For the Balkinization symposium on Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric, Power to the People: Constitutionalism in the Age of Populism (Oxford University Press 2021).
Colm Ó Cinnéide
Introduction: Why This Book is So Good
Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric have done a great service. The arguments set out in
Power to the People: Constitutionalism After Populism cut through the
rhetorical fog that surrounds the concept of populism. In particular, they provide
a calm and much-needed corrective to over-heated claims that populist politics are
inherently ‘antithetical to constitutionalism’ (p.
36). Such claims are treated as axiomatic in much of the post-2016 deluge of academic
commentary on populism. However, Tushnet and Bugaric prick this over-inflated
conceptual bubble, and instead provide a radically different and much more
convincing analysis of the populism/constitutionalism relationship.
As I read their book, their key arguments are as follows. (i) Populism
as a mode or style of political mobilisation can take very different forms, and
act as a vector for a broad range of different political ideologies. (ii) Populist
movements interact with established state constitutional frameworks in a
variety of different ways, usually reflecting the influence of their associated
‘host ideologies’. (iii) Such interaction can disrupt or destabilise such
frameworks, sometimes generating new constitutional norms - but the aims,
objectives and actions of populist actors in this regard are often entirely compatible
with the basic, core, foundational set of liberal democratic constitutionalist
norms, which Tushnet and Bugaric refer to as ‘thin constitutionalism’. (iv)
There is thus nothing intrinsically antagonistic in the relationship
between populism and constitutionalism - despite what the norm-shredding behaviour
of a few specific populist politicians of an authoritarian bent, like Orbán and
Bolsonaro, might suggest. (v) Expressions of concern about constitutionalism are
often used as a ‘mask’ (p. 35) to conceal political disagreement with populist movements.
(vi) More generally, demonisation of populism ignores its positive democratic
potential. (vii) Greater democratisation all round, and in particular the
development of new forms of direct democracy, offers the best inoculation
against its more destructive variants.
In general, with some significant qualifications that I discuss below, I think these arguments are broadly convincing - and the book develops them with admirable clarity and precision. So, to show my critical appreciation for Tushnet and Bugaric’s work, I’m going to highlight three particular aspects of their analysis that I especially agree with, before moving on to sketch out where I disagree with them. I will then conclude with a brief comment about how I think the ‘populism versus constitutionalism’ debate may evolve in the future.
The Compatibility of Constitutionalism and Populism
I’ll begin with my points of particular positive endorsement. To
start with, Tushnet and Bugaric are right to emphasise that populist themes
recur repeatedly in democratic discourse, and have always done so. To
illustrate this point, they mention Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s anti-elite
rhetoric – but De Gaulle, Bevan, and De Valera could all be thrown into the mix
from that general time period, not to mention the leaders of the emerging anti-colonial
movements. More generally, it doesn’t require much digging to unearth populist
tropes lurking in every corner of the political spectrum. Indeed, as Margaret
Canovan famously argued, populism understood as an appeal to the people against
‘the established structure of power and the dominant ideas or values’ is always
a potential part of the democratic repertoire – or, as Kalyvas puts
it, is a perennially available ‘antisystem electoralist
strategy…that is part of the technology of democratic competition’. Thus, as
Tushnet and Bugaric argue, populist
mobilisation reflects both the instability and vigour of the democratic
process. Furthermore, it inevitably has resonance in the current era, given the
persisting prevalence of technocratic governance and the dispersal of
democratic accountability across multiple nodes of constitutional governance.
As such, framing populism as inherently anti-constitutional risks
demonising a significant mode of democratic discourse.
Secondly, Tushnet and
Bugaric are also right
to highlight that many forms of populist politics are entirely compatible with
a commitment to ‘thin’ constitutionalism, understood to entail respect for
basic principles such as majority rule, judicial independence and respect for
core civil and political rights. Populists may often challenge existing
configurations of constitutional governance, by e.g. seeking to limit judicial
power, or alter the existing separation of powers. They may even seek
fundamental changes to established constitutional architecture, or be willing
to ‘break the guardrails’ that normally constrain the behaviour of political
actors within a given constitutional system. However, that doesn’t by itself
render their behaviour incompatible with basic liberal democratic norms:
constitutional revision is prima facie a legitimate goal of political
activity, as Tushnet and Bugaric argue. They acknowledge that populist
movements have periodically crossed the line, and undermined core
constitutional norms such as judicial independence. They also recognise and
expand on Kim Lane Scheppele’s important argument that an assortment of constitutional revisions, each one
innocuous and/or defensible when considered in isolation, may ultimately create
a ‘Frankenstate’ where democratic norms are fundamentally corroded. But such
concerns do not mean that any and all populist attempts to revise
constitutional structures are inherently illegitimate – despite what much of
the anti-populist rhetoric of recent years might suggest.
Indeed, there is a real danger here of crying wolf. Not every
populist leader shares Orbán’s desire to shake off the shackles of existing
constitutional norms, or has the poisonous political ideology of a Bolsonaro.
Furthermore, there is a danger in invoking the specter of Orbán to justify
demands that all political mobilisation conform to the established contours of
a state’s existing constitutional culture, as policed and patrolled by judges,
lawyers and constitutional law academics. This potentially opens the door to a
form of controlled democracy, or at least a questionably constrained sphere of
political debate.
