Balkinization  

Thursday, March 05, 2020

What is the Rule of Law Good For?

Andrew Koppelman


Everyone loves the rule of law, but they don’t agree on what it is or why it matters. That’s why Paul Gowder’s book, The Rule of Law in the Real World, is so important. It begins with the humblest task of analytic philosophy, the disambiguation of the common sense meaning of terms. It shows that these terms point to a morally urgent ideal.

Thus opens my review of the book at the New Rambler, here.

Which Democratic candidate is the most electable in the electoral college?

Ian Ayres

Ian Ayres and Zachary Shelley

In a recent coauthored LA Times op-ed, we discuss the importance of polling on head-to-head matchups with Trump for determining electability of the Democratic primary candidates. Using state-level polls on these matchups with Trump, we find that Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders would be expected to defeat Trump in the general election. These two candidates would be expected to flip 106 and 84 electoral votes, respectively. Democrats only need to flip a net of 38 electoral votes from 2016 in order to win.

We note, however, that Joe Biden has the largest electoral college lead of these candidates, which provides a buffer against the possibility that polls incorrectly measure Trump’s support (as was the case in 2016).

The graphs below show how several candidates (including Elizabeth Warren and Pete Buttigieg, who have dropped out of the race) poll compared to Clinton’s 2016 election results.

Read more »

Why it’s hard for Warren to endorse either Biden or Sanders

Andrew Koppelman



Few politicians stand for a distinctive ideology.  It wouldn’t make sense to talk about McConnellism, or Schumerism.  And the shrinkage of the Democratic presidential field, for the most part, doesn’t mean a loss of ideological options.  It’s no surprise that Buttigieg, Klobluchar, and Bloomberg all endorsed Biden after they dropped out.  They stand for the same Democratic centrism.  Their contest was about who would be the best messenger for it.

Elizabeth Warren is different – different enough that it makes sense to talk about Warrenism, as Will Wilkinson does in a new essay that is as shrewd an assessment of her as I’ve seen.  He makes clear that it’s far too crude to expect her to back Sanders in order to consolidate the left wing of the party.  He writes:

“Elizabeth Warren doesn’t want to nationalize manufacturing, seize the wealth that capitalists have stolen from workers, or radically level the distribution of income and wealth to align with some abstract ideal of distributive justice. 

“As far as I can tell, what Elizabeth Warren wants is the kind of democracy and market economy she thought we had when she was a Republican, but was scandalized to discover we didn’t have, thanks to the undue influence of self-dealing moneyed interests in the policymaking process. 

“Because the American republic is, in fact, in the midst of a spiraling crisis of corruption, there is more than a whiff of radicalism in a reform agenda focused on rooting out graft and restoring popular sovereignty. But Warren’s program is animated by earnest devotion to sturdy procedural ideals — fair elections, the rule of law, equitable and responsive political representation, and clean public administration— not left-wing ideology. It aims to realize a homely republican vision of America in which equal democratic citizens of every gender, color, and creed can vote their way to a system that gives everybody a fair shot at a sound education and a decent wage sufficient to raise a family in a comfortable home without becoming indentured to creditors or wrecked by the vicissitudes of capitalist dislocation.”

This is different from what Sanders is offering, and it’s certainly not Biden, whose support of the dreadful 2005 bankruptcy bill was what brought Warren into politics.  It is a distinctive ideology: robust capitalism, with a state strong enough to resist capture by nasty actors like the credit card companies who wanted to make it harder for people to get out of debt.  The familiar left-right categories don’t really explain it.  Wilkinson does.  He explains why it’s important for Warren, and Warrenism, to remain a force in American politics.  His essay is strongly recommended.




Meltdown? On Rhetoric and Causation

Guest Blogger

For the symposium on Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy (Yale University Press, 2020).

