Balkinization  

Sunday, November 25, 2018

Procedural Implications of the Midterm Elections

David Super


     Well before the recent election, activists and pundits were hard at work shaping expectations for what would change in light of anticipated Republican losses.  Many of these predictions reflect considerable naivete about the operations of Congress.  Although many questions remain open, it seems useful to review what we know to this point.  This is the first of two posts; the second will focus specifically on budgetary issues.

     First, as to leadership.  The Senate is unlikely to see meaningful changes at the top:  Majority Leader McConnell led his caucus to larger-than-expected gains.  Democrats’ losses seem hard to attribute to Minority Leader Schumer, and having won his position by acclamation just two years ago he has no obvious challenger.  House Majority Leader McCarthy was easily elected minority leader after having worked tirelessly, and reasonably successfully, to minimize his party’s losses.  He also had the President’s support, which insulated him against the conservative critics who denied him the speakership previously.  To prevail, he only needed a majority of the Republican Caucus.

     House Democrats are another story.  Rep. Pelosi was one of the most skilled and effective speakers of modern times; if anything, she demonstrated even more acumen as minority leader.  Her ability to force Republicans into difficult votes while often shielding her own Members has a lot to do with Democrats’ reconquest of the House.  She also shrewdly leveraged situations when the Republican Caucus was split to extract substantial policy concessions from the Speakers Boehner and Ryan in exchange for the necessary Democratic votes.  The minority leader risks blowing up a deal of this kind if she dances a jig upon its completion, but her successes in defanging the devices Republicans had used to leverage cuts in domestic programs – the debt limit, sequestration, the need to adjust Medicare physicians’ reimbursement rates, etc. – merit a full ballet.

     Republicans have, however, succeeded in making her a lightning rod and frequently tried to tie Democratic candidates to her.  Her path to the speakership is considerably more difficult than Rep. McCarthy’s path to becoming minority leader was because she not only needs to win a majority of the Democratic Caucus – which she likely will secure in the next two weeks – but also to have 218 Members vote for her to be speaker on the first day of the new Congress.  That would require several Democrats who pledged not to vote for her to reverse their positions.  She is a superb vote-counter, and if she does not have those votes will withdraw on her own.  If she does step down, the rest of the House Democratic leadership, which currently has regional and factional balance, may be upended.  For example, if Democrats choose a more moderate candidate for speaker, progressive members may demand that one of their own become majority leader rather than retaining Minority Whip Hoyer.  Sorting this out could take quite some time.

     Senate Republicans may claim that their modest gains entitle them to shift the partisan balance in committees’ membership, presumably to create an 11-to-9 Republican advantage on the typical committee.  Democrats in theory could filibuster the organizing resolution that sets up Senate committees at the start of the new Congress but likely would only do so if the Republicans overreach sufficiently that the Democrats feel confident that the public will not blame them for obstructionism.  During the George W. Bush administration, Republicans (relying on Vice President Cheney’s tie-breaking vote) insisted upon a one-seat advantage on all committees when the Senate was evenly divided between the parties, and Democrats acquiesced.  In the current situation, one can imagine negotiations leading to two-seat Republican majorities on more powerful committees and one-seat majorities on others.

     A two-seat Republican majority still would allow Democrats to block legislation or nominations if they can stay together and persuade one Republican.  It does mean, however, that Democratic amendments to legislation will fail in committee unless they can attract two crossovers, which seems unlikely given the near-total disappearance of Republican moderates.  A two-seat majority also would allow Republicans to advance legislation when one of their Senators is ill or otherwise absent.

     House committees historically provide the majority party considerably larger margins than their overall numbers would dictate.  Nonetheless, because of the ideological range of the caucus, some committees may prove unreliable for the leadership’s priorities.  And with relatively tenuous control of the House and many new Members from Republican-leaning districts, Democrats cannot even consider passing over more conservative Members who are in line to chair committees. 

     Some Democratic activists have rejoiced that Democrats will have a voice in policy for the first time under President Trump.  This is incorrect:  the threat of a filibuster required all legislation apart from budget reconciliation bills to be negotiated with Senate Democrats, and fractures in the House Republican Caucus often gave House Democrats leverage on important legislation such as appropriations and legislation raising the debt limit.  Democrats’ taking over the House should, however, prevent Republicans from threatening to resort to budget reconciliation.  That, in turn, will strengthen the hand of Senate Democrats despite their somewhat diminished numbers by forcing all legislation to go through the regular order.

     The House Democratic leadership may have considerable difficulty controlling the floor.  Although control of the gavel and committee supermajorities initially may succeed in bottling up problematic legislation, Republicans amended House rules to facilitate petitions discharging committees from the further consideration of particular bills.  If a majority of representatives signs a discharge petition for a particular bill or resolution, the leadership must bring it before the House promptly.  Republican seem likely to exert strong pressure on vulnerable Democrats to sign discharge petitions on politically seductive legislation, including bills to further harm the environment and to intensify pressure for budget cuts by extending or expanding the 2017 tax cuts.

     One result of a Democratic House majority that activists most eagerly anticipate, and that Republicans most fear, is the ability to subpoena executive branch witnesses to investigate what the Administration has been doing.  This process is not nearly as simple as many seem to believe. 

     Rule XI(m) of the House’s standing rules allow committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas, either by a majority vote or through committee rules delegating the subpoena power to the chair.  One might hope that the issuance of such a subpoena would be decisive, but the current Administration may not be inclined to comply routinely, 

     The Senate has a special statute allowing its legal counsel to bring a civil contempt action in federal district court to compel compliance with its subpoenas.  The House, unfortunately, lacks such a statute (and certainly is unlikely to obtain one under this Administration). 

     Should an Administration official (or anyone else) ignore a subpoena, the House may pass a resolution asserting that that individual is in contempt of Congress and referring her or him to the appropriate U.S. attorney for prosecution.  Jefferson’s Manual § 299 at 143-44 (2017).  The first such case against a sitting executive branch official involved EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch in 1982. 

     The President, however, controls the Justice Department, and his appointees can decline to take action against those ignoring House subpoenas.  The President has repeatedly asserted that the Department of Justice should act to further the current Administration’s policy; it therefore remains to be seen whether this aspect of the Department’s historical and statutory role will survive.  The House occasionally has passed resolutions authorizing the Sergeant at Arms or other officers of the House to retain counsel to assert the interests of the House, Jefferson’s Manual § 291b at 135 (2017), and in theory it may direct its Sergeant at Arms to detain any recalcitrant witness.  Jefferson’s Manual § 297, at 140 (2017).  When compared with the resources of the Administration, however, these seem rather underpowered.    

     Should the Administration both refuse to comply with a lawful subpoena and direct the Justice Department to take no action to enforce the House’s subpoena, the House in theory could commence impeachment proceedings against the official refusing to comply, against the attorney general, or against the President.  The minimal prospects of obtaining the required two-thirds majority in the Senate to convict – indeed, with no assurances that Senator McConnell would even convene an impeachment trial at all – this is a rather limited threat. 

     These practical limitations may be part of Democratic leaders’ motivation in insisting that House committees limit and coordinate their oversight efforts.  If subpoenas may only be effectively enforceable in the court of public opinion, Democrats will want to avoid the perception that they are overreaching.  

