E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
As David points out, if (as the Court held) the AUMF does not trump the limitations on military commissions that are only vaguely and implicitly lurking in 10 U.S.C. 821 and 836(b), surely that force authorization cannot supersede FISA's express provision that FISA and title 18 prescribe the "exclusive means" of engaging in electronic surveillance, and FISA's specific wartime surveillance provision, which authorized surveillance outside the FISA framework through December 3, 2001, but no later.
If we're all correct about this -- and I haven't seen any argument to the contrary -- then it raises two interesting questions:
2. Will Cass Sunstein finally give up the ghost on his idiosyncratic view that the AUMF can be construed to authorize the NSA program?
I ask this not only because, as far as I know, no legislator has agreed with Sunstein and DOJ that the AUMF provided such authority. (One should be suspicious of any argument about congressional intent that doesn't reflect, well, any legislator's intent. Handy new canon of statutory construction: Interpretations that would come as a shock to all 518 legislators who voted for a bill are disfavored.) Nor even because Hamdan has so severely undermined the theory.
No, the main reason I'm curious about Professor Sunstein's current views is that he has just published an article in which he reads Hamdan to confirm the principle that "[i]f the president is acting in a way that threatens civil liberties, he will be probably lose unless Congress has explicitly authorized him to do that."
The Hamdan decision doesn't actually say that, and is not really about that question: The Court's holding does not depend on the absence of clear statutory authorization -- it turns instead on the fact that the President's commissions violated statutory limitations. But more to the point, even if Sunstein's characterization were apt, and clear stautory authorization is necessary in order for the Executive to infringe on personal freedoms, how can Sunstein adhere to his previous view that the vague and general authorization of the AUMF silently authorized the President to act in a way that would otherwise not only infringe on personal freedoms, but also transgress clear pre-existing statutory limitations? Posted
9:42 AM
by Marty Lederman [link]
Comments:
there has never been a government statement (or any other evidence from the NYT or any other source) that the program was ever actually in violation of FISA.
But here's what Alberto Gonzales said just days after the story broke:
The President confirmed the existence of a highly classified program on Saturday. . . . The President has authorized a program to engage in electronic surveillance of a particular kind, and this would be the intercepts of contents of communications where one of the -- one party to the communication is outside the United States. . . . Now, in terms of legal authorities, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides -- requires a court order before engaging in this kind of surveillance that I've just discussed and the President announced on Saturday.
That sounds pretty definitive to me. Plus, if the administration wasn't actively violating FISA, while all the fuss? Why wouldn't they just say that what they are doing is not covered by FISA, but they can't go into specifics? They're clearly engaged in surveillance that violates FISA.
Ann Beeson is arguing one of these cases Monday July 10 in Detroit, the international consultants case where the judge evidently is looking favorably on the chilled speech complaint, though the government is seeking to force the entire proceeding in camera closing the doors to the public. See her post today on MyDD.
Sunstein seems to have turned a corner, though remaining protective of academia. He had an interesting statistical post last week examining the zero tolerance paradigm the vice president has proposed as the litmus for success of antiterror policy.
I, too, read Stevens' simple statement as pinning Congress to its inability to pass a revised AUMF to cover fourth amendment concerns.
I expect most of the datamining cases, though, to bog down in the courts; for example, the ATT case currently proceeding in San Francisco.
It seemed to me the supreme court was willing to see if the executive and legislative can return to the bargaining table on many of these issues.
The former WHC who has a column on Findlaw wrote an interesting commentary last Wednesday regarding mistrust between Supreme Court and congress, though some of the material there elicits a smile.
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