Balkinization   |
Balkinization
Balkinization Symposiums: A Continuing List                                                                E-mail: Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu David Luban david.luban at gmail.com Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu Compendium of posts on Hobby Lobby and related cases The Anti-Torture Memos: Balkinization Posts on Torture, Interrogation, Detention, War Powers, and OLC The Anti-Torture Memos (arranged by topic) Recent Posts Disaster Relief and the Constitution: A History of "Strict Construction" The Case for A New Computer Crime Law A Brief History of Cyberlaw Guest Blogger: Orin Kerr Introduction Synthesizing Originalism and Living Constitutionalism Does God Mess With Free Will? The Washingtonienne Case and the Still-Very-Much-Alive Public Disclosure Tort Roberts and the Ghost of Iran-Contra More on the Iraqi Constitution Laissez Faire Redux? The Fourth Amendment, New Technology, and Judicial Deference Godless Darwinism? What Fearless White Men Are Afraid of A Bully Using Threats About Money is Still a Bully Proposals Considered in 1936 on How to Curb Judicial Review Hoax or Real? "Intelligent Falling" There's More Than One Kind of Judicial Review "The Left's Judicial Review Debate" Babies on the No Fly List E Pluribus Pluribus Don't Dis the Enlightenment Lowered Expectations Invasion produces WMD's Liberal vs. Conservative Cities Early Substantive Due Process Dred Scott and Kelo
|
Wednesday, August 31, 2005
Disaster Relief and the Constitution: A History of "Strict Construction"
JB
Our prayers and best wishes go out to our friends in New Orleans and in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama who have been hit by the effects of Hurricane Katrina. Today the federal government has several programs in effect for providing disaster relief to individuals, localities and states when natural disaster strikes, and no one questions the right and the duty of the federal government under the Constitution to do this. It was not always thus. One of the earliest and most contentious debates during the first years of the Constitution's history was whether or not the federal government had the power, under its authority "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States," to spend money for disaster relief for a specific community. Jeffersonian strict constructionists argued that the words "general welfare" precluded such a power, arguing first, that the general welfare clause only gave Congress the power to spend on behalf of one of its other enumerated powers, and second, that even if the power to spend for the general welfare were an independent power, Congress could not devote money to a specific locality or region, but must spend for the entire country as a whole, i.e., "the general welfare of the United States." Loose constructionists, following Alexander Hamilton, argued that the general welfare clause gave Congress a separate power, and that the clause gave Congress wide latitude to spend money to promote what it viewed as conducive to the general welfare. (N.B.: the discussion that follows is drawn from the upcoming Fifth edition to Brest, Levinson, Balkin, Amar and Siegel, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking (Aspen 2006), and, in particular, to the wonderful work of my colleague Sandy Levinson). The strict constructionist/state's rights position which was offered by Jefferson's party caused the Republicans political embarrassment because of floods and fires that occurred in the South, where the Republicans were strongest. As David Currie writes in THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 224 (1997): Hamilton's view has won out, which is why nobody in the federal government today has any constitutional qualms about sending federal money and assistance to New Orleans. Professor Michele Landis Dauber at Stanford Law School has done some excellent work on the history of disaster relief and its connection to the modern regulatory and welfare state, see, for example, Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 23 Law and History Rev. 387 (2005); Michelle L. Landis, Let Me Next Time be "Tried by Fire": Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State, 1789-1874, 92 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 967 (1998). Reasoning along similar strict constructionist lines, President James Madison (who had supported federal disaster relief) vetoed a bill for using federal money to build canals and other internal improvements in 1816, arguing that Although there were several successful appropriations for disaster relief in the 19th century, strict constructionist objections that such appropriations went beyond the Constitution's limited and enumerated powers did not entirely cease. In 1887, Democratic President Grover Cleveland vetoed a bill “to enable the Commissioner of Agriculture to make a special distribution of seeds in the drought-stricken counties of Texas, and making an appropriation thereof.” Although Cleveland admitted that distributing relief could mitigate the drought and prevent future disasters, he argued that it was beyond a strict construction of the federal Constitution: Fortunately, the constitutional text does not require so narrow a construction as Madison, Cleveland and various state's rights politicians have contended for over the years, and a wiser and more liberal interpretation (in both the older and the newer senses of that word) has prevailed, first in the case of disaster relief, and later in the case of internal improvements. By 1888, the Supreme Court upheld legislation that provided partial federal financing for interstate railroads, in the California Railroad Cases, 127 U.S. 1 (1888); however, Justice Bradley relied on the commerce power rather than the spending clause, as we would today. By the New Deal it was long settled that Congress could spend money for “the general welfare” directed at specific localities and regions, including, for example, the Tennessee Valley Authority. In this area at least, strict construction has lost out to loose construction, and it’s a good thing too. There is no doubt that Congress can and has abused its powers to tax and spend– every year we seek more and more pork in the federal budget. But preventing Congress from providing disaster relief to specific areas of the country, as strict constructionists argued early in the country’s history, is not the right solution to the problem. The remedy for bad decisions about public money has to be found within the democratic process itself. Tuesday, August 30, 2005
The Case for A New Computer Crime Law
Anonymous
As a result of this history, most law professors -- and even most cyberlaw professors – have missed the area of law that is going to be most altered by computers and the Internet: criminal law and criminal procedure. The field of criminal law and procedure is most prone to a rethinking in light of computers and the Internet because it is notably sensitive to the specific means by which individuals engage in legally relevant acts. To paint with a very very broad brush, most areas of civil law are focused on harms, and on victims of the harms recognizing when they are harmed. As a result, the precise means by which A harms B is not nearly as relevant as the fact that A somehow does so. What matters isn’t the precise mechanism so much as the end result. Criminal law and procedure is different. The rules of criminal law and procedure are particularly sensitive to mechanisms. Substantive criminal laws are statutory prohibitions explaining what individuals cannot do or else face criminal prosecution; under the void for vagueness doctrine, the law must state in reasonably clear terms what is prohibited. The law can’t simply say, “don’t harm B,” or “don’t be negligent.” Rather, the laws are more specific and more rule-like: “Do not enter into B’s dwelling at night without B’s permission,” or “Do not operate a motor vehicle on a public road with a BAC of .08 of over”, etc. The same goes for laws of criminal procedure, which are legal commands that govern police conduct in the course of investigating crime. The law can’t simply say to the police to “investigate nicely,” or “don’t go overboard.” Rather, the rules end up being developed by the courts into often unusually specific commands. They say exactly when the police can enter a person’s home, when they can get a warrant, what the warrant allows the police to do, and the like. Relative to most areas of civil law, the regime of substantive criminal law and procedure has produced clear mechanism-dependent rules. This has profound significance for the future of criminal law and criminal procedure because computers and the Internet change all of the mechanisms. Traditional criminal law and criminal procedure are designed for a world of physical property. The crimes themselves are tied to physical property: theft is taking away of physical property with intent to permanently deprive; trespass is entrance onto physical property without permission; etc. So are the rules of criminal procedure, and particularly the Fourth Amendment. Entering a home or opening physical containers is a Fourth Amendment “search;” taking away physical property is a “seizure.” Computers replace the familiar mechanisms with something new. The old crimes remain the same, of course. But there’s a new world that is becoming more and more important over time: a new world of