Guy Charles

Rick Hasen is a prolific scholar (and a wonderful interlocutor).  He is not only one of the most thoughtful scholars in the field of election law, he seems to write a book every other year.  He has a great eye for identifying the issues of the moment, he has a prodigious command of relevant information, and he has an ability, which is rare among most legal academics, to distill complex issues in a manner that makes sense to non-academics.  His latest project, Election Law Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy, displays these skills in ample abundance.  Rick’s timing could not have better. Or worse?  His book, predicting an election law meltdown, came out just as, it seemed, the Iowa Caucuses were experiencing the election administration version of the ten plagues of Egypt.  Rick relies on a series of vignettes and real-world events to show how the confluence of “four factors—voter suppression, pockets of incompetence, foreign and domestic dirty tricks, and incendiary rhetoric—undermines public trust in the fairness and accuracy of American elections and creates high risks for the 2010 elections and beyond.” (10).  The book is engaging, moves quickly, raises a number of important points, and is extremely accessible.  I want to focus on two issues in particular that the book raised for me, one about rhetoric and the other about causation. 
Read more »

Wednesday, March 04, 2020

There's No "I" in Supreme Court

Gerard N. Magliocca

The Chief Justice is mistaken if he thinks that solo press statements criticizing comments by elected officials will do any good. He should end this practice immediately.

Put bluntly, the Chief Justice lacks the stature necessary to convince the public when he is not speaking in an opinion. He is not Charles Evans Hughes, who was the Governor of New York, the Secretary of State, and a presidential nominee. Nor is he Earl Warren, the three-term Governor of California and a vice-presidential nominee. They might have been able to pull off what Roberts is trying to accomplish, though I'm dubious even they would have succeeded.

Consider the most successful example of a Chief Justice speaking out publicly about judicial independence: Chief Justice Hughes' 1937 letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee attacking President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. What made that letter work was that Hughes got Louis Brandeis and Willis Van Devanter to join him (without telling the other Justices, who might have dissented). Three Justices appointed by different Presidents representing different points of view made a powerful statement. A letter from the Chief Justice alone would have been less convincing and, probably, counterproductive.

In short, the Chief Justice should convince his colleagues to join his admonishments. If he cannot, then he should take a vow of silence.  

Asymmetrical Hardball and Criticizing Supreme Court Judges

Mark Tushnet

The April 21, 1989, issue of the National Review had a cover depicting Thurgood Marshall dozing on the bench. The article was written by Terry Eastland, whose biography includes stints as a speechwriter for Reagan Attorney General William French Smith and director of public affairs for Attorney General Edwin Meese. Substantively the article discussed -- in terms that we would call today genteel snark -- the effects of aging on the performance of Supreme Court justices.

The cover is, I think, different, and transformed the snark into racism. The Federalist Society was founded in 1983. I may have missed them at the time and in my research on Justice Marshall, but I don't recall comments from conservative academics in 1989 describing the National Review's cover as "inexcusable" or the like.

The Paradox of Political Problem Perception (or if you will, Persily's Paradox)

Nate Persily

For the symposium on Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy (Yale University Press, 2020).

One of the central concerns animating Rick Hasen’s excellent book, Election Meltdown, is Americans’ decreasing confidence in the electoral system.  Genuine worries about voter suppression and voting machine insecurity, as well as manufactured anxieties due to disinformation, lead citizens to question the fairness of the system and the legitimacy of election results.  As scholars of comparative politics are quick to recount, trust in the mechanics of democracy becomes very difficult to regain once it is lost. The 2020 election, therefore, represents a turning point for the United States: Will supporters of the losing candidate question the validity of the election and the legitimacy of the winner?

I should admit that I have frequently criticized a focus on confidence and perceptions in the context of the law of democracy.   In the campaign finance context, I have worried about the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the appearance of corruption as a justification for regulation of contributions or expenditures.  In the context of voter identification, coauthors and I sounded an alarm that perceptions of fraud may have been disconnected from the reality of what was happening in polling places. And in the context of race-based redistricting, wherein majority-minority districts were alleged to create “expressive harms” through racial stereotyping, coauthors and I suggested the evidence did not back up such assessments.

Times have changed.  We now live in an era where perceptions of electoral dysfunction are at least as important, if not more so, than the reality. Those perceptions might be shaped by real or exaggerated reports of what is happening on the ground.  Or they might be caused by broadbased public cynicism fed by polarized coverage of a particular election-relevant phenomenon. 

