Donald
Trump and Brett Kavanaugh offered the American people two clichés when
describing how Supreme Court justices should decide cases. The first is that they must interpret the
Constitution as written. The second is
that they should use common sense. One problem is that in many important cases the two conflict. The more serious problem is that when the two
conflict, Kavanaugh always selects the option that promotes Republican policies
and politics.
The
Constitution as written belies Kavanaugh’s claims that sitting (Republican)
presidents cannot be indicted. No
provision in the Constitution explicitly forbids the indictment of a sitting
president. No provision was
self-consciously intended to forbid the indictment of a sitting president. Of course, an indictment would interfere with
presidential duties, but indictments also interfere with the duties of every federal
officer mentioned in the Constitution, every federal officer not mentioned in
the Constitution, every private person whose actions are of consequence to the
federal government, every state official (did someone say 10th
Amendment), and every private person whose actions are of consequence to state
governments. For that matter, if we are
worried about a distracted president, then the president’s family, friends, and
businesses should be immune to criminal processes. We ought not put down the president’s dog
for fear of upsetting the president, even if the dog has rabies and has been
biting children. Common sense permits us
to make some distinctions, but none of these distinctions are rooted in the
Constitution as written.
If,
however, common sense is our guide, then Kavanaugh’s claims that persons have a
Second Amendment right to bear assault weapons and that the federal government
may prevent a very pregnant alien teenager from having an abortion fall by the
wayside. Common sense and the English
language make clear that something called an “assault rifle” is not primarily a
defensive weapon. Common sense and basic
human decency make clear that one should not delay abortions for very pregnant
frightened teenagers, particularly those who have a limited understanding of
the medical system in the United States.
The Constitution as written might be construed to defy common sense, but
the arguments for assault weapons and forcing pregnant teenagers to become mothers
are rooted solely in the written Constitution, not common sense.
These
contradictions bother neither Trump nor Kavanaugh. When the Constitution as written interferes
with Republican policies, they argue common sense. When common sense interferes with Republican
policies, they argue the Constitution as written. When both are inconsistent with Republican
policies and politics, no doubt a different cliché will be trotted out. That Trump choose the only justice on the
short list whose career outside the court was devoted to the single-minded pursuit
of Republican party policies and politics says far more about would-be Justice
Kavanaugh’s judicial commitments than the clichés uttered when he was
nominated.
UPDATE: Several people have noted that the Minnesota Law Review article in question declares only that Kavanaugh has "serious questions" about whether a president can be criminally indicted. But, the very slightly modified version of the argument goes, a textualist ought not have serious questions, since the text nowhere indicates presidential (or congressional or judicial) immunity from criminal process. Such immunity might make common sense and might be consistent with purposive interpretation, but then we are discussing judicial discretion rather than calling balls and strikes.
UPDATE: Several people have noted that the Minnesota Law Review article in question declares only that Kavanaugh has "serious questions" about whether a president can be criminally indicted. But, the very slightly modified version of the argument goes, a textualist ought not have serious questions, since the text nowhere indicates presidential (or congressional or judicial) immunity from criminal process. Such immunity might make common sense and might be consistent with purposive interpretation, but then we are discussing judicial discretion rather than calling balls and strikes.