     One possible deterrent to blatant disregard for the House’s subpoenas is the possibility that an individual doing so could be prosecuted under the next Administration should the President not be re-elected.  Although prosecutions under the statute for contempt of court carry a one-year statute of limitations, contempt of Congress is criminalized under a separate law and thus would appear to fall under the general five-year federal statute of limitations.  Of course, any Administration official refusing to comply with a House subpoena facing that prospect could hope that the President would pardon her or him before leaving office.  

Affirmative action and racial tribalism

Andrew Koppelman


Last week, at the Federalist Society Lawyers Convention in Washington DC, I was on a panel about Students for Fair Admission v. Harvard, in which it is alleged that Harvard has been discriminating against Asian-Americans.  Here are my remarks:




The affirmative action controversy is tediously familiar.  It’s a ubiquitous part of American life.  (I’m a beneficiary of affirmative action myself, since I’m the token liberal on this panel.)  For many years, American conservatives have proposed to interpret all civil rights laws, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to prohibit it.

It’s a commonplace of semantics that the exact same action can have different meanings in different contexts.  Students for Fair Admission v. Harvard presents itself as a blow against racial tribalism.  In context, though, this is likely to make that tribalism worse.

I begin by wishing a plague on both your houses – the opponents of affirmative action, but also its defenders.  Start with the opponents.

When Chief Justice Roberts writes that “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,” he claims that the essence of racism is classification.  Roberts implies, as Alan Freeman put it decades ago, "that Black Americans can be without jobs, have their children in all-black, poorly funded schools, have no opportunities for decent housing, and have very little political power, without any violation of antidiscrimination law."  To this one might add mass incarceration, with its devastating effect on families and communities – something that conservatives, who care about intermediate associations and the values of local communities, ought to be more concerned about.  On Roberts’s account, if black people think that these disadvantages stamp them with a badge of inferiority, that is solely because they choose to put that construction upon it.

Aggregate racial effects matter.  A large class of Americans remains disadvantaged because their ancestors were slaves.  To that extent, we still haven’t defeated the Confederacy.  Opponents of affirmative action commonly say that we can achieve a comparable level of racial diversity without using racial classifications.  But note that they concede that it is ok to say that.  Evidently they’re not indifferent to aggregates either.

But one can say all this without defending affirmative action, which doesn’t remedy the worst injuries of racism. It benefits the most privileged minority applicants.  It helped create a large black middle class, which is a great accomplishment, but it doesn’t address the most damaging consequences of slavery and segregation.  It’s racial justice on the cheap. 

It creates the illusion of equality.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger is quite transparent about this:  “In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.”  The entering class of Harvard is to be selected, as Robert Delahunty once put it, on the same principle as “models in a United Colors of Benetton advertisement.”  The obsession with appearances also drives the demand for obfuscation, as when the Court allows race to be a plus factor but bans quotas, even though these are functional equivalents.  And it also stokes racial resentment: for every black student admitted, there are 100 white ones who know, to a moral certainty, that they would have gotten that slot.

The left shouldn’t settle for this.  It should demand a lot more.  I would cheerfully jettison affirmative action in favor of measures that would actually improve the condition of the worst off people in American society, black and white.  Maybe Congress could do it, in a grand bargain that clarifies the Civil Rights Act while at the same time taking more concrete measures against racial subordination.  I have no illusions that that will happen.  The proposal that is on the table is to abolish affirmative action and replace it with nothing at all.

One doesn’t need to love affirmative action to worry about Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard.  I won’t try to adjudicate the merits of the lawsuit, since the expert statisticians are in deep disagreement.  If Harvard does discriminate against Asian-Americans, that’s nasty.  Discrimination against an ethnic minority is exactly what the law aims to prohibit.  On the other hand, it’s confused to say that Asians have any special stake in eliminating affirmative action for African-Americans.  Even if you set aside a quota for that group, that says nothing about what you do with the remaining slots.

Everyone understands that this litigation aims to beat a path to the Supreme Court, and to persuade the Court to discard the decades-old understanding of Title VI in favor of an absolute bar on any consideration of race.  The consequence would be a significant reduction in the number of black students at many universities.  This private litigation may be the opening wedge of more lawsuits to come.  The Trump administration is preparing to redirect resources of the Justice Department’s civil rights division toward investigating and suing universities over affirmative action admissions policies deemed to discriminate against white applicants. 

What will it mean for a Republican Justice Department to start investigating colleges for telltale signs that there are too many African-Americans?  It would fit very neatly into a dangerous narrative.  Only 27 percent of Republicans think that black people experience a lot of discrimination today, but 43 percent think that there is a lot of discrimination against white people.  (In the past few years, the percentage of Republicans who believe that Muslims, LGBT people and Jews face discrimination has likewise dropped.)  This litigation promotes a narrative in which incompetent and undeserving black people are taking desirable spots from whites.

Chief Justice Roberts writes:

Government action dividing us by race is inherently suspect because such classifications promote “notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility,” “reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin,” and “endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.

Not a word about subordination: racism divides groups that he imagines to be otherwise equal.  The problem is thinking of ourselves in tribal terms. 

But stipulate that he’s right, and look at what this litigation does – again, to the extent that its goal is the elimination of all racial classifications.  It is widely understood, by left and right, to be an effort to enlist Asian-Americans to form a bloc with whites, to resist the claims of blacks.  It promotes the politics of racial hostility.




Thursday, November 22, 2018

For those of you interested in the actual merits of the Census Citizenship-Question case . . .

Marty Lederman


The parties just filed their post-trial memoranda with proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, linked below.  Judge Furman will hear oral argument next Tuesday, November 26, and then issue a judgment . . . unless the government seeks a stay in the Supreme Court and the Court, for some inexplicable reason, orders the court not to issue a judgment in the case.

Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Facts

Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law

Defendants' Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law

Wednesday, November 21, 2018

"We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges."

Mark Tushnet

Don't cheer too soon. Wait until he or other conservatives trot out the line when the Supreme Court holds by five (Republican appointees) to four (Democratic appointees) that [fill in the blank], then see what you think.

Chief Justice Roberts' Press Statement

Gerard N. Magliocca

I'd be fascinated to hear more about how these comments to the Associated Press came about. Surely the Chief Justice must have told someone to tell the journalist to call him for this statement. I doubt very much that intrepid reporters are constantly calling his chambers looking for comments and--at long last--hit the jackpot.

Sunday, November 18, 2018

[UPDATED] The Odd Supreme Court Grant in the Census Citizenship Question Case

Marty Lederman

Currently pending in the Southern District of New York is a case in which many States, counties, cities and private organizations have sued the Department of Commerce, seeking to enjoin the Department's plan to add a question about residents' citizenship to the 2020 census questionnaire.  Plaintiffs' primary arguments are that the inclusion of such a question is arbitrary or capricious and that it is the result of race discrimination in violation of the equal protection "component" of the Fifth Amendment.

Two important things happened in that case on Friday.

First, District Judge Furman completed the trial in the case, and scheduled post-trial oral argument for next Tuesday, November 27.

Later that same day, however, the Supreme Court treated the government's pending petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, granted the petition, and set an expedited briefing schedule with oral argument scheduled for February 19, 2019.  It's important to understand that the Supreme Court petition is not about the merits of the case.  It was filed before the trial started, and the only question it presents is with respect to the proper scope of discovery.  This is the Question Presented:

Whether, in an action seeking to set aside agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq., a district court may order discovery outside the administrative record to probe the mental processes of the agency decisionmaker—including by compelling the testimony of high-ranking Executive Branch officials —when there is no evidence that the decisionmaker disbelieved the objective reasons in the administrative record, irreversibly prejudged the issue, or acted on a legally forbidden basis.  
The Court has ordered the government to submit its opening brief by December 17.