Even worse, there are also a set of problems concerning the functioning of elections, which, when you draw attention to them, you make them worse.  Analysts and critics of the system are therefore placed in a bind: Keep silent about the problem and hope your concerns are not as significant as they appear or identify the problem and be responsible for the foreseeable, if unintended, consequences when you amplify their significance.  Call this the paradox of political problem perception.

Read more »

Tuesday, March 03, 2020

Critical Legal Studies in Historical Perspective

Mark Tushnet

Last week Princeton University's LAPA program and library hosted a conference on critical legal studies in, as I would put it, historical perspective. (There is of course something a bit odd about finding oneself to be an object of historical inquiry.) I'm still digesting what was said, but here are some preliminary, mostly unconnected observations.

1. In what sense, other than as an organization, is CLS dead? One younger participant suggested that it wasn't dead at all, because it lived on in scattered "sleeper cells" ready to emerge when circumstances become favorable. I had been circling around a similar metaphor. In the late 1960s the underground newspaper in Cambridge was called the "Old Mole." The name was taken from a phrase from Marx (channeling Shakespeare), referring to a mole that had been burrowing underground for years, to come out into the light and be greeted, "Well grubbed, Old Mole."

2. I was struck at the conference, as I have been in the past, at the central role the common law curriculum played in the development of CLS. One reason, pointed out to me by Willy Forbath, was that first year students were targets of opportunity for early CLS teachers -- or, put another way, CLS as an organizing technique had to meet its audience where it was. I think there might have been another reason -- the common law curriculum deals with private law, and private law is at the heart of liberal legalism. In liberal legal ideology public law serves to insulate the private domain -- itself defined through private law -- from public intrusion/regulation. To the extent that I see myself as having made a contribution to core CLS ideas, I see that contribution as being the demonstration that the contours of public law were defined reciprocally with those of public law -- or, put another way, that the CLS critique of private law had to include some input from (a critical analysis of) public law.

3. Perhaps not surprisingly, there were interesting echoes of past "concerns" about the political valence of CLS. In its first iteration the concern was (roughly), "Here we liberal legalists are fighting off the threat of Reaganite conservatism, and you folks are arguing that the ground on which we are attempting to stand is made of sand." In its current iteration one simply substitutes Trump and a much more intense concern about what's at stake, for Reagan. The task for progressives, it was and is said, is the retrieval rather than the critique of liberal legalism.

I was taken by the response offered by one of the speakers, perhaps Gary Peller, that what we are facing is the possibility of an authoritarian liberal legalism, embodied in the person of John Roberts. (In my forthcoming book I allude to this problem by characterizing liberals as thinking of John Roberts as Obi-Wan Kenobi, our only hope.) My exemplary opinion is Roberts's "Muslim ban" opinion with its distinction between "this [racist] President" and "the presidency [to be occupied serially by other marginally less blatantly racist presidents]." One project that a younger person with CLS-like leanings might profitably engage in, I think, would be the elaboration of what authoritarian liberal legalism would look like. (That elaboration would have to take into account the CLS view that "ordinary" liberal legal liberalism was itself authoritarian.)

President Trump, the CDC Budget, and Fiscal Irresponsibility

David Super


            The President’s critics have savaged his response to the novel coronavirus outbreak.  Certainly his obsession with the stock market, his assignment of his science-resistant Vice President to lead the coronavirus task force, and his efforts to restrict the flow of expert information are deeply disappointing.  The exploitation of this crisis to promote more ill-targeted tax cuts and anti-immigrant measures is shameful.  The world lost its chance to prevent a coronavirus pandemic when one illiberal regime prioritized avoiding political embarrassment over the public health; ours seemed determined to repeat that mistake. 

            A narrower but still important question that has arisen about whether the President has cut the budget of the Centers for Disease Control.  The Guardian ran a piece by former Labor Secretary Robert Reich entitled “Coronavirus is bad enough – Trump's cuts have made the danger far worse,” although its text describes only cuts the President has proposed for next fiscal year.  Some fact-checkers have criticized Democratic presidential candidates for speaking as if those cuts had already been enacted. 

