amendment (New York University Press, 2013) Stephen M. Griffin, Long Wars and the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2013) Andrew Koppelman, The Tough Luck Constitution and the Assault on Health Care Reform (Oxford University Press, 2013) James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues (Harvard University Press, 2013) Balkinization Symposium on Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality (Harvard University Press, 2013) Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (University of Chicago Press, 2012) Sanford Levinson, Framed: America's 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2012) Linda C. McClain and Joanna L. Grossman, Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women's Equal Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2012) Mary Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford University Press, 2012) Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Harvard University Press, 2011) Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud and Other Abuses of Intellectual Property Law (Stanford University Press, 2011) Richard W. Garnett and Andrew Koppelman, First Amendment Stories, (Foundation Press 2011) Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World (Harvard University Press, 2011) Gerard Magliocca, The Tragedy of William Jennings Bryan: Constitutional Law and the Politics of Backlash (Yale University Press, 2011) Bernard Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (Harvard University Press, 2010) Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Harvard University Press, 2010) Balkinization Symposium on The Decline and Fall of the American Republic Ian Ayres. Carrots and Sticks: Unlock the Power of Incentives to Get Things Done (Bantam Books, 2010) Mark Tushnet, Why the Constitution Matters (Yale University Press 2010) Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff: Lifecycle Investing: A New, Safe, and Audacious Way to Improve the Performance of Your Retirement Portfolio (Basic Books, 2010) Jack M. Balkin, The Laws of Change: I Ching and the Philosophy of Life (2d Edition, Sybil Creek Press 2009) Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton University Press 2009) Andrew Koppelman and Tobias Barrington Wolff, A Right to Discriminate?: How the Case of Boy Scouts of America v. James Dale Warped the Law of Free Association (Yale University Press 2009) Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The Constitution in 2020 (Oxford University Press 2009) Heather K. Gerken, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is Failing and How to Fix It (Princeton University Press 2009) Mary Dudziak, Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall's African Journey (Oxford University Press 2008) David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) Ian Ayres, Super Crunchers: Why Thinking-By-Numbers is the New Way to be Smart (Bantam 2007) Jack M. Balkin, James Grimmelmann, Eddan Katz, Nimrod Kozlovski, Shlomit Wagman and Tal Zarsky, eds., Cybercrime: Digital Cops in a Networked Environment (N.Y.U. Press 2007) Jack M. Balkin and Beth Simone Noveck, The State of Play: Law, Games, and Virtual Worlds (N.Y.U. Press 2006) Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines (Yale University Press 2006) Brian Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End (Cambridge University Press 2006) Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (Oxford University Press 2006) Mark Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (Cambridge University Press 2006) Jack M. Balkin, ed., What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said (N.Y.U. Press 2005) Sanford Levinson, ed., Torture: A Collection (Oxford University Press 2004) Balkin.com homepage Bibliography Conlaw.net Cultural Software Writings Opeds The Information Society Project BrownvBoard.com Useful Links Syllabi and Exams |