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Saturday, September 23, 2006
Clarification of What the War Crimes Amendment Would (Not) "Authorize"
Marty Lederman
In today's New York Times, I'm quoted as saying that the Administration "appear[s] to have negotiated a statutory definition of cruel treatment that doesn't cover the C.I.A. techniques," and that the negotiators "purport to foreclose the ability of the courts to determine whether [such techniques] satisfy the Geneva obligations." All that is true enough (although even this definition of "cruel treatment" obviously covers the "alternative" CIA techniques in at least some circumstances).
Comments:
It's worth mentioning that not only the Geneva Conventions but also, and even more specifically, the UN Convention Against Torture (which the US signed and ratified under Ronald Reagan, making it part of "the supreme law of the land") prohibit what the Bush Administration has been doing.
There's no lack of "clarity" there.
Professor Lederman:
Exactly what objective measures are you using to define any particular interrogation technique as either "cruel" or "torture" under Article 3? Our court system has never come up with an objective definition for what constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment under the 8th Amendment and essentially imposes the subjective judgment of that particular court. It is utterly unfair to make interrogators criminally or civilly liable for standards some court will make after the fact and which are completely unknown to the interrogator at the time of the interrogation. If you dislike the current compromise definitions, please come up with an objective alternative. That would make for an interesting discussion.
Bart,
My definition would be real simple: Using any method to induce physical discomfort for the purpose of extracting intelligence information is out of bounds. End of story.
Our court system has never come up with an objective definition for what constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment under the 8th Amendment and essentially imposes the subjective judgment of that particular court.
It is utterly unfair to make interrogators criminally or civilly liable for standards some court will make after the fact and which are completely unknown to the interrogator at the time of the interrogation. Note the contradiction between these two paragraphs: our Constitution contains equally vague phrases (and he omits that it works just fine), but the Geneva Convention can't use those phrases because their "too vague". Then note the intellectual dishonesty of demanding a definition. Again, the Constitution contains all manner of undefined phrases: "due process"; "cruel and unusual"; "reasonable". The reason they do is that it's impossible to specify all the possible ways of doing wrong. An honest response would specify the particular techniques at issue and have an open debate about them. But Bush and his supporters long ago left honesty behind in their eager pursuit of even more egregious mortal sins.
Professor,
I'm hoping you can clarify a point. If Congress enacts a law purporting to fully satisfy a treaty, may a court, in the course of its normal operation, judge the enactment to be lacking and instead use its own reading of the treaty itself? Basically, I'm unclear on what it means to say that the CIA's conduct is illegal under the Geneva Conventions if Congress passes a law purporting to fully implement the treaty, and which also permits the CIA's actions.
On the topic of clearly defining torture:
The UN Convention Against Torture says, in part: "the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions." Read on to see what else is explicitly prohibited, including Bush's practice of sending prisoners to other nations to be tortured.
maiken's question brings up another one. Section 8(3) gives the President "the authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions" and goes on to make that intepretation "authoritative". Doesn't that violate the separation of powers by investing in the President the Constitutional prerogative of the Judiciary, vis., "it is emphatically the province of the judiciary to say what the law is"?
raven:
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On the topic of clearly defining torture: The UN Convention Against Torture says, in part: "the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions." This is the US definition we inserted into the Torture Convention because we found the general terms of that convention to be too broad. In the proposed legislation, we are essentially using the same old US definition to clarify the broad terms of the Geneva Conventions. The fact that other countries who have signed onto these Conventions have different definitions than we do indicates that these broad terms are essentially unworkable.
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