            CDC’s budget illustrates a broader pattern that has replicated itself numerous times across the federal budget.  To see this, we should examine the CDC’s budget over the past ten years.  This exercise has value beyond the immediate crisis because the CDC is representative of federal government activities more broadly:  few people think much about it most of the time but we urgently want it to be strong and effective when a crisis arises.  Were the current crisis of a different type, we would be focusing on some other agency with the same sense of urgency. 

            In fiscal year 2010, the main CDC account received $6.7 billion.  There is no reason to believe that was the “right” number under any particular set of norms, but it is far enough back to provide a useful point of comparison for subsequent events.  (I am focusing on the main CDC account rather than the total CDC budget to focus on activities most relevant to the current crisis and to filter out some, although by no means all, of the volatility resulting from one-time needs and from activities being transferred into or out of the CDC’s budget.  The story is not significantly different if one aggregates all CDC accounts.  All figures here are in budget authority.) 

            By 2012, the CDC’s budget had shrunk to $6.5 billion as Republicans took control of the House of Representatives.  House Republicans extracted reductions in non-defense discretionary spending from President Obama as their price for approving increases to the debt limit.  Another concession they won was the Budget Control Act of 2011, which resulted in across-the-board discretionary cuts (“sequestration”) in 2013.  That reduced the CDC to less than $6 billion, an 8.8% cut in a single year. 

            For the next several years, many domestic discretionary programs stayed close to their sequestration levels, sometimes with modest inflation adjustments.  The CDC might well have suffered a similar fate but for the Ebola epidemic in west Africa.  Because the CDC possessed much of the federal government’s expertise on communicable diseases, President Obama and Congress routed a large part of the funding for this country’s response to Ebola through the CDC.  Its budget returned to $6.7 billion in 2014 and shot up to $8.7 billion in 2015.  These increases were facilitated by two-year bipartisan agreements that traded cuts in entitlement spending for a modest relaxation in caps on defense and non-defense discretionary spending. 

            As the crisis receded, the CDC’s budget fell to $7.6 billion in 2016 and $7.2 billion in 2017.  In theory, fiscal year 2017 should have been the last year whose funding President Obama would have negotiated with Congress; in fact, he and congressional Republicans never came close to agreement and final spending levels were set in May 2017 by President Trump and Congress.  Although the nominal level for 2017 was greater than that for 2010, it actually provided the CDC with significantly less purchasing power:  adjusting the CDC’s 2010 budget for inflation would have required almost $7.5 billion by 2017. 

            OMB Director Mick Mulvaney, a former congressional “deficit hawk”, recently admitted that Republicans care about deficits only when a Democrat is in the White House.  Sure enough, they have been relatively lenient with discretionary spending for both defense and non-defense accounts since President Trump took office.  One can see this in the CDC’s budget, which rose to $8.0 billion in 2018 before sliding to $7.3 billion and $7.6 billion the last two years.  This year’s CDC appropriation is roughly $200 million less than in 2010 after adjusting for inflation.  It is virtually the same in nominal terms, and a bit less than $400 million dollars after adjusting for inflation, relative to the 2016 figure in the last annual appropriation President Obama signed.  A truly apples-to-apples comparison would require removing spending on the Ebola crisis from the 2016 figure and spending on the opioid crisis from current figures as well as adjusting for transfers of funding and responsibility.  That would require a deep dive into the fine points of the CDC’s budget but probably not change the bottom line much. 

            It therefore seems fair to say that the CDC has been financially weakened under President Trump’s watch, although not dramatically so.  On the other hand, the White House’s furious denials that he cut the CDC are a bit hard to accept when he has repeatedly tried to do just that.  His budget for fiscal year 2021 calls for cutting the CDC budget to $6.4 billion, a 21% cut in purchasing power from 2010 and a 24% real cut from the 2016 level.  Last year, his budget would have cut the CDC’s budget to $6.1 billion.  The year before that, his budget proposed cutting the CDC to $5.2 billion.  And his first budget proposed $5.9 billion for the CDC.  If the CDC’s budget has only shrunk by moderate amounts under President Trump, it certainly is not for his lack of trying to do much more. 