digital crimes and digital evidence. Computers facilitate new types of criminal activity: some of the activity falls into the category of computer misuse crimes, such as hacking and viruses, and the rest of it is traditional criminal activity facilitated by computers, such as fraud schemes, child pornography crimes, and online threats. Even when the crime is a traditional offline offense, like a homicide, there may be digital evidence (e-mails, websurfing records, etc.) that the police may want to collect to prove their case. In the new environment, however, many of the familiar mechanisms used by preexisting law can no longer work. The physical spaces and properties used to define the basic rules of criminal law and procedure are gone, and instead we just have zillions of zeros and ones of electricity. Coming up with legal rules to define exactly what conduct involving the zillions of zeros and ones is permissible, both as a matter of criminal law and procedure, proves surprisingly difficult. A simple translation of old concepts to the new environment proves much harder than you might think; it triggers a seemingly endless series of new puzzles for the law. To pick just a few basic doctrinal examples, what does it mean to “steal” data? What does it mean to “possess” contraband files? To “search” files? To “damage” them? How about to “seize” them? What rules govern the process of retrieving evidence from computer hard drives? What are the rules that govern government access to e-mail? Are they the same as rules that govern access to homes? Does it matter how the e-mails are obtained? Stepping away from doctrine and looking at a more conceptual level, do the traditional physical concepts “theft” or “search and seizure” even work for digital evidence? Or do we need something else? Monday, August 29, 2005
A Brief History of Cyberlaw
Anonymous
As I mentioned earlier, I’m blogging this week about the new field of Computer Crime Law. To frame the topic, I want to start by discussing the broader topic of “cyberlaw.” Tomorrow I’ll explain how trends in cyberlaw point the way to computer crime law as a surprisingly distinct field. Guest Blogger: Orin Kerr
JB
I'm very happy to announce that Orin Kerr, who is one of the leading figures in the study of cybercrime, will be guest blogging at Balkinization. Please give him a warm welcome. Introduction
Anonymous
I’m delighted to be guest-blogging here at Balkinization. I teach criminal law, computer crime law, and criminal procedure at George Washington University Law School, where my office is down the hall from Daniel Solove. I plan to blog about a few different things while I’m here, but I want to focus first on a project I started in 2001 and have been working on intensely for the last few months: writing a casebook for West Publishers on Computer Crime Law. I want to explain what the field of computer crime law is about, why it’s important, and why I think computer crime law is going to end up someday as a standard part of the curriculum at most law schools. I’ll start my substantive blogging shortly, with a post on the Rise and Fall of Cyberlaw as a field of law. I should be posting it later tonight.
Synthesizing Originalism and Living Constitutionalism
JB
My defense of the idea of a living Constitution and my criticism of the way originalism is currently understood appears in Slate here. As you'll see from the piece, I argue that everybody is actually a living constitutionalist whether they admit it or not, because nobody wants to be bound by the original understanding once they understand what that really entails. Conversely, I argue that living constitutionalists are and should be bound by the original meaning of the constitutional text but not by its original expected application. This puts me in the same camp for many purposes as someone like Randy Barnett, who regards himself as an originalist, or my colleague Akhil Amar, although in the Slate piece I'm distinguishing myself from and criticizing other people who also regard themselves as originalists (like Scalia and Thomas). In fact, if my views are originalist in any degree, then it suggests that some forms of originalism and living constitutionalism are fully compatible, rather than opposed, as Justice Scalia contends. That by itself should suggest that the labels "originalist" and "nonoriginalist" may do far less work than people might think. Perhaps more importantly, it also suggests the possibility of a synthesis of the historical work that originalist scholars have been doing over the past twenty years in uncovering the original meaning and understanding of the constitutional text with the premises of a living Constitution. In fact, I think such a synthesis is not only possible, but highly desirable. Saturday, August 27, 2005
Does God Mess With Free Will?
Ian Ayres
A few years back in the movie Bruce Almighty, the character Bruce (played by Jim Carry) got to temporarily substitute for God. Bruce was omnipotent except for two rules. He couldn’t tell any one about his powers and he couldn’t change anyone’s desires. He could make people do things, but he couldn’t change their free will. 16 To the woman he said, "I will greatly increase your pains in childbearing; with The Washingtonienne Case and the Still-Very-Much-Alive Public Disclosure Tort
Anonymous
Earlier this summer, I blogged about the Washingtonienne case. Recently law professor Andrew McClurg wrote a piece for the Washington Post about the case. He writes: Thursday, August 25, 2005
Roberts and the Ghost of Iran-Contra
JB
The Washington Post reports that during his time in the Reagan Administration John Roberts offered advice on the establishment of the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO), an organization used by the Reagan Administration to circumvent the Boland Amendment. For those of you who don't remember, the Boland Amendment made it illegal for U.S. intelligence agencies to provide covert funding to the contras in Nicaragua. John Poindexter and Oliver North attempted to get around this prohibition by diverting millions of dollars to the contras through a secret deal-- approved by the President-- which sold anti-tank and anti-aircraft missles to Iran. Poindexter and North then funneled the money to the contras. The NHAO was formed within the State Department to provide what was, at least on the surface, legitimate humanitarian assistance to Nicaragua; Oliver North, however, used it to send money and supplies that the CIA couldn't send directly. Put another way, he used the NHAO as a cover for illegal covert funding for the contras in violation of federal law. We do not know what Roberts' role was in any of this. For example, he might simply have been asked to set up the NHAO for purely humanitarian purposes and then North infilitrated and twisted the organization for his own illegal ends. If so, there's nothing in the file on the NHAO that should be problematic for Roberts. He simply did what any good lawyer would do for his client. On the other hand, if Roberts was asked to justify circumventing the Boland Amendment in any way, he would have been a hitherto unknown part of the Iran-Contra scandal. If that were so, it would be inappropriate for someone who had participated in fomenting a serious constitutional scandal to be rewarded with a Supreme Court appointment. The Democrats obviously want to know what is in those files; the Bush Adminstration doesn't want anyone to know. At the very least the senators should ask Judge Roberts for his recollections, to the extent that he can provide them. More on the Iraqi Constitution
JB
On the same day that David Brooks lauds the Iraqi Constitution as what is just right for Iraqis, the Iraqis themselves announce that they have not been able to agree on the terms. The sticking point, as I suggested in my previous post, is not primarily the idea of Islam's role in a democratic state. It is federalism. The Sunni want a strong central government for two reasons. First, they led a strong central government for many years. Second, they are worried that without such a government, they will be the poorest and least powerful of three basically autonomous regions. The Shia and the Kurds, conversely, would like nothing more than to become autonomous regions if not fully independent. The problem, as I explained before, is that it is not yet clear to the different parts of Iraq why there should be a single country called Iraq. It is clear to the Bush Administration, of course, but it's the Iraqi's constitution, not the Bush Administration's, and without a strong reason to unite, different incentives among the various groups in Iraq will prevent agreement. The Bush Administration may ultimately decide to bully its way through (as it has so often in its foreign policy), by aligning itself with the Shia and Kurds and bringing forward a blueprint for a very loose confederation for popular approval. The problem, of course, is that this will only further alienate the Sunnis, who are already paranoid that their interests will be disregarded by the other two groups which form a majority in the country. If enough Sunni's feel this way, and if they feel that the Americans occupying the country are forming a conspiracy with the Shia and Kurds against them, this will only add support to the insurgency. We may get a constitution, if cooler heads prevail, and all three groups decide that they need each other. Or we may get civil war. Laissez Faire Redux?
