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Balkinization
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Thursday, June 14, 2007
Legal Theory as Myth Construction
Brian Tamanaha
Last weekend at a conference on the rule of law, I blurted out, in a moment of indiscretion: “the rule of law is a myth!” It would not be surprising to hear this uttered by a radical, but I wrote the book on the rule of law (literally) and I promote it (the ideal, as well as the book) at every opportunity. I eagerly and without compensation give lectures on the rule of law to officials or jurists from developing countries, and indeed to anyone else who is interested. To my great excitement, the book has been translated into Ukrainian, it is currently being translated into Chinese, and I have received a proposal to translate it into Spanish. So how can I call it a “myth”?
Comments:
Wow, Brian, what a tough point to ponder. I think you might be right, though (keeping in mind that I am not a legal theorist). Utilitarians in moral theory encounter a similar issue; Jeremy Bentham is famous for his theory of "fictions," which are very much the same as what you mean by "myths"-- propositions which are literally false, but which are nevertheless conducive to the production of general utility were we to take them as true, and so that's enough reason to encourage belief in them.
I'm a little perplexed, though-- exactly what empirical claim about the world does the rule of law get wrong? I always took that as a purely prescriptive claim that stood or fell independently of whether actual legal systems managed to procure the rule of law adequately or not. Is there something I'm missing?
Legal Theory I think is a bit of a misnomer. As you rightfully point out, legal theories more closely resemble explanation for an active power dynamic in the judicial arena.
You need different theories for understanding different power dynamics. The predictive value of those theories is totally dependent on the similarities of the power dynamic to be analyzed with the power dynamic the theory was developed for. does that make any sense? thus, Ackerman's theories aren't predictive now because we have a battle between Congress and the President over presidential power. the Supreme Court is about to make some major rulings. which previous legal theories were developed to explain a similar scenario? Nixon. And the upshot of that was sweeping reform from Congress and a SCOTUS rebuke to the President. In this case, however, the Court may not be hostile to Bush. How would Nixon have turned out if the Court allowed him to hang on to the tapes due to Executive Privilege? This is the scenario that is before us, but on even grander scale due to the sweeping claims of the administration for unchecked Presidential power. Is our current court more conservative than it's Burger counter part?
But, didn't the "rule of law" prevail today re: Libby's sentencing? Bush-haters around the Internet rejoice -- good thing Fitzgerald was never after Bill Clinton for HIS perjury to the grand jury and obstruction of justice -- just wait until the next Democrat gets in the White House for some serious payback ; )
Can we at least agree IF Libby's conviction is completely overturned on appeal (I'm not referring to any Presidential Pardon for the moment -- although I see that even Obama's campaign attorney, Robert F. Bauer, has urged that Bush should pardon Libby as well), then it would be wrong to have forced Libby to serve jail time? Where's Project Innocence when you need them?!
Charles,
libby had a million dollar defense team and a jury trial. it's ulikely it will be overturned on evidentiary issues. it's been suggested that Fitzgerald's appointment was somehow an unconstitutional appointment of a principle officer. this seems weak too. Fitzgerald was delegated authority sufficient to conduct a criminal investigation of a high ranking official. Scooter got to introduce his exculpatory evidence and the jury said he was obviously guilty. If he does time, it will be no more unfair than any other convicted felon doing time while awaiting appeal. Of course, if the Judge finds his appeal to be likely of success he can allow him out pending appeal. I don't think so.
And Kenneth Starr was no less of a bulldog and waster of taxpayer money as Fitzgerald even you have to admit.
Starr just couldn't drum anything up as you would say of Fitzgerald.
in fact, it is Starr and not Fitzgerald who is the poster child for a run-away prosecutor.
from land deals in arkansas to kinky sex in the oval office. millions of dollars wasted while the world laughed at us. no one's laughing now.
Starr "drumed up" more than Fitzgerald. At least there was a three-judge panel authorizing every expansion of Ken's investigation.
and how did Fitzgerald expand his investigation beyond who leaked Plame?
we still don't know the facts because scooter obstructed justice.
But, didn't the "rule of law" prevail today re: Libby's sentencing? Bush-haters around the Internet rejoice -- good thing Fitzgerald was never after Bill Clinton for HIS perjury to the grand jury and obstruction of justice -- just wait until the next Democrat gets in the White House for some serious payback ; )
so you suggest the Ken Starr failed to bring down clinton where fitzgerald would have. you also suggest that a Republican minority in Congress will have the juice to get a Dem appointed AG to appoint a special prosecutor out of thin air. those are some pretty big assumptions. not quite believable.
Garth:
Was Libby convicted of leaking Plame's name? No, so there's an expansion right there. Was leaking Plame's name even a crime? It seems not, since Fitzgerald never prosecuted Richard Armitage. As for Ken Starr, he did everything he could legally do for a sucessful impeachment, but it was up to the Senate to remove Clinton. Who I am comparing Fitzgerald to was Starr's successor, who failed to indict and prosecute Clinton once he left office. Someday, there will be a Democrat back in the White House (hopefully not 2009) and a Republican majority in one House of Congress at least. Wait til THOSE investigations gear up. I would be issuing DAILY subpoenas to every senior West Winger (for "oversight purposes" of course ; )
Well, you only asked "how did Fitzgerald expand his investigation beyond who leaked Plame?" Meaning, we know now, Richard Armitage (who, last time I checked, was not prosecuted or sentenced).