            Moreover, this is in no way a complete accounting of President Trump’s treatment of the CDC.  Agencies can be undermined in many different ways.  President Trump’s first CDC director resigned after it was disclosed that she had bought tobacco stocks after taking her position, creating an untenable conflict of interest.  President Trump’s current CDC director’s appointment was opposed by some public health organizations based on accusations of scientific misconduct and his advocacy of HIV/AIDS policies based on religious teachings rather than science.  I am not qualified to assess the merits of these concerns. 

            The broader lesson here is that our current approach to funding federal programs is not just irrational but dangerous.  No one – and certainly not generalists like voters, journalists, Members of Congress, and Presidents – can possibly know what all the agencies in the federal government do.  We thus have no basis for assuming that continual cuts to funding for non-defense discretionary programs can be achieved without harm.  Today, in light of the coronavirus epidemic, starving the CDC looks foolish.  Were the headlines instead about collapsing bridges, or contaminated food, or leaking nuclear power plants, our parsimony with other agencies would get the attention.  One of the most frustrating aspects of the Benghazi embassy tragedy is the near-universal failure to mention the role of deep cuts in diplomatic security funding. 

            We need to abandon the ill-informed, and often tragically wrong, assumption that there is always fat to be cut in federal programs.  Where specific excesses are identified, or where we decide we want to curtail a particular activity, by all means we should cut.  But budgetary caps requiring unidentified cuts in federal programs’ purchasing power are much more likely to hollow out agencies we may need than they are to eliminate actual waste.  

@DavidASuper1

Choosing a Vice President

Sandy Levinson

One of the most truly dubious features of a generally defective Constitution is the vice presidency.  Under the original scheme, which was exposed as making no sense even by 1796, when the establishment of a party system was well underway, electors would vote for the two people they believed best equipped to become president.  This made a modicum of sense in the absence of political parties, but no sense otherwise, so we ended up with Adams and Jefferson in 1796.  And then, of course, there was the fiasco of the 1800 election, with the tie vote and Burr's (and the Federalists') machinations to deprive Jefferson of his victory.  That was rectified by the Twelfth Amendment, but it in fact legitimized picking second-raters as VPs as part of a political strategy to gain support from key states or blocs.  Is it a coincidence that the first three VPs to become president because of death or assassination were John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, and Andrew Johnson, all of whom would be on a list of our worst presidents?  We've done better in the 20th century, but recall some of the idiotic choices of running mates, including, most memorably for anyone alive today, McCain's unforgivable choice of the totally incompetent Sarah Palin in 2008.  Whatever explained Donald Trump's choice of Mike Pence, it was certainly not a defensible belief that he was truly equipped to be President (unlike, one has to admit, Dick Cheney, a person with truly appalling views but with the experience one seeks in a president, as was the case, for that matter, with Reagan's decision to choose Bush as his own running mate in 1980.

I find myself thinking of such things because of the fact that it now appears quite likely that the two candidates in November will be septuagenarians.  One should at ponder the possibility that the VP will succeed to the office because of the death of a then-octogenarian.  So that brings me to the increased speculation about whom various Democratic candidates might choose as their running mates.  Chuck Shumer has suggested, for example, that it would be a really good idea to pick an African-American woman.  One of the persons he suggested was Kamala Harris; the other two, however, were Stacey Abrams and an obscure member of the House of Representatives.  Let me suggest that he could not possibly believe that the latter two are equipped to become President at the present time, even if one concedes, arguendo, that isn't the case with Sen. Harris.  I greatly admire Ms. Abrams; I wish very much she had chosen to run for one of the two now-open Senate seats in Georgia.  I can easily see her as a national leader in the future.  But it simply is not serious to say that she is capable of entering the Oval Office right now.  Barack Obama, whom I avidly supported over Hillary Clinton, certainly could have been more seasoned in terms of relevant experience.  It speaks very well for him that he chose Joe Biden, who complemented him in many important ways.  Obama was truly serious in picking a VP; I fear that Senator Shumer is not.  Or, to be fair, he is serious only about winning back the White House, a worthy goal.  But single-minded focus, however understandable, is also a symptom of what Jack aptly terms "constitutional rot" inasmuch as it is evidence of reckless indifference about the actual ability of the person named to take on the awesome responsibilities of a president on literally a moment's notice.