Brian Tamanaha
Edward Corwin's Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. (1941) describes the rise of laissez faire views in court opinions in the late 19th Century: Wednesday, August 24, 2005
The Fourth Amendment, New Technology, and Judicial Deference
Anonymous
It’s come to fisticuffs. Professor Orin Kerr and I have taken our many debates out of the halls of GW Law School and into the pages of a forthcoming symposium issue in Fordham Law Review. Monday, August 22, 2005
Godless Darwinism?
Guest Blogger
Andrew Koppelman The movement against Darwinism is spreading from Protestant fundamentalists to the Catholic Church. Cardinal Christoph Schonborn, archbishop of Vienna, has denounced the idea that mankind came into being through “evolution in the neo-Darwinian sense -- an unguided, unplanned process of random variation and natural selection.” The Cardinal has thus joined millions of others who think that a mechanical process of evolution is inconsistent with belief in God. The growing popularity of anti-Darwinism is strange, because religious rejection of Darwin rests on such bad theological arguments. Religious objections to Darwin take two very different, in fact inconsistent, forms. The first holds that the account of creation in the Book of Genesis is literally true, and that any talk of one species emerging from another, or indeed of the earth being millions of years old, cannot be true. Here the conflict is undeniable. But hardly anyone still wants to deny what the fossil record establishes, and even Cardinal Schonborn concedes that “evolution in the sense of common ancestry might be true.” The other religious response to Darwin is “scientific creationism,” which jettisons Genesis, but claims that the process by which new species have emerged is one in which some enormously powerful intelligent being must have periodically intervened. (Guess Who.) The shrewdest of America’s “scientific creationists,” Phillip Johnson, has emphasized that scientific method is predisposed to reject intelligent design, because it assumes, rather than proving, that nature is all that there is. The job of a scientist is to look for natural physical causes, rather than divine interventions. If God had played a role in the creation of new species, then, scientists would have trouble seeing it. Johnson is right. Science presupposes that everything in nature has a physical, not a supernatural, cause. It only looks for physical explanations. But there is a reason why science has become so prestigious in the last few centuries. The assumption of mechanical causation in nature has led to spectacular results. All of modern technology rests on the assumption that nature is mechanical and predictable. Is the idea of a causally determined, self-sustaining world inconsistent with religion? If it is, then it isn’t just the evolutionary biologists who are in trouble. Anyone who acts on the physical world, on the assumption that matter is inert and manipulable, would be rejecting religion too. Are auto repair shops hotbeds of atheism? Cardinal Schonborn writes that there is “purpose and design in the natural world, including the world of living things.” He could mean two things by this. The first is that there is a point to the universe’s existence, and human life has cosmic significance. The second is that ordinary physical processes are not the product of blind causation, but of continuing divine intervention. You can accept the first proposition without accepting the second one. God might well have created a universe in which physical processes – say, the emergence of homo sapiens from other species, or the operation of your car’s engine – take place by themselves. The universe as a whole might be fraught with purpose, even if its parts operate mechanically. This in fact appears to be the view of the book of Genesis, which informs us that on the seventh day, after creating the universe, God rested. If God was resting, then evidently the universe was able to keep running by itself. Darwin’s most important precursor in arousing the wrath of the religious is, of course, Galileo: the idea that the earth was not the center of the universe was as disconcerting then as evolution is now. It is, however, at least equally consistent with the Judeo-Christian tradition to consider it impious for one to presume knowledge of God's intentions in creating the universe. As God said to Job: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding." There is no reason in principle why one cannot believe in God without also believing that He is a kind of cosmic Kilroy, who feels impelled to leave His initials carved on every tree. It is even doubtful that the hypotheses of the scientific creationists deliver the comfort they purport to give. If the story they tell is accepted, some very powerful being repeatedly intervened in the evolutionary process. The logic seems to be the following:(1) here is a being more powerful than any we have ever encountered; (2) any being more powerful than any we have ever encountered must be God; (3) this is God. The fallacy should be obvious: proposition (2) was accepted by the Aztecs when they met the Spanish conqueror Cortes in 1519. He turned out not to be God. God’s existence may not be the kind of thing that you can prove with historical evidence. Galileo and Darwin do place greater demands on religious faith than their predecessors. They require that faith stand on its own bottom, rather than leaning on comforting hints drawn from observed phenomena. And this is, perhaps, why they are resisted so fiercely. Faith is hard. But the enemies of Darwin are not helping religion’s cause. If we did not, in our daily activities, assume a mindless, predictable nature, we probably could never do anything at all. The idea that religion necessarily rejects science and mechanism ought to appeal only to the most militant atheists. Its embrace by sophisticated religious people is bizarre. What Fearless White Men Are Afraid of
Dan Kahan
Why are white men less concerned with all manner of risk (global warming, gun accidents, various medical procedures, etc.) than are women and minorities? Known as the “white male effect” (see, e.g., Melissa Finucane, Paul Slovic, C.K. Mertz, James Flynn & Theresa A. Satterfield, Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: The "White Male" Effect, 3 Health, Risk, & Soc'y 159 (2000)), this phenomenon has long puzzled scholars of risk perception. Various hypotheses -- that white men are more informed than women and minorities, that women and minorities feel more vulnerable or less able to protect themselves, that women (and perhaps minorities) are more empathetic than white men -- have all been found wanting in empirical tests. The phenomenon of “cultural cognition” suggests a different explanation, one that has been confirmed in a national study of culture and risk. The reason white males are less fearful of various risks is that they are more afraid of something else: namely, the loss of status they experience when activities symbolic of their cultural worldviews are stigmatized as socially undesirable. Cultural cognition refers to the processes by which cultural worldviews influence risk perception and related beliefs. Insofar as risk perceptions are responsive to emotions (and boy, are they ever), cultural values matter because they determine the content and strength of the emotions people experience toward putatively dangerous activities. Insofar as perceptions of risk depend on the information we receive, cultural values matter because they influence what information catches our attention and is thereafter recalled. And insofar as risk perceptions reflect what other citizens have to say, cultural values matter because we tend to trust the opinions of those who share our worldviews and distrust the opinions of those who don’t. As a result of these dynamics, disputes over how to respond to nuclear power, guns, domestic terrorism and various other asserted risks can be understood to reflect what Joseph Gusfield describes as symbolic status competition. Because differences of opinion on these matters cohere with the worldviews of competing cultural groups, what position the law takes will inevitably come to be understood as a measure of whose stock is up and whose down in the market for societal esteem. In particular, to the extent that some activity symbolic of the values of a particular group is attacked as dangerous, we can expect members of that group to display a defensive form of risk skepticism and members of opposing groups to display an aggressive form of risk sensitivity. Status-protective motivations help to explain not only differences in risk perception across cultural groups but also certain demographic differences within such groups. Within different ways of life (hierarchical, individualistic, egalitarian, and communitarian), the types of behavior that entitle persons to esteem can vary according to gender and even race. It follows that within particular cultural groups, men and women, and whites and minorities, will react with different degrees of risk skepticism and risk sensitivity depending on whose status the dangerous activity supports. This dynamic, I and other researchers have found, accounts for the so-called “white male effect” in risk perception. Firearm possession, for example, is integral to predominantly male roles (father, protector, hunter) within a hierarchic way of life and symbolic of predominantly male virtues (courage, honor, physical prowess) within an individualistic way of life. For that reason, hierarchical and individualistic males have the most culturally grounded status to lose when guns are singled out as a source of danger worthy of regulation. They