This is, I believe, a very strange, almost inexplicable, grant, in light of two things:

First, on October 22, the Supreme Court denied a government motion to stay discovery of matters outside the administrative record (with the exception of the deposition of the Secretary of Commerce, which therefore did not occur).  The Solicitor General then made another motion to stay the district court proceedings, and once again, on November 2, the Supreme Court denied that motion, too.  Accordingly, the discovery at the heart of the petition then occurred and, as noted above, the trial is now finished, with oral argument to be held next week.

Second, the district court judge has already announced his expectation that in any findings of fact and conclusions of law that he makes in his post-trial judgment, he'll "differentiat[e]" between evidence that's within the administrative record and evidence adduced at trial that's outside the administrative record.  [UPDATE:  Here's a handy chart the plaintiffs submitted on Saturday identifying the submitted evidence from inside and outside the administrative record.]  That is to say, the judge will explain whether the plaintiffs should prevail on the administrative record alone and, if not, how any evidence outside that record might or might not affect the judgment.  The court added that "Defendants remain free to argue . . . that the Court should disregard all evidence outside the administrative record and, if unsuccessful, can argue on appeal that the Court erred in considering extra-record evidence."  Accordingly, as Judge Furman explained, "if the Court rules against Defendants on the basis of extra-record materials and a higher court holds that the Court should not have considered those materials, Defendants would be able to get complete relief" from the appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, after final judgment--no retrial would be necessary.

So what's the point of the Supreme Court's cert. grant, to review the propriety of discovery that has already been completed and to do so before the trial court enters judgment?  Why didn't the Court at least wait until Judge Furman issued his judgment?  If the district court has issued its judgment before December 17, when the government's opening brief in the Supreme Court is due, does the Court expect the parties simply to treat the proceedings in the Court as a sort of direct appeal from the district court on the merits--transforming the case into one involving a de facto certiorari before judgment of sorts--thereby circumventing the court of appeals?  That seems unlikely.  (And that's assuming the district court rules against the government.  If Judge Furman rules in favor of the government, what happens to the Supreme Court case?  Presumably the plaintiffs--unlike the government(?)--would be required to initially appeal to the court of appeals.  But if so, why is the government's evidence-based petition ripe for SCOTUS review now?)

And if Judge Furman's judgment comes after December 17, what are the parties supposed to do about it during their remaining briefing schedule in the Supreme Court?  Begin treating the SCOTUS case as if it were an appeal on the merits?  Simultaneously go up to the Second Circuit on the merits while the ancillary evidentiary question about what evidence the district court should have considered is pending in the Supreme Court?

I sense that I must be missing something here, but I've asked these questions of a bunch of people following the case, and no one's had a clue about what the Court has in mind.  [One wild speculation:  Perhaps the Court fully expects to dismiss the petition as moot once Judge Furman issues his judgment, but is merely trying to spur him to rule expeditiously--something the Court presumably cannot simply order a trial judge to do--to make it more likely the appellate courts can opine on the merits before the end of June.  If that's the reason, however, it seems unnecessary--as far as I know Judge Furman has been moving things along very briskly, with the summer deadline in mind.]

Meanwhile, just a few hours ago (yes, on a Sunday), the government defendants asked Judge Furman to revisit his prior decision to proceed toward final judgment, and moved him to stay all proceedings until the Supreme Court issues its decision on the evidentiary questions sometime between next March and June.  I must confess that I don't see the point in such a delay, especially in light of the court's determination to specify, in his forthcoming judgment, whether and how the plaintiffs' claims are affected by any materials outside the administrative record.  A four- to seven-month delay before the court enters its final judgment would effectively preclude the courts from being able to carefully consider the merits of the case before the new census forms are to be printed up in June.  Why would that be (in the government's words) "the most prudent course"?

[UPDATE:  Judge Furman has instructed the plaintiffs to file their response to the government's new motion by 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, November 20.  Here is that opposition.  Not satisfied with such a rapid schedule, DOJ has now gone to the U.S. Court of Appeals with a motion to stay the district court proceedings.  Others may disagree, but I don't see in that motion any persuasive basis for a stay.]

[UPDATE, Nov. 20:  Here's the plaintiffs' opposition to the stay motion.  Meanwhile the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has instructed the government to be patient:
The Government moved yesterday for a stay of proceedings in two consolidated district court cases pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of In re Department of Commerce, No. 18-557. A similar motion for a stay of proceedings, filed only two days ago, remains pending before the District Court, which set a deadline for filing any opposition to the motion by today at 4 p.m.  Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that the motions for a stay are DENIED as premature, without prejudice to renewing the motions for the Court’s consideration in the event the District Court denies the stay motion pending before it. In the event the District Court denies the motion, this appeal will be deemed automatically renewed for our consideration.
Late this afternoon, Judge Furman denied the motion for stay and didn't mince words about his views of the government's conduct:
"Unless burdening Plaintiffs and the federal courts with make-work is a feature of Defendants’ litigation strategy, as opposed to a bug, it is hard to see the point." 
"To borrow from Camus, '[o]ne must imagine Sisyphus happy.'"  
"The words 'harm' and 'injury' do not appear anywhere in their motion . . . for good reason, as the notion that they—or anyone else—would suffer 'irreparable harm' without a stay is laughable." 
"Defendants’ motion makes so little sense, even on its own terms, that it is hard to understand as anything but an attempt to avoid a timely decision on the merits altogether."   
"If Defendants’ motion in this Court comes close to the sanctionable line, [their CTA2] filing would sure seem to cross it."   
"Defendants’ motion is most galling insofar as it is premised on the suggestion that granting a stay would help conserve judicial resources.  It is plainly more efficient for this Court to rule expeditiously." 
"If Defendants were truly interested in conserving judicial resources, they could have avoided burdening this Court, the Second Circuit, and the Supreme Court with twelve stay applications over the last eleven weeks that, with one narrow exception, have been repeatedly rejected as meritless. Instead, Defendants would have focused their attention on the ultimate issues in this case, where the attention of the parties and the Court now belongs." 
"Enough is enough."
And still later this afternoon, the government, undeterred, went back to the Second Circuit and asked that court to now treat its earlier motion for stay as "automatically renewed."]

[UPDATE 11/21:  Here's the opposition to stay in the court of appeals from the city, county and state plaintiffs.

This afternoon the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit quickly and unceremoniously rejected the DOJ/DOC motion to stay Judge Furman's proceedings "substantially for the reasons set forth in the District Court’s brief opinion."]

[FURTHER UPDATE:  Just before midnight, the parties filed their post-trial memoranda--with oral argument to be held next Tuesday, Nov. 26:

Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Facts

Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Law

Defendants' Proposed Findings of Facts and Law]

Saturday, November 17, 2018

The Motion to Substitute

Gerard N. Magliocca

The Supreme Court would be doing everyone a favor by ordering briefing on the motion to substitute that Tom Goldstein has filed challenging the legality of the Acting Attorney General's appointment. I doubt that the Court would ever have to resolve this dispute. The mere order of briefing probably will hasten either the nomination of the next Attorney General or the withdrawal of Whitaker in favor of Rod Rosenstein, whom everyone agrees can serve as the Acting Attorney General.

