E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
I will gladly accept the invitation of my friend Marty Lederman to say a few words about life tenure, largely because I can also bring to your collective attention a new collection co-edited by Roger Cramton and Paul Carrington, REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, just published by the Carolina Academic Press. It brings together a collection of people from across the political spectrum (including, for example, Steve Calabresi, one of the founding fathers of the Federalist Society). Most, though not all, of the participants oppose life tenure. Calabresi and his Northwestern colleague Jim Lindgren point out, for example, that the average length of tenure between 1911-1940 was 16 years and dropped to 12.2 years between 1941-1970 )perhaps skewed by the one-year term of James Byrnes and the 4 or 5 year term of Charles Whittaker). The average length between 1970-2005 is 26.1 years! And the average age of leavetaking in this period has been just short of 80. This is crazy. Almost no other country has this kind of "real" life tenure, as distinguished, say, from "life tenure with age limits." And most countries, at least in constitutions written since World War II, have wisely chosen to have limited terms for their highest courts.
The best defense of our system is offered by Ward Farnswroth, who offers a shorter version of an article that has also been recently published in the Illinois Law Review. Farnsworth is an interesting (and independent) thinker, but I think it's fair to summarize his argument as of the "if it ain't broke, it doesn't need fixing" genre. He freely admits that no one advising some other country on "constitutional design" would suggest the US system. Most of us believe that the system IS broken, for reasons ranging from the political gaming of appointments (with an incentive to appoint youngsters) and resignations, not to mention the fact that a depressing number of judges have stayed on even after losing (at least) a step in mental acuity. The worst example was William O. Douglas, but, alas, he's not the only one. (David Garrow has a piece in the Carrington-Cramton book on this.)
The major disagreement between Calabresi-Lindgren and myself is whether one would need a (practically unattainable) constitutional amendment in order to establish term limits (we all agree that 18 years would be the right term) or whether this could be done by legislation. My piece in the book argues for the latter, since the Constitution simply does not SAY "life tenure." It, instead, says that a judge can't be impeached so long as his/her "behaviour" is "good."
The Federalist surely doesn't think the Constitution was intended to allow term limited judges. Since term limits, especially overly short ones, raise various problems such as possible favoritism in hope for a position after forced retirement, an amendment is probably needed.
As to Douglas. Term limits would not solve that problem. I think term limits would encourage a set number of years on lower courts, thus perhaps ten on each level, at least in certain cases. Thus, oveall, a judge would have extended service. Think of term limits in state elective bodies that allow a person to run for a different position.
Furthermore, Douglas had his stroke in his mid-70s. Consider Powell, appointed in his sixties, and on the Court for around fifteen years. In the future, especially with term limits and longer life spans encouraging appointment of older nominees, various judges might be in their 70s before being term limited.
The best way to deal with a Douglas is a stricter definition of "good behavior." The successful first impeachment was basically to deal with a sick judge. Alexander Hamilton noted that insanity would make a judge unfit for service.
Mental incompetence would as well. If push came to shove, Douglas should have been deemed in "bad" behavior. Insisting to stay on even though he knew he was not able to do the job.
I think O'Connor retired about the right time. A few others sticked around a few years too long, though surely did not linger on THAT long. White, for instance, was on for a long time, but no one suggested he past his time. I really don't find the 25yr time as that outrageous.
I think your suggestion to set fixed term limits taints the nobility of the US Justice, but am open to debate, and will enjoy the book in which you collaborated. I worry about the infamous vagaries of numerous foreign countries' judiciaries. And I have parallel concern that our solution be as auspiciously unique as our form of government. I dread the thought of the photogenic Justice receiving electronic prompting from a coterie of senior clerks during argument, as if SCOTUS were transmuting into a panel of Justice-experts and the lead anchor Justice. Other areas difficult to assess without much study are effects such as our newfound longevity; the effect on mentation induced by health maintenance pharmaceuticals; and, as your earlier commenters quickly observed, the new partisanships that would impart a new kind of inertia to SCOTUS rendering it more similar to some state courts with elected judges for fixed terms. One idea that came to mind was to form a panel of appeals court judges to write performance reviews of the nine Justices, though I could imagine clamor from academia, ABA, and thence, Federalist, Heritage, and all the influential jurisprudential societies to rotate through their own representation in the review panel. The riskiest element in the concept of fixed terms is its first vetting. Something about the ambience in the current congress makes me sense its aims in such deliberations might be less far seeing than the enthusiastic souls who comprised the constitutional conventions.
Why should a constitutional amendment be insurrmountable?
The 11th, 12th, 20th and 25th which made similar minor housekeeping changes in the Constitution that weren't deeply partisan.
An 18 year term, particularly if it was made prospective only, is just the sort of matter upon which bipartisan agreement could be achieved and upon which ratification could be accomplished.
Whether the founders definitively considered whether it would be possible or not to by statute have something other than life tenure, long practice in the United States has been to the contrary and has cemented the view that Article III judges are entitled to life tenure.
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