therefore display considerably more risk skepticism than do hierarchical and individualistic women. Indeed, once this culture-specific gender differential is taken into account, it turns out there is no general differences in the risk perceptions of men and women toward guns. Culture-specific status concerns also explain the impact of race on gun risk perceptions. Traditionally at least, the positive connotations that guns bear within a hierarchic way of life have been largely specific to whites. As historian Richard Hofstadter put it, “in the historic system of the South, having a gun was a white prerogative,” making gun ownership an enduring “symbol of white male status” in particular. Not surprisingly, holding a hierarchical worldview strongly predicts gun-risk skepticism among white males, but not among African-American ones. Within an individualistic way of life, however, the positive association of guns with male roles doesn’t seem particularly race specific. And in fact, among individualistic blacks, as among individualistic whites, men are much more skeptical of guns than are women. In this case, at least, male status anxieties don’t discriminate on the basis of race! We found a similar relationship between the cultural status anxiety and the white male effect in environmental risk perceptions. To begin with, there are no differences in risk perception across race once cultural worldviews are controlled for. Gender differences do persist. But they are due entirely to the the wide discrepancy in the views of extremely risk-skeptical white hierarchical males and considerably less risk-skeptical hierarchical women. There are no gender (or race) based differences in environmental risk perception among relatively individualistic or egalitarian persons. Again, these patterns suggest the impact of culture-specific gender differences in status-conferring social roles. Within a hierarchic way of life, men tend to earn esteem by achieving success in civil society, while women earn it by successfully occupying domestic roles. Accordingly, it is hierarchic men, not hierarchic women, who experience the greatest status threat when commercial and industrial activities are challenged as dangerous. Within an individualist way of life, success in the market is status-conferring for men and women. Accordingly, individualistic men and individualistic women react with status-protecting skepticism when commerce and industry are attacked as dangerous. Commerce and industry are symbolic of social inequality and unconstrained individualism within egalitarian and communitarian ways of life. Accordingly, as a means of promoting their status, men and women alike within these cultural groups tend to embrace claims of environmental risk. As should be clear, it would be wrong to suggest that white hierarchical or individualistic men are the only ones whose risk perceptions are shaped by status anxieties. Indeed, we found that status concerns also help to explain interesting variations in risk perception among women relating to the dangers of obtaining an abortion. Hierarchical women but not individualistic or egalitarian ones perceive obtaining an abortion to be very dangerous to a woman’s health. Sociologist Kristin Luker depicts abortion as the symbolic focal point in a status conflict between two groups of women: those who subscribe to hierarchical norms that confer esteem upon women who occupy domestic roles such as motherhood; and those who adhere to individualistic and egalitarian norms that confer esteem upon women and men alike for successfully occupying professional roles. It is thus status protective for the former group of women to accept the asserted health risks of abortion and for the latter to reject these asserted risks. What is the practical upshot of the relationship between cultural status anxiety and risk perception? It certainly isn’t that white males (or hierarchal and individualistic white males) are “wrong” and everyone else “right” about global warming, guns, etc. -- or vice versa. Knowing the social psychological origins of some groups’ views about risk doesn’t tell us anything about whether those views are sound or unsound! But knowing that peoples’ risk perceptions are rooted in cultural cognition does tell us something important about the prospects for communication of sound risk information. It probably doesn’t make sense, in particular, to assume that the “truth” will win out in the market place of ideas when it comes to political debates over risk. The natural tendency of persons (all persons, of all worldviews and demographic characteristics) to protect the status of their cultural group operates as a distorting influence on in the public’s processing of sound information. Overcoming this biasing effect of cultural cognition should thus be a critical objective of policymakers and -analysts. Not merely the tone of our public discourse, but the safety or our society, depends on devising a culturally pluralistic idiom for discussing contentious issues like global warming, guns, and other contentious risk issues. Friday, August 19, 2005
A Bully Using Threats About Money is Still a Bully
Brian Tamanaha
The United States proudly holds itself up as a country that abides by the rule of law. And of course this country is against genocide and other crimes against humanity. You would think, therefore, that the United States supports the International Criminal Court. The Clinton Administration did, but not the Bush Administration. Correct that: the Bush Administion is not against the ICC as such, only against the possibility that it might be used to prosecute Americans. Thursday, August 18, 2005
Proposals Considered in 1936 on How to Curb Judicial Review
Brian Tamanaha
Debates on what to do about judicial review are as old as the Constitution. Looking back helps gives us some perspective on this issue. Max Lerner published an essay in The Nation in March of 1936 that ran through the different options being discussed at the time. He mentioned and dismissed three proposals as unrealistic or insufficient solutions: pick better Presidents, who would then select better judges; set up a system in which the justices issue preemptive advisory opinions on legislation (reducing uncertainty about what would survive challenge); and find judges who will practice "self-limitation." Hoax or Real? "Intelligent Falling"
Brian Tamanaha
The Onion reports that "Evangelical Scientists Refute Gravity With New 'Intelligent Falling' Theory" (thanks to Leiter Reports for pointer). Here are excerpts: There's More Than One Kind of Judicial Review
JB
Following up on Mark's post, it's important to recognize that there are many different versions of judicial review. There can be judicial review of Congress, judicial review of the Executive, and judicial review of state and local government action. The most important form of judicial review in a democracy may be judicial review of executive and administrative action. Many countries whose courts lack the power to strike down legislation as unconstitutional have nevertheless developed judicial doctrines limiting what the Executive and bureaucrats can do. The fact that so many countries have developed judicial review of administrative action without a written constitution or with only limited review of legislation suggests that reining in executive discretion and executive overreaching is the most important job of a judiciary in a democracy. In countries with a federal system, judicial review of conflicts between the national government and the states, or between the states themselves, can also be particularly valuable for the health of a democracy, because it is sometimes necessary to have a national referee for these sorts of conflicts. This may be more important in countries that are barely holding together than it is for the contemporary United States, but it is also possible that the presence of judicial review of federal state conflicts may have helped stabilize the American federal system given the repeated disruptions of economics and demographic shifts. Moreover, this sort of review does not always require striking down laws; it may involve judicial construction of legislation to harmonize apparent conflicts. The least important form of judicial review is probably the one that people spend the most time worrying about: judicial review of individual rights violations by the national government and by states and local governments. As between the two, the latter violations by states and localities are more important to police than the former, because multiplying the number of state and local governments multiplies the number of opportunities for violating individual rights. On the other hand, one way to keep a federal union together is to let different localities enforce individual rights guarantees in different ways. Since the Civil War the American constitutional system has settled on the idea of a uniform floor for civil rights protection set at the national level, but that's clearly not the only way to do it. I should point out that nothing I have said in these remarks is premised on what would be good or bad for the left or the right. Indeed, I have come to the conclusion that this is not a helpful inquiry. That is because judicial review, like federalism and separation of powers, is a structural feature of constitutions. It is characteristic of structural features that they alternatively please and annoy different factions at different points in history, and that because their purpose is not the enhancement or furtherance of a particular political program or ideology (narrowly conceived), but rather the promotion of a stable democracy that forces political compromise as an ongoing project. Some structural provisions do this better than others, and some are complete failures, with all sorts of bad effects, but that judgment should not be confused with whether a particular structural provision is good or bad for the left or for the right. My study of the constitutional claims of political ideologies in the United States has led me to conclude that whatever the left (or the right) wants in terms of constitutional structure at a particular moment in history, there is a good chance that it will want the opposite some years later. We can always ask what is good for the left or the right at this present moment in politics, but there is no guarantee that our perspective will be the same even five years hence. So it may be more useful to ask different questions about constitutional design. Tuesday, August 16, 2005