Wednesday, November 14, 2018

Jack Balkin on Original Methods Originalism: A Response

Guest Blogger

John O. McGinnis and Michael Rappaport

In a recent blog post, Jack Balkin argues that Jonathan Gienapp’s new book creates problems for original methods originalism, the originalist approach that we have developed.  But, unfortunately, Balkin misunderstands original methods.  Balkin writes: “Original methods originalism is based on the assumption that there was a general consensus among well-trained lawyers about how to interpret the Constitution at the time it was adopted.”  Balkin repeats this claim later in the post.  But we have never claimed that there was such a general consensus.  And, in fact, we have disclaimed relying on that consensus.  In short: original methods works both interpretively and normatively whether or not there was a consensus on interpretive methods.      
Read more »

Sunday, November 11, 2018

Matthew Whitaker and the No Religious Test Clause

Guest Blogger

Philip Bobbitt

I gather a spokesperson for the Department of Justice---who declined to speak on the record--has been clarifying remarks made by the acting Attorney General, Matthew Whitaker, on a number of constitutional subjects.  Among these is the statement, made in a 2014 debate when Whitaker was a candidate for the Republican nomination for senator from Iowa, in response to a question as to “what criteria” a senator should use in evaluating judicial nominees.  Whitaker is reported to have said, “I’d like to see things like their world view, what informs them.  Are they people of faith?  Do they have a biblical view of justice, which I think is very important…And what I know is as long as they have that world view, they’ll be good judge.  And if they have a secular world view, where this is all we have here on Earth, then I’m going to be very concerned about that judge.”

In the various published commentaries made attacking or defending this position, I have been surprised not to have come across anyone who quotes Article VI of the Constitution that provides that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”

Nor is this omission irrelevant to persons interested in constitutional interpretation.  To those who think that the standards for Senatorial confirmation are constitutional in nature, even if there is no role for litigating the matter, ignoring the plain text of the Constitution is disheartening.  It gives further impetus to claims like, "the standards for impeachment are whatever the House finds them to be," "because the pardon power is by its terms unlimited, a president can pardon for any reason he wishes," despite textual commitments to the contrary.

Philip C. Bobbitt is the Herbert Wechsler Professor of Federal Jurisprudence and director for the Center for National Security at Columbia Law School. You can reach him by e-mail at pbobbi at law.columbia.edu





Saturday, November 10, 2018

Minority Rule: How Long?

Joseph Fishkin

I don’t usually do this, but I thought I’d re-up a prior post from before the election: majority leverage against minority rule.

The reason is the following simple point. The current Senate math suggests it is just possible—if almost everything breaks right—for Democrats to imagine potentially being in a position to govern the country in January 2021. Making plausible assumptions as I write this (Sinema in Arizona, Hyde-Smith in Mississippi, uncertainty in Florida), the Republicans will have a Senate majority in January 2019 of either 52 or 53.

Under current conditions of radical polarization, enacting any serious legislative agenda requires control of all three branches. That is even more true for any Democratic efforts to reform the political system in ways that make it less prone to minority rule—a federal statute protecting the right to vote, admitting new states such as Puerto Rico, limiting gerrymandering, enacting campaign finance laws compatible with current Court doctrine such as public financing, and so on. For Democrats to have any possibility of enacting such reforms in 2021, they will need a lot of unity and focus; they will need to win the presidential election; and they will need to net either +2 or +3 seats (at a minimum) in the Senate. Then they will need to enter the chamber in 2021 and immediately set rules that would protect the necessary reforms from filibuster. That is how a Democratic majority could use temporary leverage to put the brakes on minority rule.

This scenario is possible—but just barely. There are Republican incumbents in only a few purplish states facing the voters in 2020: Maine, Colorado, North Carolina, Arizona, Iowa. Meanwhile, Doug Jones (D-AL) will have a very uphill battle to retain his seat. So, under radically polarized conditions, the likely horizon of Democratic gains in a good year—and here we have to assume a year where Democrats are winning the White House—is just barely above the minimum required to regain a majority. If Democrats fail to win those races despite winning the votes of most voters in 2020, we will settle in for a considerably longer stretch of minority rule.

What will be absolutely unconscionable is if Democrats do manage to retake the Senate and White House in 2021, yet fail to use this temporary point of leverage to enact the kind of changes that would inch our system closer to majority rule. 

(Original post here.)

Friday, November 09, 2018

How Could Religious Liberty Be a Human Right?

Andrew Koppelman


A growing number of scholars think “religious liberty” is a bad idea.  The unfairness objection is that singling out religion for special protection is unjust to comparable nonreligious conceptions of the good.  The distraction objection asserts that religious liberty is a misleading lens: oppression sometimes occurs along religious lines, but the underlying conflicts often are not really about religious difference.  Both objections are sound, but under certain conditions religious liberty should nonetheless be regarded as a right.  Law is inevitably crude.  The state cannot possibly recognize each individual’s unique identity-constituting attachments.  It can, at best, protect broad classes of ends that many people share.  “Religion” is such a class.  Where it is an important marker of identity for many people, it is an appropriate category of protection.

That's the argument of my newly published article in the International Journal of Constitutional Law, here.  The same issue of the journal has a critical response by Prof. Gita Stopler, here, with a rejoinder by me, here.


Thursday, November 08, 2018

Interview for The Point Magazine

Corey Brettschneider

Here is my interview with The Point Magazine about my new book The Oath and the Office: A Guide To The Constitution For Future Presidentshttps://thepointmag.com/2018/dialogue/executive-decisions-american-politics-presidency

Who is the Attorney General?

Gerard N. Magliocca

Neal Katyal and George Conway have an op-ed in The New York Times arguing that the appointment of Acting Attorney General Whitaker is illegal and that any actions that he takes are null and void. I want to make one observation about their argument.

The Constitution sets forth a way to fill a vacancy created when a Cabinet member resigns, dies, or is fired. The President can make a recess appointment under Article Two, Section Three. In 2014, the Supreme Court held in Noel Canning that the Senate gets to decide when that body is in recess and, thus, when the President can make a recess appointment. This means that if the Senate was in recess yesterday, Mr. Whitaker's appointment is lawful but will expire at the end of the year.  But was the Senate in recess yesterday? The Senate was not in session yesterday. but I am unclear whether the Senate's adjournment on Tuesday (scheduled to last until Friday) is a recess.

If the Senate was not in recess yesterday, then I'm having a hard time understanding how the Federal Vacanies Reform Act does not present a constitutional problem as applied to Whitaker's appointment. What is the point of the Senate staying in session to prevent recess appointments if the President can make the same pick under the Act? Moreover, the Act in this instance may be increasing the scope of the President's temporary appointment power beyond what the Constitution would give (less than two months), and I'm not so sure that Congress can do that.

Monday, November 05, 2018

Our American Story

Gerard N. Magliocca

I am proud to tell you about a forthcoming book called Our American Story: The Search for a Shared National Narrative, which is now available for pre-order on Amazon. Scholars and elected officials from the left and right (including me) have contributed essays explaining how we think Americans might find common ground in this polarized age. Here is the Abstract:

Over the past few decades, the complicated divides of geography, class, religion, and race created deep fractures in the United States, each side fighting to advance its own mythology and political interests. We lack a central story, a common ground we can celebrate and enrich with deeper meaning. Unable to agree on first principles, we cannot agree on what it means to be American. As we dismantle or disregard symbols and themes that previously united us, can we replace them with stories and rites that unite our tribes and maintain meaning in our American identity? 
Against this backdrop, Our American Story features leading thinkers from across the political spectrum--Jim Banks, David W. Blight, Spencer P. Boyer, Eleanor Clift, John C. Danforth, Cody Delistraty, Richard A. Epstein, Nikolas Gvosdev, Cherie Harder, Jason Kuznicki, Gerard N. Magliocca, Markos Moulitsas, Ilya Somin, Cass R. Sunstein, Alan Taylor, James V. Wertsch, Gordon S. Wood, and Ali Wyne. Each draws on expertise within their respective fields of history, law, politics, and public policy to contribute a unique perspective about the American story. This collection explores whether a unifying story can be achieved and, if so, what that story could be.