Indeed, I think it is highly desirable if the various remaining candidates indicate well before Milwaukee whom they will pick as their running mates.  And, as I've argued earlier, I wish that candidates for the presidency would also indicate during the campaign their intended cabinets.  We have drifted into a terrible form of an elective monarchy, something none of the candidates wish to talk about even as they justifiably denounce the sociopath in the White House as unfit for the office.  But, frankly, that's like shooting fish in a barrel.  It allows us to pretend that there are not truly serious problems with our entire constitutional order that need to be addressed.

Actually, though, my preference would be that the VP, assuming we choose to retain that office in my constitutional convention, be chosen after the election along the lines set out in the 25th Amendment:  I.e., the new president, even before inauguration (which I hope would be sooner than the present January 20) would nominate a VP, who would have to be confirmed in a joint session of the House and the Senate by a majority vote.  This would, I am relatively confident, assure the selection of someone competent to enter the Oval Office if need be.  I would also make the VP fireable by a similar vote, since I see literally nothing to be said for giving the VP the same assurance of tenure in office as the president now has.  (I would, of course, much prefer a process by which we could also fire a president in whom we had lost confidence.)

Formal procedures matter!

Sandy Levinson

The major disagreement between Jack and myself, spelled out in our epistolary exchanges in Democracy and Dysfunction, concerns the relative weight we assign to political culture as against formal institutions and rules. Both of us agree that each is important, but then we go our own ways in terms of assessing the strength of the two.  I do think it is appropriate on Super Tuesday, though, to emphasize the importance of two formal procedures.  One is the fact that in order to gain any delegates at all, a candidate has to receive at least 15% of the total vote.  Another is the increasing prevalence of "early voating," which, by definition, means that many voters (like myself--I voted two weeks ago, very happily for Elizabeth Warren) cast their ballots without knowledge of future events that might have made a difference.  In my case, it is irrelevant that Klobohar, Buttegieg, and Steyer have dropped out since I voted, but I can imagine many voters for whom that is not true.  If states had ranked choice voting, then the problem would be dissipated, but save for Maine, that is not currently the case.  So it is thinkable--we'll find out later today, that Warren will get almost 15%, but be deprived of any delegates by the fact that the now-irrelevant votes will nonetheless be key parts of the denominator establishing the baseline for the 15%.  I don't know what the solution is.  Everything is a question of tradeoffs, but it is now obvious that decisions made by the DNC, in blissful ignorance of concrete realities of the situation--is this what decisionmaking behind a veil of ignorance leads to?), coupled with the prevalence of early voting especially in large states like California and Texas, can have real consequences.

Too Little Hope, Not Enough Gloom

Guest Blogger

For the symposium on Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy (Yale University Press, 2020).



Tabatha Abu El-Haj

Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy is an accessible, engaging read that synthesizes the stories Rick Hasen systematically collects on his invaluable blog into a graphic depiction of the stresses on our electoral systems. The most significant include: insidious allegations of voter fraud to provide cover for voter suppression; pockets of incompetence in election administration, including in critical swing states; and hacking and misinformation—the political “dirty tricks” of the digital age. Under the pressure of intensifying political polarization, these three phenomena fuel the most serious threat of all: incendiary rhetoric about “stolen elections.” This rhetoric, which has spread to the Democratic Party, Hasen worries is undermining the bedrock democratic commitment  to peaceful transitions of power. Not surprisingly, Hasen devotes considerable space to condemning not only those who undermine the public’s faith in the integrity of our electoral system through the spread of fabricated claims about in-person and non-citizen voter fraud but also those who make reckless assertions of “stolen elections.”
                                                                 
