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Tuesday, December 06, 2005

Watching Legal Philosophers Lose Their Cool

Brian Tamanaha

If you thought legal philosophers are a staid bunch engaged in reasoned exchange, think again. Starting with Ronald Dworkin's dismissive account of legal positivist theory in the Harvard Law Review a couple of years ago, it seems that hurling insults at opponents in a high profile forum is no longer out of bounds. A recent article in the august American Journal of Jurisprudence by Matthew Kramer, Professor of Legal Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, takes this to new heights.

Here's a passage from the second paragraph: "When the inadequacy of [Prof. Nigel Simmonds] grasp of the issues surrounding that central point is revealed, readers will be able to judge for themselves the likelihood of the soundness of his remaining arguments."

That sounds mild, but he's just warming up. A few paragraphs later: "Until I came upon these ripostes by Simmonds, I would not have imagined that any competent reader could have construed my analysis in the manner in which he has construed it."

Then Kramer really gets rolling: "Simmonds's distortive interpretation"; "entirely wrong"; "What Simmonds has woefully failed to recognize..."; "To see how shallow Simmonds's understanding of the matter is..."

The final paragraph of the article contains these gems: "In sum, although Simmonds exhibits an impressive capacity for bombast and invective, he exhibits not even an elementary grasp..."; "When his faulty understanding of the matter is dispelled..."; "Simmonds has blundered in thinking..."

These insults, and few more I left out, were packed into a 10 page article--the coveted lead article, no less. If you are wondering what Simmonds did to deserve such treatment, about a year ago I happened to have read Simmonds's article, which was sharp, to be sure, but not way over the line (though I guess the line is getting fuzzier).

Now, I admit to having a committed more than a few rhetorical excesses in print (especially in first drafts, which are later defanged), and I'm certainly not beyond sarcasm now and then.

In blogs this would be fine (I am an avid reader of Leiter Reports, which launches an occasional attack of this sort, though more artfully).

But personal attacks like this in a highly respected scholarly journal are beyond the pale. Professor Kramer, no doubt a really smart fellow, obviously has issues (as my teenage daughter would politely put it), but the solution in instances like this lies with the Journal Editors: JUST SAY NO! (clean it up or no go).

It would be an exaggeration to say that this nasty style of discourse is becoming a trend in legal philosophy--it isn't--but it does appear to have popped up a bit more than usual in the last few years. It would be ironic if civility became a casuality in debates among legal philosophers over issues relating to law and morality.

Oh yeah, after being distracted by the nastiness, I stopped focusing on the substance of Kramer's argument. I'm sure it said something worthwhile, but I was no longer interested.

Comments:

There is something to be said for a little more passion in scientific writing, generally, in that it can make a text more engaging to both casual readers and peers of the author who would disagree. But a long line of personal attacks seems to only damage both the argument (can it not stand for itself?) and the author (what is his issue, anyway?).
 

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