"The Left's Judicial Review Debate"
Mark Tushnet
That's the title of a post this morning at American Prospect. It mentions my recent exchange in Dissent magazine with Laurence Tribe and Jeremy Waldron. I don't want to re-hash the argument itself, but pick up instead on this comment: "this debate is rather perversely detached from any sense of realistic political possibility in this country, so it’s probably wise not to spend too much time dwelling on it. At the same time, the Roberts nomination offers the rare occasion for a fairly high-profile discussion of the ideal role of the courts in the United States and of the tricky dynamics and pitfalls of judicial politics. Liberals’ engagement with these issues can only be enriched by an understanding of the progressive case against judicial review." Babies on the No Fly List
Anonymous
According to the AP: E Pluribus Pluribus
JB
Why didn't the Iraqi delegates agree on a constitution on time? The answer is simple. The deadline imposed on them was an artificial one imposed from without rather than by the political necessities of Iraq itself. It is no surprise that regional autonomy has become a sticking point. It is difficult to get very different regions to join together unless they believe they have a common interest in doing so. The former American colonies agreed to the 1787 Constitution because they believed that a stronger national government was necessary to their continued survival. They were worried, among other things, that foreign powers would divide them and pick them off one by one. The problem today is that the Shia, Sunni, and Kurds are not as convinced that they need each other, much less that they need a strong central government. Instead of foreign powers threatening to pick them apart, one foreign power, the United States, which is occupying the country with its army, is insisting that they belong together because it is in American interests to do so. (Meanwhile another power, Iran, is no doubt hoping for greater Shia autonomy). The U.S. is certainly right that allowing the three groups to split apart would be dangerous for the stability of the region. But that doesn't necessarily mean that the Shia, Kurds, and Sunnis have the same sense of urgency. The Shia and Kurds in particular are more interested in pushing for as much autonomy as they can get. And if the Sunni's wont go along, they may try to push a very weak constitution on the Sunnis, who may have the greatest interests in staying together, gambling that the Sunnis won't be able to veto it in the upcoming referendum. The Iraqi delegates may get a draft done eventually. But given the internal incentives of the various regions (as opposed to the incentives of the Americans), it should surprise no one that they are taking so long. Monday, August 15, 2005
Don't Dis the Enlightenment
JB
Chris Mooney notes that the Bush Administration's tendency to play fast and loose with science is a far greater threat to science than fashionable academic arguments about social construction. If anything, the recent political attacks on science have been a wakeup call for the humanities, far more important, I would argue, that Alan Sokal's famous practical joke at the expense of Social Text. The humanities, Mooney argues, have come to understand that they and the sciences are engaged in a common pursuit of reason. It's about time. When I was writing about postmodernism in law early in my career, it always struck me as somewhat ridiculous that one would oppose either postmodernism or deconstruction to reason and reasoned argument. What in the world was one doing as an academic, I thought, if not trying to promote enlightenment and understanding through the best available arguments? The academy is a learned profession, after all. If academics aren't interested in the pursuit of truth, in the increase of knowledge, and in the development of expertise, they are in the wrong profession. And despite the bad press that academics regularly receive in the popular press, most academics I know understand themselves to be devoted to truth, enlightenment and the spread of knowledge. That's why they got into this business in the first place. They disagree heatedly about what the truth is; they also disagree about the effects the truth has; but that's not the same thing as being opposed to it. Sunday, August 14, 2005
Lowered Expectations
JB
The Administration is now preparing the American public for a very different result in the Iraq war than it grandly predicted in March of 2003, the Washington Post reports: The United States no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-supporting oil industry or a society in which the majority of people are free from serious security or economic challenges, U.S. officials say. "What we expected to achieve was never realistic given the timetable or what unfolded on the ground," said a senior official involved in policy since the 2003 invasion. "We are in a process of absorbing the factors of the situation we're in and shedding the unreality that dominated at the beginning." Pressed by the cost of fighting an escalating insurgency, U.S. expectations for rebuilding Iraq -- and its $20 billion investment -- have fallen the farthest, current and former officials say. Pentagon officials originally envisioned Iraq's oil revenue paying many post-invasion expenses. But Iraq, ranked among world leaders behind Saudi Arabia in proven oil reserves, is incapable of producing enough refined fuel amid a car-buying boom that has put an estimated 1 million more vehicles on the road after the invasion. Lines for subsidized cheap gas stretch for miles every day in Baghdad. Oil production is estimated at 2.22 million barrels a day, short of the goal of 2.5 million. Iraq's pre-war high was 2.67 million barrels a day. The United States had high hopes of quick, big-budget fixes for the electrical power system that would show Iraqis tangible benefits from the ouster of Hussein. But inadequate training for Iraqi staff, regional rivalries restricting the power flow to Baghdad, inadequate fuel for electrical generators and attacks on the infrastructure have contributed to the worst summer of electrical shortages in the capital. Water is also a "tough, tough" situation in a desert country, said a U.S. official in Baghdad familiar with reconstruction issues. Pumping stations depend on electricity, and engineers now say the system has hundreds of thousands of leaks. "The most thoroughly dashed expectation was the ability to build a robust self-sustaining economy. We're nowhere near that. State industries, electricity are all below what they were before we got there," said Wayne White, former head of the State Department's Iraq intelligence team who is now at the Middle East Institute. "The administration says Saddam ran down the country. But most damage was from looting [after the invasion], which took down state industries, large private manufacturing, the national electric" system. Ironically, White said, the initial ambitions may have complicated the U.S. mission: "In order to get out earlier, expectations are going to have to be lower, even much lower. The higher your expectation, the longer you have to stay. Getting out is going to be a more important consideration than the original goals were. They were unrealistic." The problem with using war to reshape the world is that war is uncontrollable. Once war is unleashed, events often spin out of control, coming back to haunt the more powerful country who began the attack. Throughout history many wars have undone countries confident of their superior power. We must hope that this war is at most a temporary setback for America and not a disaster with long term consequences for our ability to safeguard our legitimate interests at home and promote democracy and human rights abroad. Saturday, August 13, 2005
Invasion produces WMD's
JB
In one of the ironies of history, it now turns out that although U.S. troops found no biological and chemical weapons in Iraq when we overthrew Saddam in March 2003, there is evidence that insurgent groups began production of chemical and biological weapons after the invasion to attack U.S. forces there. Thus, we may have inadvertently chosen a policy that led to the production of the very WMD's we fought the war to destroy. The Washington Post reports: The operation was the biggest suspected chemical-weapon lab found so far in Iraq, Boylan said. A lab discovered last year in the insurgent stronghold of Fallujah contained a how-to book for chemical weapons and an unspecified amount of chemicals. The spokesman said the operation was new, not dating from before the U.S.-led invasion. The Bush administration used allegations that Hussein's government was manufacturing weapons of mass destruction as the main justification for the invasion. No such weapons or factories were found. Thursday, August 11, 2005