I only wish that Bill Clinton had gotten 30 months in federal prison for HIS perjury to a grand jury and obstruction of justice (maybe that, and the O.J. trial, is what Brian was referring to re: "myth" of rule of law?).
Charles, incredible as it may seem to you, Democratic investigations of the Bush Administration are not mere "payback" for Ken Starr, they are looking into evidence of real and serious abuses that the Republican Congress allowed to flourish unchecked.
If a Democrat is in the White House and Republicans control Congress and there is evidence of real abuse by the President, then by all means, let the investigations begin. But you are "jokingly" implying that you want to get back at this Congress by setting out to hamstring any Democratic President with investigations as a matter of pure partisanship. "Jokes" like that tend to cover a serious intent.
Brian,
We can unpack aspects of the rule of law that are not a "myth": the definition, its elements, and so forth (albeit with much disagreement). Taken as such, these are not stories that claim to make factual assertions. But there is a great deal of myth making within rule of law theory. For example, one fundamental aspect of the rule of law is that the law must be "general" (not aimed at a single person), but for much of English history a substantial bulk of the law was particular--dealing with specific individuals. There are other elements (certainty, adherence to law, etc.) said to be characteristic of systems that possess the rule of law, which are dubious as a factual matter. The rule of law is not a myth when taken as a political ideal, but when we go beyond that to make factual assertions (historical or present) about which countries have the rule of law and why it begins to shade into myth making. Brian
Brian Tamanaha @ 2:41 pm: "The rule of law is not a myth when taken as a political ideal, but when we go beyond that to make factual assertions (historical or present) about which countries have the rule of law and why it begins to shade into myth making."
I understand (I think). But it seems to suggest that perhaps the rule of law as a (normative) political ideal is itself vague, perhaps suspect, if we can't use it to judge which legal systems better exhibit it as a characteristic without making empirical mistakes about the very legal systems we point out as examples. If you wish to answer me by saying, "Go read my book," I'll be happy with that; my institution's law library has it.
Perhaps Armitage was not sentenced because Fitzgerald concluded he had not committed a crime.
We know he leaked because he admitted it. Scooter lied about it. But, by all means, if Armitage committed a crime he should be prosecuted for it. even if the crime is lying about a non-crime in order to cover up an investigation into a national security leak.
The rule of law is not a myth when taken as a political ideal, but when we go beyond that to make factual assertions (historical or present) about which countries have the rule of law and why it begins to shade into myth making.
This sounds less like a myth than an unachieved (or unachievable) ideal.
we don't know if scooter leaked too, independently of armitage.
armitage may not have committed a crime. libby may well have and thus chose to lie. he was found guilty of lying. so we don't know if he leaked, but the mere fact that armitage leaked too, doesn't exculpate him.
Brian and Mark,
The people who first wrote about the rule of law influentially (Dicey, Hayek, Fuller), saw and described law--and hence the rule of law--in somewhat idealized (read that: mythical, at least in part) terms. Their writings shape our understandings of what the rule of law consists of. So while it indeed is a political ideal, and can be understood as such without being considered a myth, what they meant to describe was the reality that attached to the rule of law, a reality that was never so. Nonetheless, the very belief in the reality of rule of law has brought positive consequences (though not only positive), which is why I support it. Brian
Brian, I'm even more confused about your statement that the constitution is not democratic after reading your statement that rule of law must be "general" (which is of course true).
You don't define democracy, nor show how the constitution doesn't qualify. The document seems to me to embody "people power" in many ways--most obviously in the Tenth Amendment. "Democracy" has always been an ideological term, prescriptive as much as it is descriptive of any constitution and society. There's a strong case to be made that in ancient Athens, it replaced an earlier and more descriptive word for the new government the people were experimenting with. That word seems to have been "isonomia", or "equality before the law". The constitution certainly makes all Americans equal before the law.
The constitution certainly makes all Americans equal before the law.
It comes reasonably close to that ideal now, but it certainly didn't at the beginning. It's that descriptive aspect to which I think Prof. Tamanaha objects.
"I promote the rule of law ideal because I believe it is better for people if their societies strive to develop and preserve the rule of law, even as I recognize that no society fully lives up to the factual claims underlying the rule of law ideal (that’s why I see it as a myth)."
-You are using an interesting definition of myth in this post. From what I've read of Paul Tillich and theologian Neil Gillman, working, living myth is defined as a construction of reality whose primary purpose is to fashion order from a chaotic world. Its relationship to fact is relatively irrelevant. And it need not be particularly idealistic. It is more important for the myth itself to function properly than for it be particularly idealistic. With that said, I agree with your point that the rule of law is, in fact, myth. But I do not think your point is as controversial as you suggest as myth's relationship to fact, as I understand it, is not a crucial factor in judging a myth's utility. Best!
Scott: "....myth's relationship to fact, as I understand it, is not a crucial factor in judging a myth's utility."
However, if a myth is perceived as not having a relationship to fact, its utility is substantially diminished.
"the Constitution is a contract (myth!)"
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But our present acceptance of the Constitution does involve literal consent from office-holders, per Article 6. I think that's the important sense in which the Constitution is a contract. See here and here.
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