E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action. . . . The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change. . . .
Far be it from me to correct anyone's use of English...so I'll let Webster's do it for me:
Fix, vb 1: to make firm, stable or stationary 2: to hold or direct steadily 3: to set or place definitely: ESTABLISH 4: to set in order 5: to get ready: PREPARE 6: REPAIR; MEND
So there are a multitude of options for what the word means in this context. Also does it make sense to say futher on in the same memo,
"Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."
if they didn't think he had WMD? No it wouldn't make sense. The only way the memo ISN'T nonsense is if you read it to mean that the Bush Administration in July of 2002 was building its case around terrorism and WMD claims...which is exactly what they did.
Well, there are at least two things in this story that should raise concern. First, the memo does *not* suggest that Bush didn't believe that there were no WMD's in Iraq; rather it suggests that the evidence that the WMD's posed a significant threat worth going to war over was "thin," but that Bush was determined to go to war anyway, and that the intelligence and facts were being read (or firmed up or established or prepared or pick your favorite synonym) in such a way as to support this foregone conclusion. It suggests that facts were not going to get in the way of what Bush wanted to do.
Second, the memo suggests that Bush was determined to go to war as early as July of 2002, although he kept insisting to the United States and the world community that he had not made up his mind to go to war until near the end of March in 2003.
Yeah - The absence of evidence that Bush might have thought Saddam didn't have WMDs is something we should take away from this memo? There is no evidence that I am not a war criminal either.
Besides, there is no way we thought Saddam had WMDs prior to July 2002 - right?
I am with the midwesterner - this secret memo is fixed in my mind as nonsense.