Symposium on The Law And Policy Of AI, Robotics, and Telemedicine In Health Care -- Collected Posts

JB

Here are collected posts published in conjunction with a Solomon Center symposium on The Law And Policy Of AI, Robotics, and Telemedicine In Health Care.

1. Jack Balkin, Introduction to the Symposium

2. Claudia Haupt, The Algorithm Will See You Now

3. William M. Sage, Non-Diagnosis: An Unappreciated but Critical Role for AI in Healthcare

4. W. Nicholson Price II, Four Roles for Artificial Intelligence in the Medical System

5. A. Michael Froomkin, Organizing the Federal Government’s Regulation of AI

6. Eric M. Fish, Key Questions for Regulators Rise with the Dawn of AI-Driven Healthcare

7. Mason Marks, Artificial Intelligence for Suicide Prediction

8. Bonnie Kaplan, Seeing Transparency Through: Healthcare Software, Data Privacy, and Regulation

9. Frank Pasquale, Who is Your Therapy App Working For?

10. Paul Vincent Tongsy, Care Robots

11. A. Michael Froomkin, Big Data: Destroyer of Informed Consent

12. Fazal Khan, Regulating Carebots for the Elderly: Are Safety and Efficacy Sufficient Standards of Review?

13. Ian Kerr, AIs as Substitute Decision Makers

14. Sharona Hoffman, Artificial Intelligence and Predictive Data: The Need for A New Anti-Discrimination Mandate

15. Valarie K. Blake, Regulating Social Robots in Health Care


Content Moderation, The Press, and the First Amendment - A Discussion with Ben Smith and Josh Marshall

JB

On Thursday, October 25th, I led a discussion with Ben Smith of Buzzfeed and Josh Marshall of Talking Points Memo about how large platforms like Google and Facebook affect the freedom of the press. This was part of a conference on content moderation held at St. John's Manhattan campus and organized by Professor Kate Klonick

It was a great conversation, and it ranged widely over a number of very interesting subjects, including (1) how platforms are being dragged into becoming professional curators of the public sphere; (2) how journalistic organizations adjust to policies of platform companies that are not particularly focused on journalism, much less the survival of journalism; and (3) how platforms affect the economics of digital journalism for better and for worse.

Both Smith and Marshall also had important insights about their work in a media environment dominated by platforms.



Sunday, November 04, 2018

A Backdoor Approach to Calling an Article V Convention

David Super


     Proponents of calling an Article V convention certainly have hit a rough stretch.  In 2017, the most prominent of these groups, the Balanced Budget Amendment (BBA) Task Force, secured three new state resolutions asking Congress to call a convention under Article V, but three other states rescinded old resolutions seeking a convention.  In 2018, neither the BBA Task Force nor the Convention of the States Project (COSP) secured a single new state resolution calling for an Article V convention.  Several states with Republican majorities in both chambers of their legislatures buried or voted down convention resolutions. 

     In addition, a third group seeking an Article V convention to reduce federal powers, the Compact for America, released a legal analysis showing that many of the state resolutions from the 1970s and 1980s, which the Task Force includes in its optimistic count of states, have divergent and often inconsistent language from the BBA Task Force’s newer resolutions.  The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which has heavily supported the BBA Task Force and COSP, ejected the Compact from its meetings, but with a pro-convention group admitting the validity of arguments that liberal and conservative Article V opponents have long made, the BBA Task Force’s claims are increasingly difficult to defend to serious observers. 

     One might imagine that this would cause funders to flee and leaders of these groups to engage in some introspection.  Instead, the pro-Article V groups are responding to these setbacks by trying to move the goalposts.  This suggests that, if next week’s elections yield pro-Article V majorities in both houses, we could easily see an Article V convention without Article V’s prerequisites being met. 

     Former law professor Rob Natelson, a long-time spokesperson for those advocating an Article V convention to limit federal powers, wrote for the Federalist Society this Spring claiming that the BBA Task Force has understated the number of resolutions in force.  Offering little explanation for why he has not made this claim over the many years he has been working with the BBA Task Force, Prof. Natelson identified some old state resolutions seeking an Article V convention and argued that, because he believes they are not facially inconsistent with considering a balanced budget amendment, they should be aggregated with the old and new BBA resolutions that the Task Force has been counting. 

     This methodology led Professor Natelson to conclude that 33 states have active resolutions, one short of the 34 that would trigger the calling of a convention.  This creates the prospect that if a single additional state passes an Article V resolution, the BBA Task Force will demand that its allies in Congress convene an Article V convention.  Given the BBA Task Force’s strong ties to ALEC and major Republican donors, Republican senators and representatives would find these demands would difficult to brush aside.  Although a few Republicans – notably Arizona Rep. Andy Biggs, one of the most conservative in Congress – staunchly oppose calling an Article V convention, proponents would only have to pick up a handful of naïve Democrats to open up the Constitution to moneyed special interest groups’ wildest fantasies.  Even if Democrats retake one or both chambers of Congress on Tuesday, a coalition of pro-convention Democrats and Republicans could bring a resolution to call an Article V convention to the floor with a discharge petition. 

     Professor Natelson’s idea for adding five states to the Article V tally without any state legislative action would be alarming enough by itself, but it turned out that he was not finished.  A few months, later, he went further and claimed that several states’ rescissions of previous Article V resolutions are not valid.  He disagrees with statements made in the preambles to the rescissions and suggests that these “errors” might render the resolutions invalid on the grounds of “mistake.”  He urges Congress “to weigh whether or not to count purported rescissions flawed by material mistakes.” 

     It appears that in Prof. Natelson’s view, a state legislature commits a mistake almost any time it departs from Article V advocates’ talking points.  For example, he criticizes six states for referring to an Article V convention as a “constitutional convention”.  Article V advocates prefer the euphemistic “convention of the states”.  Neither term is in Article V, but as “constitutional” is an adjective defined as “of or relating to the constitution,” it is difficult to see why a convention whose business is changing the Constitution is not a “constitutional convention”.  He similarly faults five states for preambles expressing concern that an Article V convention could stray to topics far-removed from those motivating states to ask that it could be called.  Article V advocates strenuously insist that such a “runaway” convention would not occur, but nothing in the Constitution imposes any limits on such a convention and it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would enforce such limits even if they existed. 

     Needless to say, Prof. Natelson’s theory of mistake would destabilize the entire legislative process.  By this logic, a future president could disregard the December 2017 tax cut legislation because Congress mistakenly believed that the tax cuts would pay for themselves and not add to the deficit.  Congress certainly operated under plenty of misconceptions when it passed the USA PATRIOT Act; do those mistakes render that legislation invalid? 

     Prof. Natelson apparently sees no irony in claiming to champion returning power to the states while suggesting that Congress may disregard state legislatures’ actions when it regards those legislatures as misinformed.  If Congress was empowered to “correct” state legislatures’ discharge of matters clearly within their purview, states would no longer be sovereign. 