Election Meltdown, thus, invites all of us to reflect on the long-term health of American democracy. By writing in a straightforward and vivid manner that is welcoming to those outside the legal academy, Hasen invites a wider audience to reflect on the norms that support the democratic institutions Americans have long taken for granted and the role civil society will ultimately have to play to secure the future of those institutions. In a passage emphasizing how norms, such as the commitment to peaceful transitions between elections, critically support democracies, Hasen writes, “We have to act now to take steps so that the next time there is a razor-thin election—and there will be one, sooner or later—our civil society is strong enough to withstand foreign and domestic efforts to tear us apart.” In this way, Hasen has done more than simply record the specific and cumulative risks of an election meltdown in 2020.

Still, for all that commends it, Election Meltdown suffers from both too little hope, and not enough gloom.

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Monday, March 02, 2020

Fiduciary Creep

David Pozen


Samuel Bray and Paul Miller have posted a new paper that critiques a growing body of scholarship that argues that the Constitution imposes fiduciary duties on various actors, including the President.  As Bray and Miller detail, the “fiduciary constitutionalism” literature has taken off over the last decade or so, both in terms of volume and influence and in terms of conceptual and empirical sophistication.  The literature’s political valence also seems to have drifted from right to left following the election of Donald Trump.

Other fields of public law scholarship have made comparable fiduciary turns in recent years.  These include administrative law, international law, and internet law.  (I have written about this last turn on Balkinization before.)  “We are undergoing something of an academic fiduciary renaissance,” James Grimmelmann observed in 2014, “with scholars arguing for treating legislators, judges, jurors, and even friends as fiduciaries.”  Some believe that this transsubstantive trend—this fiduciary creep, if you will—holds “great promise.”  Others worry that as scholars apply fiduciary principles to contexts further and further removed from trust law, agency law, and corporate law, they increasingly “deploy[] a sense of fiduciary so open as to be empty.”

Separate from the merits of any particular proposal, however, we might also ask a more meta-level question about fiduciary creep’s emergence as an academic phenomenon in this manner and at this time.  Why have so many public law scholars begun to offer fiduciary theories?  I can only speculate.  But this being a blog post, and in the hope of sparking a conversation, speculate I shall.  The following strike me as plausible if reductive hypotheses, none of which are mutually exclusive:

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The Default of American Politics: The Perpetual and Never-ending Prospect of an Election Meltdown

Guest Blogger

For the symposium on Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy (Yale University Press, 2020).

Franita Tolson

I very much appreciate the opportunity to review Professor Rick Hasen’s timely and thoughtful book, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy.  The book does a great job of identifying some of the most pressing threats to our election system, and I do not think that voters sufficiently appreciate the seriousness of these threats.  Many individuals assume that our democracy can survive these challenges because the system has survived challenges.[1]  Professor Hasen challenges this assumption in important ways, presenting current threats as uniquely situated to cause enduring damage to our political system.  According to Professor Hasen, “The synergy of…four factors—voter suppression, pockets of incompetence, foreign and domestic dirty tricks, and incendiary rhetoric—undermines public trust in the fairness and accuracy of American elections and creates a high risk for the 2020 elections and beyond.”[2]


While I appreciate the risks that Professor Hasen identifies, I do not think that the current dysfunction of our politics is unprecedented or that these risks are unique in the dangers that they pose to our system of democracy.  More often than not, the prospect of an election meltdown has been the baseline from which most of our elections have always occurred.  We have long accepted this risk because we somehow make it through each election cycle, quickly forgetting the problems that plagued the system or, at best, forming a commission of some sort to address immediate past problems (both real and perceived).  But it is clear that our elections have never been healthy and robust.  In my view, our current dysfunction is simply a different variation of the same problem that has haunted our country since the Founding.  The default for our political system is, and always has been, well-ordered chaos.  As historian James Baumgardner observed over three decades ago, “there is an often unspoken but well-known axiom to the effect that there never has been a truly honest election in the country’s history.”[3]  Baumgardner made this comment in the context of the 1888 election, which was especially corrupt, but the idea that our elections are marked by misconduct of some sort could apply to virtually every election cycle.  In the 1888 election, in particular, Republican Senator Benjamin Harrison defeated the Democratic incumbent, Grover Cleveland, although Harrison lost the popular vote by 90,596 votes.[4]  In what is becoming a familiar narrative, it was the third election (and second in twelve years) in which the popular vote winner lost the Electoral College.