Liberal vs. Conservative Cities
Anonymous
Over at PrawfsBlawg, my co-blogger Kaimi Wenger links to a study's results of the Top 25 most liberal U.S. Cities and the Top 25 most conservative ones based on voting patterns. Early Substantive Due Process
Mark Graber
Some support and some modifications of Jack's post on substantive due process before the Civil War. I believe it is becoming the consensus view of legal historians that due process (or the equivalent "law of the land" provision) had a substantive component. Significantly, this view is shared by scholars on the left (Howard Gillman, see his wonderful The Constitution Besieged), on the right (James Ely's work on property), and those whose constitutional politics are unknown to me (i.e., Charles McCurdy). As Alfred Hill wrote, "Taney’s . . . unsupported assertions in . . . Dred Scott of a substantive scope for the due process clause are less plausibly explained by an assumption of uncharacteristic slovenliness on so important an issue, than by his probable awareness that, on the state level, such a scope for the clause . . . in protection of ‘vested rights’ had long been taken for granted." Dred Scott and Kelo
JB
The closest analogy to the substantive due process argument in Dred Scott v. Sandford isn't Roe v. Wade. It's the dissenters' position in Kelo v New London. Have I got your attention? Good, because it's time for a little lesson on the history of substantive due process. Dred Scott is often cited as the Supreme Court's earliest flirtation with the idea that the Due Process Clause places substantive as well as procedural limitations on government, often known as the doctrine of substantive due process. Because Roe v. Wade also relies on the idea of substantive due process, critics of Roe often invoke Dred Scott to show why Roe was such a bad idea. There is a second comparison between Dred Scott and Roe that is sometimes run together with the first: In Roe the Supreme Court held that fetuses are not persons; in Dred Scott the Supreme Court held that blacks are not citizens. These are not substantive due process arguments; they are arguments about the original understanding of the constitutional text. One of these two arguments is based on sound history and the other is not. Guess which one? It turns out that it's Roe. In 1868 the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment was not generally understood to include persons who were not yet born, in part because, at common law, abortion was not a felony before quickening. Dred Scott's argument about the original understanding of citizenship, however, is not sound. Taney's originalist argument that blacks were not expected ever to be citizens is not supported by history, as Justice Curtis's dissent shows: there were in fact free black citizens in various states at the time of the founding. But, today, as I said, I'm interested in substantive due process. Many people think that substantive due process is inconsistent with the original understanding and that the doctrine began with Dred Scott as a means of defending slavery. Therefore Dred Scott is doubly bad. This is incorrect. Taney's argument in Dred Scott comes from the same source as the argument of the dissenters in Kelo, and it has the same pedigree in thought of the founding era. Now, in fact Taney applies the substantive due process argument incorrectly, as Justice Curtis ably shows in his dissent in Dred Scott. But the key point is that Taney's argument in Dred Scott is not the originator of the idea of substantive due process; the idea goes back to the founding (and before in the history of the English common law), and the same argument lives on in the dissenters' views in Kelo. Indeed, as I shall explain later, it lives in even on the majority's opinion and in Justice Kennedy's concurrence. Substantive due process, I must report, is as American as apple pie, and even the people who publicly disdain it actually invoke it. Kelo is just the latest example. This doesn't show that Roe or any other substantive due process case is right or wrong; My point is simply that the "substantive due process is evil because it appeared in Dred Scott" meme is stupid and shows an ignorance of history. Moreover, once you understand that history, you will see the closest analogue to Taney's argument in Dred Scott is not Roe v. Wade; it is the dissenters' position in Kelo. And that doesn't make their position necessarily wrong either. Hoping that I've tantalized you enough with my comparison of Dred Scott and Kelo, let me try to explain what Dred Scott's substantive due process argument was actually about. Remember, this is *not* the infamous argument that blacks can't be citizens-- that's the argument from original intention. (Are you listening, Justice Scalia?) Rather, Taney's due process argument is the claim that Congress could not, through the Missouri Compromise, ban slavery in the territories north of the compromise line, because the Federal Government must abide by constitutional civil liberties guarantees in territories it controls. Thus, Taney argues: Nor can Congress deny to the people the right to keep and bear arms, nor the right to trial by jury, nor compel any one to be a witness against himself in a criminal proceeding. These powers, and others, in relation to rights of person, which it is not necessary here to enumerate, are, in express and positive terms, denied to the General Government; and the rights of private property have been guarded with equal care. Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person, and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process of law. And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law. And there it is. But before getting to the substantive due process argument, note the context in which it appears. Taney is arguing that if as long as the United States holds territory, the Constitution and the civil rights the Constitution guarantees bind the government there. Does this sound familiar? Yes, it's the same issue at stake in the litigation over interrogation practices at Guantanamo Bay. The Bush Administration put detainees there so that it would not be bound by American constitutional norms, arguing that the Constitution does not follow the flag. But Chief Justice Taney says that won't work. You can't deny people basic constitutional rights just because a piece of land you control isn't part of the mother country. The United States was once a colony, too, and the British Empire didn't protect the colonists' rights. When we became a nation, we promised we would do better. Thus Taney says, "citizens of the United States who migrate to a Territory belonging to the people of the United States, cannot be ruled as mere colonists, dependent upon the will of the General Government, and to be governed by any laws it may think proper to impose." Take that, King George. So Taney is making an anticolonial argument: If the United States holds a piece of property as its territory, it cannot escape guaranteeing constitutional rights. Of course the rights he was thinking about were the property rights of slaveholders, and the rights the Guantanamo Bay detainees are arguing for are the right to a hearing and the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. But this would not be the first time that constitutional law made strange bedfellows. You can distinguish the Guantanamo case in two ways. First, Guantanamo Bay is held by a perpetual lease, not owned outright, and second the detainees are aliens, not citizens. But in Rasul v. Bush, Justice Kennedy's concurrence pointed out that this was a formalist ruse. The United States holds Gitmo quite securely; it exercises sovereignty over it in all practical terms. If you buy Taney's argument that we should do better than the British Empire did, the idea that the U.S. can escape its constitutional obligations through the formality of a leasehold argument rings quite hollow. And although Taney spoke of the rights of citizens, the Bill of Rights does not make distinctions between aliens and citizens, particularly not the Due Process Clause, which protects "persons," not citizens. In any case, Taney's anticolonial argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions in the early 1900's collectively referred to as the Insular Cases. The Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico and other possessions gained through the Spanish-American war were, unlike Louisiana and California, "unincorporated" territories, and so the Bill of Rights (and the Constitution generally) did not apply there. At most, the federal government was required to respect only the most fundamental rights applied. One of those rights, however, was due process of law. The irony of Dred Scott and the Insular Cases is that today we think of Dred Scott as the very antithesis of a human rights decision. But in fact Dred Scott actually offered a theory of the Constitution that was far more protective of human rights in U.S. possessions (and territories under America's effective control, like Guantanamo Bay) than the doctrines the Court subsequently created to justify the United States' imperial ambitious following the Spanish-American War. But of course, the irony makes perfect sense if you understand that Taney wanted to protect the property rights of white southerners who owned slaves, while the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases didn't want to extent full constitutional rights to the native peoples in Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Like the Court in the Insular Cases, Taney wanted to protect civil rights only for the people he cared about most; he didn't think that blacks had any "rights which the white man was bound to