     It would be easy to dismiss Prof. Natelson were he not so central to the efforts of both the BBA Task Force and COSP as well as the enormously powerful ALEC.  It seems unlikely that he would be undermining his credibility with these extreme positions were those groups not seriously contemplating an attempt to get Congress to make an end run around state legislatures without the required 34 valid resolutions.  None of these groups appears to have made any effort to distance themselves from Prof. Natelson’s views. 

     This also puts to rest, once and for all, the notion that advocates of an Article V convention somehow represent a principled departure from politics as usual.  If they are open to disregarding the constitutional prerequisite of 34 state resolutions prior to the calling of an Article V convention, no one should expect that they will respect Article V’s requirement that 38 states ratify any proposed constitutional amendments before they take effect.  And they certainly will not respect state resolutions purporting to control convention delegates or their own promises about limiting the scope of an Article V convention. 

     The effort to call an Article V convention is not about aspirations for a better country.  Instead, it is very much an extension of the single-minded, bare-knuckles, brand of interest-group politics that has dominated in recent years.  The only difference is that the stakes are even greater.  

Saturday, November 03, 2018

The Devil is in the Data

Guest Blogger

Oliver J. Kim


At various points in our nation’s health history, a new technological advance is hyped as the silver bullet for our healthcare system. Of course, it is an axiom of law and public policy that the speed at which technology advances, vastly outpaces the law—that’s why we are coming together for this conference. Without legal, policy, and ethical guidelines to balance innovation, these breakthroughs may lead to unforeseen or even negative consequences for our society in our efforts to make healthcare more affordable and accessible.

One area that I focus on is how technology can be leveraged to reduce health disparities. Concerns about disparities can often focus on the relationship between innovation and costs: if these disruptive technologies are only be available to those who can best afford them, they will continue to widen the healthcare and digital divides in our society.

But there is another area of concern: who is actually in the data? The simplest way to illustrate this concern came from Jerry Smith, the Vice President of Data Sciences and Artificial Intelligence at Cognizant, at a Politico forum on AI. Type “grandpa” into Google’s image search and see what pictures come up. The vast majority of images are old, white men, and when I did my search for this blog, I scrolled through seven rows before I spotted an African American and down to the twentieth before I see a second. Perhaps because it is close to Halloween, I spotted a zombie grandpa and a Sponge Bob grandpa before even seeing an image even remotely depicting someone of my paternal grandpa’s ethnicity.

There is a Catch 22 about equity in the use of big data. Among many communities of color—often those most hurt by health disparities and in need of greater healthcare access—there is a historic mistrust in the healthcare system. Many individuals may fear giving up data due to uncertainties over who has access and how it may be used against them in unforeseen ways. But without this data, we are building systems that may not reflect our society as a whole.

We know well of numerous examples of medical experiments on low-income black communities. These events still have far-reaching effects: as Harriet Washington wrote in Medical Apartheid, “Mainstream medical scientists, journals, and even some news media fail to evaluate these fears in the light of historical and scientific fact and tend instead to dismiss all such doubts and fears as antiscience.” These concerns resonate even today in various aspects of care: in a community study of Washtenaw County, Michigan, African-American participants in a focus group revealed they were concerned about sharing information related to their end-of-life wishes because they were concerned that it could be used against them to ration their care. Current political trends also may make patients—particularly those seeking care that is either stigmatized or at odds with federal policy—fearful of sharing data or even accessing care.

But the datasets that inform our technologies may be biased towards a whiter, more affluent construct of American society and fail to pick up on nuances to create a richer, more accurate picture of society as a whole. For example, the term “Asian American” refers to a wide array of very different ethnicities with varied cultures, languages, socioeconomic statuses, and immigrant experiences. But being able to parse out this diversity has huge implications, particularly in health policy, for the Asian American-Pacific Islander (AAPI) community. One often-cited example is that the incidence of colorectal cancer appears to be similar between whites and Asian Americans as a whole, but when data on Asian Americans was disaggregated, researchers found that certain Asian ethnicities have lower screening rates. In other words, if AAPIs are viewed as a whole, it would be difficult to notice that difference but if the data is further sliced, it is possible to see significant variation. Data disaggregation is a huge issue for AAPI organizations such as the Asian American & Pacific Islander Health Forum, of which I am a board member.

Some of technology’s limits are due to the biases of its human creators. Often in designing a policy or a product, we may fail to meet people where they are. For example, the means that patients use to access patient portals—or get online in general—can present a barrier for some communities to fully access their data. For many African American and Latino patients, a smartphone, not a desktop computer or a tablet, is the most common device for going online. However, such devices may not be suitable for accessing health records: “Although it is possible for patients with smartphones to access any available computer-based PHR using their mobile devices, websites that are not optimized for mobile use can be exceedingly difficult to navigate using the relatively small-sized smartphone screens.” Moreover, federal Medicare and Medicaid incentives for the meaningful use of electronic medical records “do not require that PHRs be easily accessible via mobile devices.

If our data is “bedeviled” because it is not fully comprehensive yet the potential sources—many individuals who may have strong feelings about the healthcare system and value their privacy—of such missing data are reluctant to share, how do we exorcise this devil in the data? Indeed, tools such as artificial intelligence and machine learning threaten to exacerbate health disparities and mistrust in the healthcare system if they are built on a data infrastructure that does not truly look like American society.

What can the law do to address these issues? I’ll be discussing in a forthcoming paper for the conference, tools that policymakers could utilize to help diversify health data by encouraging an environment of trust, security, and accountability between patients and the research community. Policymakers can regulate, including prohibit, behavior that runs counter to their policy goals. For example, a series of federal laws—including Section 185 of the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act, Section 3002 of the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, and Section 4302 of the Affordable Care Act—were supposed to encourage more rigorous reporting requirements for Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program as well as federally certified EMRs. Such richer data sets would “represent a powerful new set of tools to move us closer to our vision of a nation free of disparities in health and health care.” However, such requirements are only useful if they are utilized or enforced.

We have high hopes for using data to improve care: “For example, epigenetic data, if validated in large-scale data, could be used to address health disparities and environmental justice.” That “if” though is crucial, and many demons need to be exorcised from the data before the hype over such data and its related uses meets our actual reality. As Dr. Smith noted, “All the data we get from our lives by its nature has biases built into it.” Bias doesn’t mean animus necessarily, but it does mean we need to think through the data—how it was collected, who is represents—before accepting it carte blanche. 

Oliver J. Kim is Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh, and Principal, Mousetrap Consulting. You can reach him by e-mail at oliver at mousetrapdc.com



Friday, November 02, 2018

Regulating Social Robots in Health Care

Guest Blogger

Valarie K. Blake

As artificial intelligence is mainstreamed into medicine, robots are designed not just as extensions of human hands but also of human hearts. A social robot is one that is programmed through machine learning to read human emotions (typically through face or voice cues) and to respond with appropriate mimicked emotional states. Social robots may appear to patients like they understand their fears, or pain, or sorrow and might reply with encouragement, or persuasion, or something like empathy. Social robots are already being successfully integrated into medicine: Paro, the therapeutic robot seal designed for elderly patients with dementia, Robin, a robot that helps diabetic children learn self-maintenance, and QTrobot, designed to build social skills in children with autism. Social robot technology is far from attaining the humanoid superiority of Blade Runner or Westworld but the technology is rapidly advancing and it receives a strong assist from our ingrained tendencies to anthropomorphize objects. Many robot scholars think that humans will form significant emotional attachments to social robots; studies of human-robot interactions already demonstrate that humans protect robots from harm, assign them moral significance, and tell them secrets that they might not otherwise share.

