E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
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Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
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Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
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Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
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Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
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Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
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Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Rick Garnett's response to my post on the infrastructure of religious freedom suggests a possible source of disagreement between his position and mine: "Sometimes, the government may single out religion for special treatment -- i.e., because it is religion -- without "establishing" religion or violating the freedom of religious conscience."
I am not yet sure we have a disagreement. It all depends on what Rick's formula means. I think he may be running together infrastructure building with accommodation.
If the state removes a disability created by a law of general application; for example, if a dry county allows the use of sacramental wine in religious services, or if Congress exempts religious organizations from Title VII's ban on religious discrimination in hiring, this does not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause. There are many close cases, but the general principle seems clear enough.
But accommodation of religion in these examples is not the same thing as building infrastructure specifically to promote religion. As I suggested in my previous post, it would violate the Constitution for the government to fund religious proselytization specifically in order to increase the number of religious believers in the United States, although it is perfectly constitutional for the government to fund science education in order to increase the number of scientists. I don't understand Rick to argue the contrary. If he does, then we do have very different views of the Establishment Clause.
Can government engage in policies directed specifically to promote religion and religious belief among its population rather than policies that promote the general exchange of ideas (and therefore also benefit religion)? I do not believe that it can. I believe that if the government stated that it was launching a pro-atheism campaign designed to increase the number of atheists in the United States this would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. I do not see why the government could engage in campaigns specifically designed to increase the number of religious believers or the strength of religious institutions per se (that is, to the exclusion of other types of institutions). It seems to me that the government may not single out religion for special forms of infrastructural building, but that it may promote speech, expression, the exchange of ideas, and charitable organizations generally; among the main beneficiaries of such infrastructural building would seem to be religious organizations.
If Rick could provide an example of government deliberately building infrastructure for the benefit of religion alone-- and in order to strengthen religion-- that (1) is not accommodation or exemption from a statute of general applicability and (2) does not violate the Establishment Clause, it would be much easier to see where, if at all, we actually agree or disagree. Posted
2:49 PM
by JB [link]
Comments:
Jack,
I think you are right. That is, I assumed, too quickly, that you were endorsing the view that religion-specific accommodations (which I am inclined to regard as a key part of the infrastructure of religious freedom) are in conflict with the no-establishment rule.
That said, I also believe (as I suggested in a comment to Marty's post, above), that governments may, without burdening religious conscience or violating the no-establishment rule, endorse the idea that "religion is a good thing." (Which is not to say that they should, or to deny that such endorsements are likely to be superficial and clunky.)
"if the government stated that it was launching a pro-atheism campaign designed to increase the number of atheists in the United States this would run afoul of the Establishment Clause"
this position suggests that you have (perhaps unconsciously) been taken in by the incorrect claim of some religion advocates that atheism (or as I prefer, being irreligious) is a "religion". as many have pointed out, either word simply means not-X, so it is no more meaningful to call a-theism a religion that to call, for example, a-communism a religion.
hence, if the government felt it was desirable (as do I) to increase the number of the irreligious, it should be no more an establishment clause problem than trying to "endorse the idea that 'religion is a good thing'", ie, that not-religion is a not-good thing. OTOH, either might be a problem on some other grounds.