E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
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Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
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Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
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Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
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Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
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Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
@Chris: what about letting the districts be drawn by a bipartisan commission?
But eventually the problems boils down to the two party system. In a two party system there is a inherent desire to consolidate existing majorities regardles of future political views. The best (short term) solution for this problem? Permanent gridlock.
The problem with gerrymandering is defining some neutral criteria for drawing districts. Smallest area? Even partisan balance? Geographical proximity? City or county lines? Statewide preferences?
I'd say that so long as we found a neutral criteria and applied it evenhandedly, we'd be ok.
I suspect that's true, but I'd like to see some simulations before I agreed. Strictly speaking, though, deciding that "we'd be ok" logically requires a prior agreement on what qualifies as "ok", which is precisely the neutral principle that we need. :)
The trouble is that there is no one neutral criterion; there are several. Maintaining "communties of interest" (racial, ethnic, economic, geographic, etc), respecting existing political boundaries, and keeping districts "compact and contiguous" are legitimate criteria, and there may be others.
I do not think there is any way to take the politics out of anything so fraught with political consequences. But taking reapportionment out of the hands of the legislature and giving it over to a bipartisan commission can at least take out some of the self-interest and more egregious forms of corruption.
But taking reapportionment out of the hands of the legislature and giving it over to a bipartisan commission can at least take out some of the self-interest and more egregious forms of corruption.
I wish this were true. I guess I'm enough of a legal realist to believe it's not, though. Such a commission may apply different values, but not necessarily better ones, in part, at least, because we share no common agreement on what's "better".
Surely we could give our commission instructions on the criteria to use in drawing districts. (At least they would not use the number one criterion used by state legislatures -- incumbency protection!).
The devil, of course, is in the details. What weight should be given to which factors. There will, as you say, never be a perfect answer because the ideal legislative map is subjective and no one can agree on what it is. But I think a commission would have to try very hard to do worse than the legislatures do.