The Food and Drug Administration governs safety and proper labeling of medical devices, for instance pacemakers, but these devices are inanimate; patients do not interact with them or believe them to have feelings and personalities. How to regulate the social robot which is neither person nor mere devices? That will depend greatly on their design and how patients respond to them. It is possible that a well-designed social robot could raise ethical and legal issues that evoke more medical practice and less device.

Consider the privacy and surveillance implications of a care robot that works something like Amazon’s Alexa but with much greater social valence. Care robots may be at besides or in homes twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. If these robots are programmed to convey information back to the medical provider or programmers (as Alexa does), they may witness and record a patient’s daily health behaviors and, if they really work as designed, even elicit confidences and, in turn, be privy to sensitive information about patients’ mental states. What if a patient shares something embarrassing or private about her medical condition? Patients may not realize that information they casually tell a social robot could be relayed back to health care providers, other people on a medical team, IT personnel, or robot maintenance and developers. Or that their information could be stored for much longer than in conventional medical settings. Also, consider important exceptions to privacy in health care contexts. Imagine the stroke patient that tells her in-home care robot that she has been feeling very down and that she has recently been thinking about suicide. Or, a child who discloses to her diabetes-educator robot, Robin, that her father abused her. Care robots might extend the frequency with which providers find out about such issues. How should the care robot respond and will such information be conveyed back to a provider in some manner, how quickly, and whose responsibility will it be to make sure this process work seamlessly?

Social robots may also create opportunities for endless patient surveillance. In the churn and burn of modern medicine, providers spend little time at the bedside of patients. The presence of care robots at homes or bedsides presents the possibility of a nanny state, where robots can “narc” on patients, telling the provider about all sorts of conduct or statements that the patient would prefer the provider otherwise not know. For instance, that the patient is drinking again, or smoking, or not taking their medication regularly, or refusing to remain bed-bound. Could such information be used for important clinician decisions, such as whether the patient is eligible for a surgery or for a scarce resource like an organ? Alternatively, might providers and hospitals seek to use this information to mitigate damages in some malpractice suits?

How a care robot is programmed and deployed may make some of these issues more or less likely. But they are meant to suggest a larger issue¾ never before have we had a category of medical care that is neither perfectly human nor perfectly device. I can think of nothing less like a pacemaker than a high-functioning social robot. Nobody tells their pacemaker secrets, nobody expects their pacemaker to have any autonomy or moral authority, and a pacemaker does not have the capability of relaying secrets back to the medical team. A social robot may be programmed to be social for specific reasons- to be an authority figure, or a proxy for the physicians, or a helper and confidante. The social AI that works well does so because it creates a social relationship with the patient. The more successful, the more the robot raises important issues around autonomy, coercion, privacy, trust in the robot and in the patient-provider relationship, and other matters that look less like issues covered by FDA regulation and far more like the traditional ethical and legal rules governing health care providers.

At minimum, bioethicists, health lawyers, and health care providers need to be engaged with roboticists at the early stages in this new era in robotics to consider the capabilities of these robots and the likely ethical and legal issues they will raise in health care settings. Beyond this, regulatory models will need to be considered that address this new hybrid in medical care. One possible model is to subject the manufacturers of these robots to a form of licensure that requires compliance with a code of ethical standards, somewhat like how health care providers have to follow certain ethical standards set forth by their state medical boards. Additionally, providers who choose to deploy social robots might have additional ethical norms they sign on to speaking to proper usage in clinical practice. More thought needs to go into various options for regulation and the best way to bring such groups into a compliance scheme, without overly burdening beneficial innovations. Social robots that truly engage patients have the potential to change the face of medical care, but the better they work the more likely they are to generate significant ethical and legal challenges.


Valarie K. Blake is Associate Professor at West Virginia University College of Law. You can reach her by e-mail at valarie.blake at mail.wvu.edu and on Twitter at @valblakewvulaw

Thursday, November 01, 2018

Balkinization Symposium on Jonathan Gienapp, The Second Creation-- Collected Posts

JB


Here are the collected posts for our Balkinization symposium on Jonathan Gienapp's new book, The Second Creation: Fixing the American Constitution in the Founding Era (Belknap Press 2018).

Jack Balkin, Introduction to Symposium on Jonathan Gienapp, The Second Creation

Jack Balkin, The Second Creation and Orignalist Theory

Gerard Magliocca, Fixation and Legitimacy

Bernadette Meyler, The Second Creation and Its Implications

Christina Mulligan, Evolving into the Fixed Constitution

Alison L. LaCroix, The Invention of the Archival Constitution







The Constitutional Challenge to Robert Mueller's Appointment

Marty Lederman

One week from today, on Thursday, November 8 at 1:00, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (Judges Henderson, Rogers and Srinivasan) will hear argument in Miller v. United States, No. 18-3052, a case challenging the constitutionality of Robert Mueller’s appointment to serve as “Special Counsel” for the Russia investigation.

The appellant is Andrew Miller, a potential grand jury witness who refused to comply with a pair of subpoenas requiring him to provide testimony and documents to the grand jury.  Miller argued, among other things, that the subpoenas should be quashed because Mueller was not lawfully appointed.  Miller continued to refuse to comply with the subpoenas even after Chief Judge Howell denied his motion to quash them, and so the Judge held him in contempt.  Miller has appealed from that contempt order.

He makes three separate arguments that Rosenstein’s appointment of Mueller purportedly violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which provides that:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
First, and most fundamentally, Miller argues that Special Counsel Mueller is a “principal” officer and therefore could only be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, which was not done here.

Second, Miller argues that even if Special Counsel Mueller is an “inferior” officer, his appointment was nevertheless unconstitutional because Congress has not “by law” vested the Attorney General with the authority to appoint such a Special Counsel (in effect, a question of statutory interpretation, about whether the appointment was ultra vires).

Third, Miller argues that even if Special Counsel Mueller is an “inferior” officer, and even if Congress authorized the Attorney General to appoint him, the Deputy Attorney General, Rod Rosenstein, may not make the appointment because he is not the “Head” of the Department of Justice, even where, as here, he’s exercising the functions of the Office of the Attorney General because the Attorney General himself, Jeff Sessions, is recused from the investigation and is therefore unable to exercise those functions.

If the court of appeals were to hold that the Mueller appointment was unconstitutional, that would, of course, be a very big deal.  In a series of posts over at Just Security, however, I do something of a "deep dive" into Appointments Clause arcana in order to explain why that’s a very unlikely outcome.   I also identify two or three questions the court of appeals need not, and probably should not, try to answer definitively that might have greater implications for developments apart from the case on appeal—including, importantly, the nature and scope of the Acting Attorney General’s authority to remove Mueller.

The first post offers a general overview of the case, with links to the lower court opinions and the briefs on appeal.

In my second post, I explain why there’s actually a serious question, not briefed by the parties, about whether the Appointments Clause applies to Mueller at all (a question the court of appeals can likely avoid by simply assuming, without deciding, that Mueller is a constitutional “officer”).

The third post is perhaps the most important—not for purposes of resolving the Miller appeal itself, but more broadly for what it says about the officers throughout the government, including Mueller, whose independence is secured in part by tenure protections that preclude “at will” removal.  In that post, I take issue with the tentative suggestion in Chief Judge Howell’s opinion that it might be proper—or necessary to avoid a difficult constitutional question—for the court to construe expansively the Acting Attorney General’s authority to remove Mueller under the DOJ Special Counsel regulations.