respect." But if one takes his argument beyond the despicable context of the property rights of slaveholders and applies it, as Taney himself understood it, to the legal obligations of an imperial power to protect basic human rights, it has surprising resonance. And that brings me to the main event, Taney's substantive due process argument. As you will recall, Taney argued that the federal government couldn't ban slavery in the Territories because that would mean that when the slaveholder crossed into free territory, he would lose his property rights in his slaves; his slaves would become free and own their own labor. Taney argued that "an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law." What Taney is referring to in this passage had a long and honored history in the United States, and before it, in England. It is the doctrine of vested rights, the idea that the legislature may not take away vested rights of property. The roots of the idea go back to Magna Carta, and its reference to "the law of the land" On the eve of the American revolution, William Blackstone, who generally supported parliamentary supremacy, nevertheless explained that taking private property either for public use without the payment of compensation, or without the owner's consent, would violate the "law of the land." That means A to B transfers without the owner's consent violate the "law of the land." Thus, in 1798, in Calder v. Bull, Justice Chase insisted that "An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority ... . A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean... . [A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it." Justice Chase's argument in Calder is the first Supreme Court appearance of the doctrine of unenumerated rights. Legislatures may not destroy vested rights. The idea of taking property vested in A and giving it to B, along with the prohibition on a person being a judge in his or her own case, were the most obvious examples of a violation of the law of the land, or of due process of law. And so it appeared to people at the Founding when they wrote the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. It was generally assumed at the time, and by federal and state courts in subsequent decisions, that the idea of "due process of law" was synonymous with the protections of the "law of the land." And both phrases were generally understood to prevent governments from engaging in simple "naked" transfers-- taking from A and giving to B. Indeed, in 1829 in Wilkinson v. Leland, Justice Story suggested that principle apparently held whether or not a state had a law of the land or due process clause in its constitution: "We know of no case, in which a legislative act to transfer the property of A. to B. without his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative power in any state in the union." If you look at the language of the Fifth Amendment, you will see that it has not one, but two limitations on eminent domain. The second one is the Public Use Clause, which says that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The Public Use Clause regulates private to public transfers for public use, but note that it says nothing about takings for private use. That is because this category is already dealt with in the first limitation on eminent domain, the Due Process Clause, which prohibits private to private transfers. The two clauses appear after each other in the text, first the due process clause, prohibiting A to B transfers, then the public use clause, regulating the conditions under which takings can occur for public use. And that brings us back to Taney and Dred Scott. Understood against this long historical background, Taney was not making things up out of whole cloth in Dred Scott when he said that the effect of the Missouri Compromise was inconsistent with due process of law. He was adverting to the basic doctrine of vested rights; the idea that government cannot take vested rights from A and give them to B. That, he claimed is precisely what the Federal Government had done when it applied the Missouri Compromise to southerners bringing their property into free territories. It was taking their property and giving it to the slave. The problem with Dred Scott, you see, was not that Taney was using the idea of substantive due process. For the idea he invoked, that the government could not take away vested rights, was among the most hallowed ideas around at the Founding. And there was nothing particularly evil about the idea of protecting vested rights in property. What was evil was that the United States allowed some people to hold property in other human beings. The problem with Taney's argument is an incorrect application of the vested rights principle. The appropriate rejoinder is Justice Curtis's in his dissent in Dred Scott. Justice Curtis, it should be noted, *agreed* with Taney that taking vested rights of property violates the Due Process Clause: "this restriction on the legislative power is not peculiar to the Constitution of the United States; it was borrowed from Magna Charta; was brought to America by our ancestors, as part of their inherited liberties, and has existed in all the States, usually in the very words of the great charter." However, Curtis explained, people do not have vested rights in property when they voluntarily enter into jurisdictions that do not recognize that species of property. For in the second jurisdiction the rights are not vested; indeed, they do not even exist. This point doesn't arise with estates in land because they are not movable, so they can't cross jurisdictions, but it does apply to chattels that can be moved from place to place. If you've been paying attention to the Supreme Court's recent docket, you may find all this talk about taking from A and giving to B familiar. It's what was at issue in Kelo v. New London, in which the Supreme Court held that taking property as part of a comprehensive scheme to stimulate economic development was a public use, and did not violate the Constitution as long as just compensation was given. Justice O'Connor began her dissent by quoting the passage from Calder v. Bull I cited above, which as we have seen, is the original citation for the doctrine of unenumerated rights. What New London was doing, she argued was nothing less than taking property from individual homeowners and giving it to other private parties. Nobody accused Justice O'Connor of engaging in substantive due process, and amusingly, Justices Scalia and Thomas, who don't usually recognize unenumerated rights, joined her opinion. Of course, the reason was that her argument was nominally premised on the text of the Public Use Clause. But as I noted above, the Public Use Clause doesn't actually say that property can't be taken for private use. It says only that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." That leaves out takings for private use without just compensation and takings for private use with just compensation. O'Connor is reading into the text of the Public Use Clause things that are not actually there. The prohibition is in the Fifth Amendment to be sure, but not in the Public Use Clause. So where *do* we get the principle banning takings for purely private use that was at stake in Kelo? We get it from the basic idea of substantive due process, which prohibits A to B transfers and protects vested rights from being destroyed by government. Justice Thomas tries to avoid recognizing this in his dissenting opinion, arguing that despite its language the Public Use clause cannot apply merely to public uses; otherwise, it would allow takings for private use without compensation, which would "contradict a bedrock principle well established by the time of the founding: that all takings required the payment of compensation." He artfully elides the question of what textual provision in the Constitution prevents takings for private use with compensation. We know the answer-- it's the Due Process Clause. That's what most people at the Founding thought, and that's why the Fifth Amendment is written that way. But, wait, that would mean that in Kelo Thomas is actually making an argument from (shudder) substantive due process. And it would be the same sort of argument that Chief Justice Taney made in Dred Scott. But we all know that Justices Thomas and Scalia don't believe in substantive due process. And they certainly don't agree with anything that awful Chief Justice Taney said in Dred Scott. Or do they? And that's not all: Let me point out that the majority and Justice Kennedy agreed that at least some private to private transfers also violate the Constitution. So they too buy into the substantive due process argument, at least where the government deliberately takes land for the purpose of benefiting a private party. (That is to say, they limit the restriction on private use to purely private purposes. This is, roughly speaking, the post-New Deal conception: The legislature can take from A and give to B for a public purpose (and if the legislative act constitutes a taking, it must pay just compensation), but it may not do so for a purely private purpose.) Let me summarize: Critics of Kelo (including the dissenting Justices) are making a very old kind of argument from substantive due process, indeed the *original* argument from substantive due process, and the very sort of argument that Chief Justice Taney made in Dred Scott. Does that undermine their arguments or make them bad people? No, it does not. And here's the moral of the story: Just because an argument appears in Dred Scott doesn't mean that the idea is bad. The idea that the Constitution follows the flag is not bad, and substantive due process is not bad. Slavery is bad.