Instead, as Tushent and Bugaric suggest, it is necessary to engage
with specific variants of populism as they emerge in different states, and the
host ideologies that animate them – rather than assuming their attitude towards
existing constitutional norms will conform to some general model. This is the
third point on which I am in particular agreement with the authors. In this
regard, I’m particularly influenced by recent debates in the UK over the
post-Brexit ideological trajectory of Boris Johnson’s Conservative government. Overwrought
claims are made to the effect that the government has adopted Viktor Orbán’s
right-populist playbook. In reality, their approach to questions of
constitutional law is best viewed as a sui generis combination of traditional Tory political constitutionalism laced with
the anti-institutional energy of post-2016 right nationalist populism. Adopting
an identikit framing of populism, encompassing all political mobilisation that
echoes some of its distinctive themes, is an error to be avoided.
The Problem of ‘Constitutional Irritation’
Having said all that, let me now turn to my points of disagreement. I
would add an asterisk to Tushnet and Bugaric’s ‘relatively
sanguine’ (p. 274) take on the relationship between populism and
constitutionalism. I think they underestimate the extent to which populist
politics may be difficult to reconcile with the functional and normative expectations
that shape the institutional mechanisms of contemporary constitutional
governance.
As Tushnet and Bugaric note, populists are often ‘impatient with
institutions’ (p. 72). This does not particularly perturb them: constitutions
need to be able to accommodate change, and the revision of existing veto
points. But such anti-institutionalism can also destabilise the ‘ordinary’
functional structures of constitutional governance – in particular by undermining
checks and balances and power-dispersal mechanisms that may play a useful role
in maintaining both state legitimacy and public ordering.
Such mechanisms may not be essential to maintain basic democratic health,
i.e. their existence may not be required by Tushnet and
Bugaric’s ‘thin constitutionalism’. But they may nevertheless serve other
important purposes – and populism’s anti-institutionalism may cut across their
functioning, and call their legitimacy in question, without necessarily
generating a change in the relevant institutional architecture. (An example of
this is the UK government’s sustained, right-populist criticism of how the
European Convention of Human Rights has been incorporated into UK law by the
Human Rights Act 1998. These attacks have cast a shadow over the legitimacy of
this important element of the UK’s constitutional governance. However, the
government’s current reform proposals leave much of the legal status quo intact while amplifying the
potential for inter-institutional conflict, meaning that the tensions
surrounding UK human rights law will remain essentially unresolved.)
Furthermore, populist politicians often promise radical social
change but struggle to deliver, usually as a result of the inevitably complex
nature of modern governance. This can generate frustration and anger among
their voters. It can also help to fuel wider patterns of social antagonism and political
polarisation, which can again have a destabilising impact on the legitimacy and
functioning of constitutional structures. (Again the UK provides illustrative examples
of this. In particular, the protracted constitutional destabilisation that
followed the 2016 Brexit referendum vote, and the ongoing slow motion
constitutional crisis in Northern Ireland relating to the status of the Northern
Ireland Protocol.)
Furthermore, I do not
share Tushnet and Bugaric’s belief that ‘more democratisation’ can necessarily
provide easy solutions to such problems. Debilitating forms of ‘constitutional
irritation’ can be difficult to resolve by the electoral process – in
particular when they involve the interaction of multiple different layers of
constitutional governance, where different international, national, regional
and devolved entities may be able to invoke different sources of democratic
authority, or where issues of minority rights protection enter the picture.
(The Northern Ireland Protocol controversy is a particularly good example of
this.) And the type of direct democracy initiatives particularly favoured by
Tushnet and Bugaric have a very mixed record of providing clear resolutions to
such issues. (Again, just sticking to UK examples, the messy aftermath of the
2016 Brexit referendum illustrates the problem here.)
Conclusion
Now, returning to the
central theme of this excellent book, none of these concerns about
constitutional irritation necessarily contradict Tushnet and Bugaric’s core
arguments. Populism and constitutionalism are not inherently antagonistic, as
they argue. But the populism/constitutionalism relationship can nevertheless be
a difficult one, all the same. As a mode of political mobilisation, populism
may be a better vehicle for deconstructing existing constitutional
mechanisms than for constructively governing through them – which complicates
any assessment of its balance-sheet.
Indeed, I suspect this
is one reason why right populism is flourishing much more than left populism (which
is Tushnet and Bugaric’s preferred variant). Right populism often aims at
seizing control over state structures, often with a view to propping up an
allegedly endangered social and cultural status quo, while leaving most private
market mechanisms to run themselves. However, left populism seeks to re-direct
the activity of state structures so as to achieve wider forms of social
transformation – which means that its ambitions can usually only be implemented
via complex governance processes. I suspect this makes the problem of
constitutional irritation inherently more challenging and difficult for left
populism, and may in part explain the reluctance of so many left ‘progressives’
to get on board populist political mobilisations.
Indeed, in a few
years, we may see the ‘populism good or bad’ debate give way to a more
sustained focus on those specific strands of populism which are currently most
thriving, namely those associated with the ‘host ideology’ of post-2016 right
nationalism. But that is a line of analysis perhaps best left to political
scientists, rather than a mere law professor like myself. For now, Tushnet and
Bugaric’s superb book will remain the authoritative perspective on the
populism/constitutionalism dynamic.
Colm Ó Cinnéide
is Professor of Constitutional and Human Rights Law at the Faculty of Laws, UCL. You can reach him by e-mail at