My fourth post addresses a handful of issues raised by Judge Friedrich in her opinion in a related case raising similar Appointments Clause challenges to Mueller, including: whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson (1988) is still "good law"; whether a bipartisan consensus has emerged that Morrison was wrongly decided; whether the Special Counsel is an inferior officer whose appointment was constitutional even under the analysis of the Court’s later decision in Edmond v. United States (1999); and whether the prospect of a possible rescission or amendment of the Special Counsel regulations affords Rosenstein greater control over the conduct of the Mueller investigation, and whether that question has any bearing on the Appointments Clause questions in the Miller case.

In my final post, I briefly discuss what I’ve labeled above as the second and third of Miller’s three Appointments Clause arguments, both of which are predicated on the assumption that the Appointments Clause applies and that Mueller is an inferior officer.

Artificial Intelligence and Predictive Data: The Need for A New Anti-Discrimination Mandate

Guest Blogger

Sharona Hoffman

For the Symposium on The Law And Policy Of AI, Robotics, and Telemedicine In Health Care.

A large number of U.S. laws prohibit disability-based discrimination.  At the federal level, examples are the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Fair Housing Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act.  In addition, almost all of the states have adopted disability discrimination laws.  This might lead to the conclusion that we enjoy comprehensive legislative protection against discrimination associated with health status.  Unfortunately, in the era of big data and artificial intelligence (AI) that is no longer true.

The problem is that the laws protect individuals based on their present or past health conditions and do not reach discrimination based on predictions of future medical ailments.  The ADA, for example, defines disability as follows: a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, b) a record of such an impairment, or c) being regarded as having such an impairment.  This language focuses only on employers’ perceptions concerning workers’ current or past health status.
Modern technology, however, provides us with powerful predictive capabilities.  Using available data, AI can generate valuable new information about individuals, including predictions of their future health problems.  AI capabilities are available not only to medical experts, but also to employers, insurers, lenders, and others who have economic agendas that may not align with the data subjects’ best interests. 

AI can be of great benefit to patients, health care providers, and other stakeholders.  Machine learning algorithms have been used to predict patients’ risk of heart disease, stroke, and diabetes based on their electronic health record data.   Google has used deep-learning algorithms to predict heart disease by analyzing photographs of individuals’ retinas.  IBM has used AI to model the speech patterns of high-risk patients who later developed psychosis. In 2016, researchers from the University of California, Los Angeles announced that they had used data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey to build a statistical model to predict prediabetes.  Armed with such means, physicians can identify their at-risk patients and counsel them about lifestyle changes and other preventive measures.  Likewise, employers can use predictive analytics to more accurately forecast future health insurance costs for budgetary purposes. 

Unfortunately, however, AI and predictive analytics generally may also be used for discriminatory purposes.  Take employers as an example.  Employers are highly motivated to hire healthy employees who will not have productivity or absenteeism problems and will not generate high health insurance costs.  The ADA permits employers to conduct wide-ranging pre-employment examinations. Thus, employers may have individuals’ retinas and speech patterns examined in order to identify desirable and undesirable job applicants.   The ADA forbids employers from discriminating based on existing or past serious health problems. But no provision prohibits them from using such data to discriminate against currently healthy employees who may be at risk of later illnesses and thus could possibly turn out to have low productivity and high medical costs.   

This is especially problematic because statistical predictions based on AI algorithms may be wrong.  They may be tainted by inaccurate data inputs or by biases.  For example, a prediction might be based on information contained in an individual’s electronic health record (EHR).  Yet, unfortunately, these records are often rife with errors that can skew analysis.  Moreover, EHRs are often designed to maximize charge capture for billing purposes.  Reimbursement concerns may therefore drive EHR coding   in ways that bias statistical predictions.  So too, predictive algorithms themselves may be flawed if they have been trained using unreliable data.  Discrimination based on AI forecasts, therefore, may not only harm data subjects, it may also be based on entirely false assumptions.   
In the wake of big data and AI, it is time to revisit the nation’s anti-discrimination laws. I propose that the laws be amended to protect individuals who are predicted to develop disabilities in the future.
In the case of the ADA, the fix would be fairly simple.  The law’s “regarded as” provision currently defines “disability” for statutory purposes as including “being regarded as having … an impairment.”  The language could be revised to provide that the statute covers “being regarded as having … an impairment or as likely to develop a physical or mental impairment in the future.”  Similar wording could be incorporated into other anti-discrimination laws.

One might object that the suggested approach would unacceptably broaden the anti-discrimination mandate because it would potentially extend to all Americans rather than to a “discrete and insular minority” of individuals with disabilities.  After all, anyone, including the healthiest of humans, could be found to have signs that forecast some future frailty. 

However, the ADA’s “regarded as” provision is already far-reaching because any individual could be wrongly perceived as having a mental or physical impairment.  Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, and religion.  Given that all individuals have these attributes (religion includes non-practice of religion), the law reaches all Americans.  Consequently, banning discrimination rooted in predictive data would not constitute a departure from other, well-established anti-discrimination mandates.

It is noteworthy that under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, employers and health insurers are already prohibited from discriminating based on one type of predictive data: genetic information.   Genetic information is off-limits not only insofar as it can reveal what conditions individuals presently have, but also with respects to its ability to identify perfectly healthy people’s vulnerabilities to a myriad of diseases in the future.

In the contemporary world it makes little sense to outlaw discrimination based on genetic information but not discrimination based on AI algorithms with powerful predictive capabilities.  The proposed change would render the ADA and other disability discrimination provisions more consistent with GINA’s prudent approach.
As is often the case, technology has outpaced the law in the areas of big data and AI.  It is time to implement a measured and needed statutory response to new data-driven discrimination threats.

Sharona Hoffman is Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Law, Professor of Bioethics, and Co-Director of the Law-Medicine Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.  You can reach her by e-mail at  sharona.hoffman at case.edu. 

AIs as Substitute Decision Makers

Guest Blogger

Ian Kerr


For the Symposium on The Law And Policy Of AI, Robotics, and Telemedicine In Health Care.
“Why, would it be unthinkable that I should stay in the saddle however much the facts bucked?”

Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty

We are witnessing an interesting juxtaposition in medical decision-making.

Heading in one direction, patients’ decision-making capacity is increasing, thanks to an encouraging shift in patient treatment. Health providers are moving away from substitute decision-making—which permits a designated person to take over a patient’s health care decisions, should that patient’s cognitive capacity become sufficiently diminished. Instead, there is a movement towards supported decision-making, which allows patients with diminished cognitive capacity to make their own life choices through the support of a team of helpers.

Heading in the exact opposite direction, doctors’ decision-making capacity is diminishing, due to a potentially concerning shift in the way doctors diagnose and treat patients. For many years now, various forms of data analytics and other technologies have been used to support doctors’ decision-making. Now, doctors and hospitals are starting to employ artificial intelligence (AI) to diagnose and treat patients, and for an existing set of sub-specialties, the more honest characterization is that these AIs no longer support doctors’ decisions—they make them. As a result, health providers are moving right past supported decision-making and towards what one might characterize as substitute decision making by AIs.

In this post, I contemplate two questions.

First, does thinking about AI as a substitute decision-maker add value to the discourse?

Second, putting patient decision making aside, what might this strange provocation tell us about the agency and decisional autonomy of doctors, as medical decision making becomes more and more automated?

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