E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
A little more on Massachusetts v. EPA: Standing and the public interest
JB
An addendum to my previous post on standing and executive power issues in Massachusetts v. EPA: At lunch my colleague Bill Eskridge pointed out to me that standing decisions serve yet another political function: they decide what kinds of plaintiffs will get into court.
Current standing doctrines-- especially if construed narrowly in the way that many conservatives like-- make it far easier for businesses to have standing to challenge government regulations, because these regulations have predictable effects on their profits or their costs of doing business. But it's much harder for citizens, NGO's , environmental groups, or members of ideological organizations to get standing to challenge administrative agency decisions that affect a more generally diffuse public interest in good government policies, including, for example, a clean environment. As a result, courts must engage in elaborate legal strategies and devices to afford these groups standing. (The SCRAP case that Chief Justice Roberts invokes with disdain was such a case.).
The net effect of these doctrines is that businesses that want to relax or eliminate administrative enforcement of business regulations generally have a much easier time getting into court than NGO's or citizens' groups that want to ensure administrative enforcement of business regulations. Massachusetts v. EPA solves this problem by awarding standing to a state. Like some NGO's, state governments may sometimes promote a more generalized public interest in the environment.
Once again, how you feel about these effects of standing doctrine depends on whether you like standing rules that are more or less protective of business interests. Not surprisingly, conservative Republicans of Alito's and Roberts' stripe are more likely to be hostile to expansive standing rules. Maintaining a business friendly legal regime was another reason why George W. Bush appointed Roberts and Alito to the Supreme Court, and it offers an additional explanation of their dissents in Massachusetts v. EPA.
In your earlier post you suggested that the standing holding in Mass. v. EPA reduces executive power. That's true. But as a whole, the opinion expands executive power, by saying that the EPA may regulate emissions that in ordinary language would not be called "pollutants" but that have some possibility of causing harm of some sort.