|
Books by Balkinization Bloggers Linda C. McClain and Aziza Ahmed, The Routledge Companion to Gender and COVID-19 (Routledge, 2024) David Pozen, The Constitution of the War on Drugs (Oxford University Press, 2024) Jack M. Balkin, Memory and Authority: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation (Yale University Press, 2024) Mark A. Graber, Punish Treason, Reward Loyalty: The Forgotten Goals of Constitutional Reform after the Civil War (University of Kansas Press, 2023) Jack M. Balkin, What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Most Controversial Decision - Revised Edition (NYU Press, 2023) Andrew Koppelman, Burning Down the House: How Libertarian Philosophy Was Corrupted by Delusion and Greed (St. Martin’s Press, 2022) Gerard N. Magliocca, Washington's Heir: The Life of Justice Bushrod Washington (Oxford University Press, 2022) Joseph Fishkin and William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution: Reconstructing the Economic Foundations of American Democracy (Harvard University Press, 2022) Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric, Power to the People: Constitutionalism in the Age of Populism (Oxford University Press 2021). Mark Philip Bradley and Mary L. Dudziak, eds., Making the Forever War: Marilyn B. Young on the Culture and Politics of American Militarism Culture and Politics in the Cold War and Beyond (University of Massachusetts Press, 2021). Jack M. Balkin, What Obergefell v. Hodges Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Same-Sex Marriage Decision (Yale University Press, 2020) Frank Pasquale, New Laws of Robotics: Defending Human Expertise in the Age of AI (Belknap Press, 2020) Jack M. Balkin, The Cycles of Constitutional Time (Oxford University Press, 2020) Mark Tushnet, Taking Back the Constitution: Activist Judges and the Next Age of American Law (Yale University Press 2020). Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights vs. Religious Liberty?: The Unnecessary Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2020) Ezekiel J Emanuel and Abbe R. Gluck, The Trillion Dollar Revolution: How the Affordable Care Act Transformed Politics, Law, and Health Care in America (PublicAffairs, 2020) Linda C. McClain, Who's the Bigot?: Learning from Conflicts over Marriage and Civil Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2020) Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction (University of Chicago Press, 2019) Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies (Duke University Press 2018) Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet, eds., Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (Oxford University Press 2018) Gerard Magliocca, The Heart of the Constitution: How the Bill of Rights became the Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, 2018) Cynthia Levinson and Sanford Levinson, Fault Lines in the Constitution: The Framers, Their Fights, and the Flaws that Affect Us Today (Peachtree Publishers, 2017) Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) Sanford Levinson, Nullification and Secession in Modern Constitutional Thought (University Press of Kansas 2016) Sanford Levinson, An Argument Open to All: Reading The Federalist in the 21st Century (Yale University Press 2015) Stephen M. Griffin, Broken Trust: Dysfunctional Government and Constitutional Reform (University Press of Kansas, 2015) Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Harvard University Press, 2015) Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution (Harvard University Press, 2014) Balkinization Symposium on We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution Joseph Fishkin, Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity (Oxford University Press, 2014) Mark A. Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2013) John Mikhail, Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment (Cambridge University Press, 2013) Gerard N. Magliocca, American Founding Son: John Bingham and the Invention of the Fourteenth Amendment (New York University Press, 2013) Stephen M. Griffin, Long Wars and the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2013) Andrew Koppelman, The Tough Luck Constitution and the Assault on Health Care Reform (Oxford University Press, 2013) James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues (Harvard University Press, 2013) Balkinization Symposium on Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality (Harvard University Press, 2013) Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (University of Chicago Press, 2012) Sanford Levinson, Framed: America's 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2012) Linda C. McClain and Joanna L. Grossman, Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women's Equal Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2012) Mary Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford University Press, 2012) Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Harvard University Press, 2011) Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud and Other Abuses of Intellectual Property Law (Stanford University Press, 2011) Richard W. Garnett and Andrew Koppelman, First Amendment Stories, (Foundation Press 2011) Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World (Harvard University Press, 2011) Gerard Magliocca, The Tragedy of William Jennings Bryan: Constitutional Law and the Politics of Backlash (Yale University Press, 2011) Bernard Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (Harvard University Press, 2010) Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Harvard University Press, 2010) Balkinization Symposium on The Decline and Fall of the American Republic Ian Ayres. Carrots and Sticks: Unlock the Power of Incentives to Get Things Done (Bantam Books, 2010) Mark Tushnet, Why the Constitution Matters (Yale University Press 2010) Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff: Lifecycle Investing: A New, Safe, and Audacious Way to Improve the Performance of Your Retirement Portfolio (Basic Books, 2010) Jack M. Balkin, The Laws of Change: I Ching and the Philosophy of Life (2d Edition, Sybil Creek Press 2009) Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton University Press 2009) Andrew Koppelman and Tobias Barrington Wolff, A Right to Discriminate?: How the Case of Boy Scouts of America v. James Dale Warped the Law of Free Association (Yale University Press 2009) Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The Constitution in 2020 (Oxford University Press 2009) Heather K. Gerken, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is Failing and How to Fix It (Princeton University Press 2009) Mary Dudziak, Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall's African Journey (Oxford University Press 2008) David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) Ian Ayres, Super Crunchers: Why Thinking-By-Numbers is the New Way to be Smart (Bantam 2007) Jack M. Balkin, James Grimmelmann, Eddan Katz, Nimrod Kozlovski, Shlomit Wagman and Tal Zarsky, eds., Cybercrime: Digital Cops in a Networked Environment (N.Y.U. Press 2007) Jack M. Balkin and Beth Simone Noveck, The State of Play: Law, Games, and Virtual Worlds (N.Y.U. Press 2006) Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines (Yale University Press 2006) Brian Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End (Cambridge University Press 2006) Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (Oxford University Press 2006) Mark Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (Cambridge University Press 2006) Jack M. Balkin, ed., What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said (N.Y.U. Press 2005) Sanford Levinson, ed., Torture: A Collection (Oxford University Press 2004) Balkin.com homepage Bibliography Conlaw.net Cultural Software Writings Opeds The Information Society Project BrownvBoard.com Useful Links Syllabi and Exams |