E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Mark Graber's post explaining his otherwise inexplicable devotion to a team I have loathed for roughly 55 years actually raises interesting issues about commitments far more important (if such is possible) than one's devotion to the Yankees, Red Sox, or any other team. Jack's Yale colleague Dan Kahan has energetically argued (often in articles with Donald Granham), with regard particularly to the debates concerning gun policy, that evidence is basically 'irrelevant," that one's commitments concerning the extent to which firearms should be regulated have far more to do with one's underlying values, or ideology, that with the evidence submitted by either side of the debate. (E.g., proponents of gun control, who often cite the number of children killed by guns, simply refused to confront seriously the fact that more children die in backyard swimming pools every year than are killed by guns; opponents of gun control policy tend to dismiss the importance of the fact that guns do in fact account for the death of X number of "innocent" persons every year, and so on.) It may be that the discussion going on right now on another thread about "1% solutions, civil liberties, environmentalism, etc." is an illustration of Kahan's basic point. (What sort of empirical evidence, if any, would persuade a strong civil libertarian to bend his/her principles or Christopher Caldwell that one should indeed continue to honor the rights of criminal defendants even when they are suspected of terrorism. Indeed, I suggested in an article in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review responding to one of Dan's pieces that his argument might well apply to the debate about Iraq more generally, particularly in 2003, when I wrote the reply. What now seems clear to almost everybody--that the Bush Administration was basically indifferent to evidence, that their zeal to invade was based on the same kind of emotion and ideology that describes Mark's commitment to the Yankees--seemed absolutely clear to me then, but, of course, many people, perhaps plausibly, would have argued that I was too consumed by loathing for the hBush Administration to credit them as making a good case. We want to believe that our political commitments are "evidence based" and not comparable to our decisions to root for sports teams. But Kahan, who is not alone, would challenge this. I take it that no amount of evidence about the "objective" awfulness of George Steinbrenner and the loathesomeness of the Yankee's using their market dominance to crush the opposition could overcome the emotions generated by his youth as a New Yorker.
One wants to believe--or at least I want to believe--that Kahan is wrong, and that we can make public policy arguments on the basis of "rational evidence." Paradoxically or not, I think the evidence is far too mixed to allow any confident conclusion that Kahan is wrong. But if he is not, then we have to reconceive what we think "democratic deliberation" is really about. Posted
7:37 PM
by Sandy Levinson [link]
Comments:
But Sandy, my argument is precisely that rational persons should consider irrelevant the evidence you cite against supporting for the Yankees, that support for teams ought to be based on precisely my identification as a New Yorker. Indeed, I might push further and suggest that your reasons for hating the Yankees are mistaken, that good reasons for hating, say, GE, are not good reasons for hating sports teams.
One might make a Walzerian argument here. Democracies are likely to be too polarized if all forms of identification are based on the same set of values. Hence, the sorts of evidence that ought to influence who we support on the diamond ought to be very different that the sort of evidence we use when evaluating gun policy. Indeed, one critique of Bush is that he tends to see the world as a sports fan (my team can do no wrong) rather than as a policy-maker.
There is an internal-contradiction in all democracies: its strengths are also its weaknesses. People essentially have the ability to undo democracy, because of democracy (see Plato's and Aristotle's criticisms of democracy). Our best-example for the fall of a democracy is the one we know best: Athenian democracy. It was because of the First Peloponessian war and the formation of the Delian League, that democracy crumbled in Athens. Once a legitimate-force in fighting the Persians (sound familiar?), it was misused by the oligarchs for imperialism. There was a misguided Sicilian-campaign, and others, until eventually the treasury was drained. Nuff-said. Reason had been abandoned, as it has now.