credible vote trading

Ian Ayres

Imagine that next week Al Gore and Ralph Nader hold a joint press conference. Gore announces that he is withdrawing his name from the ballot in Texas and seven other states where polls project George Bush as a clear winner and Gore directs his supporters in those states to vote for Nader. Nader in turn announces that he is withdrawing his name from the ballot in twelve other swing states and directs his supporters in these states to vote for Gore.

This deal represents a kind of interstate vote trading that could be good for both candidates. Nader and his Green party would be virtually assured of receiving more than 5% of the overall votes cast – and thus would qualify for public funding in both this and the next campaign cycle. Gore would gain votes in the crucial swing states that might very well determine the election.

While polling results have been notoriously volatile in this campaign, recent polls have shown Gore to be trailing by more than 20 percentage points in Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and
Wyoming. But nonetheless almost 3% of the nation’s total votes are predicted to be cast for Gore in these states. Gore gains nothing from these votes, but these same votes if cast for Nader could mean all the difference in qualifying for public funding.

In contrast, there are twelve states in which there is less than a 10 percentage point difference between Gore and Bush, but in which Nader
support represents at least 50% of the difference. These swing states (Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Washington and Wisconsin) account for almost one-half of the total electoral college votes that Gore needs to win. In five of these states, the current polls suggest that Nader votes added to Gore’s current support would move Gore from behind to ahead of Governor Bush.

By cutting this deal, Gore would be trading almost 3 votes for every 1 vote that he picked-up from Nader in return -- about 3 million votes in the eight states where he will almost surely lose in exchange for about 1 million votes in the twelve states where Nader’s presence on the ballot may otherwise cost Gore the election.

The impetus for vote trading grows out of the winner-take-all structure of state elections. The second place finisher in a state gains no electoral college votes regardless of whether this finisher earned 1% of 49% of that state’s overall vote. Interstate vote trading serves to re-enfranchise substantial voting populations whose votes are trapped as worthless minorities in winner-take-all states by allowing them to have at least an indirect effect on the election. Vote trading can thus overcome certain anti-democratic aspects of the current electoral college system and pushes at least modestly toward a system where the candidate who was nationally most popular would win the election.

Of course, Gore’s conceding defeat in selected states might depress democratic turnout for Congressional races -- but democratic Congressional candidates are already preordained to lose most of the subsidiary elections in these staunchly republican states. And vote trading may even spur democratic turnout in these states. Instead, of casting a meaningless vote,
democrats -- can by voting for Nader -- increase the chance that Gore wins the national election.

Another problem is that it is too late in some states for candidates to remove their name from the ballot. And express vote trading might offend a sufficient number of undecided or decided voters so that the trading might cost them both more votes than it gains them. But there are many
less explicit ways to trade votes. For example, Gore could hold the press conference without Nader. And instead of expressly withdrawing his name from the ballot, Gore could simply call on his supporters in Texas to vote for Nader, but simultaneously call on all liberals in the swing states to vote for him (as the clear lesser of two evils).

As a sign of his good faith, Gore might even promise to appoint Nader as the nation’s chief consumer advocate (chair of the Federal Trade Commission) or promise to participate in future Presidential debates only if the Green party candidate is invited.

Indeed, it is not necessary for either Gore or Nader to hold a press conference. The idea of interstate vote trading has already occurred to individuals. The press has reported anecdotes of Gore supporters in Texas striking vote trading deals with friends who support Nader in Colorado.

But without some centralized coordination it will be hard for this market to clear. At a minimum, it is necessary to propose a focal point for voting. So here goes. I call on Gore supporters in Bush country (Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming) to vote your conscience. If you think Nader would make the better president, or if you think our public debate would be richer with a better funded Green Party, or even if you just want to help encourage reciprocated Gore support in the swing states, then you should vote for Nader.

But if you are a Nader supporter and live in a swing state (Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington and Wisconsin), you should vote for Gore. In these swing states, a vote for Nader may actually hand the presidency to a more conservative candidate. And if a vote-trading norm takes hold, voting for Gore can even be seen as voting your conscience as it indirectly can give rise to three votes for your preferred candidate in other states.

As it turns out this proposal would have worked to perfection in the last election, Nader with the Gore votes from the red states would have qualified for federal funding, and Gore with the Nader votes in the swing states would have easily won Florida and the election.

A crazy idea to be sure, but one that Kerry might deploy to respond to the Nader problem this election as well.