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Saturday, February 29, 2020

Hasen's Timely Warning

Stephen Griffin

For the symposium on Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy (Yale University Press, 2020).

Rick Hasen delivers a warning with a real punch in Election Meltdown.  This is an essential account of the problems with our electoral system just in time for the 2020 election cycle.  I’m certainly going to have my students read it when I teach voting rights this fall.

Hasen, a well-known expert in election law, identifies four critical dangers facing American democracy: voter suppression, instances of incompetence by both parties in the administration of elections, “dirty tricks” (by which he means the malignant use of social media by foreign and domestic agents), and “incendiary rhetoric” from the political right and left in terms of charges of “stolen” or “rigged” elections.  These are all useful points that Hasen makes persuasively.

But persuasive to everyone?  The kind of legal and policy analysis Hasen provides in this book is considered more convincing if it follows the evidence and remains even-handed.  Hasen does follow the evidence but this means he cannot be even-handed.  The Republican Party stands accused of multiple instances of trying to suppress the vote of Democratic voters.  Meanwhile Democrats stand accused of occasional incompetence in election administration and often overstating the impact of voter suppression on electoral outcomes.  However, Democrats also seem more interested than Republicans in counting every vote, particularly in jurisdictions in which absentee voting is common.  These accusations do not exactly even out and Hasen does not pretend otherwise.  As he states, “only one party is seeking to make it harder to register and vote for those likely to vote for the other party.”  This will likely limit the impact of his book, but I’m willing to keep an open mind.

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Friday, February 28, 2020

The Centrifugal Forces of Democracy

Guest Blogger

For the symposium on Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy (Yale University Press, 2020).

Dan Tokaji

Rick Hasen’s Electoral Meltdown tells a story of democracy in decline.  Americans are riven by conflict, distrustful of one another, and bitterly divided over how we should run our elections.  His book identifies four main culprits:  vote suppression, administrative incompetence, dirty tricks, and overheated rhetoric about stolen or rigged elections.  This constellation of problems,  he contends, has diminished public faith in elections and threatens to undermine our democracy.

I wish I could say he’s wrong.  But in reality, I fear that he’s only scratched the surface.  The pathologies in American democracy run even deeper than those on which Electoral Meltdown dwells.  And they won’t be solved by election law alone.  Rather, they demand a confrontation with the two centrifugal forces:  partisan polarization and economic inequality.  Until we deal with these larger structural issues, the voting wars that he describes will continue to rage unabated.

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Thursday, February 27, 2020

Bernie Sanders's intellectual sleight-of-hand

Sandy Levinson

I have indicated quite a few times since 2016 my distaste for Bernie Sanders's purported self-identification as a "revolutionary," given his absolute unwillingness to address in any way the extent to which it is the Constitution of 1787 that most truly "rigs" the constitutional order in favor of the status quo.  The only two explanation for that refusal is either abject ignorance (and commitment to a simplistic Marxism that looks at any and all formal institutions as mere epiphenomena when compared with the one things that is really important, i.e., class structure) or political cupidity.  For better or worse, his flamboyant willingness to embrace the label of democratic socialist and to offer some (merited, by the way) praise of Fidel Castro even while (equally justifiably) denouncing his regrettable excesses, unfortunately suggests that ignorance or ideological rigidity is more likely to be the explanation than more ordinary political opportunism.

His unwillingness to support getting rid of the filibuster, should he win and have a Democratic Senate, is dispositive evidence that he is totally unserious about governing.  Mario Cuomo famously said that one campaigns in poetry and governs in prose.  Bernie speaks only his own form of poetry, unfortunately.  Assuming he can win, the most likely result is a massive disillusionment on the part of his young supporters, most of whom know almost literally nothing about the details of the American political process--in part because Bernie is so completely unwilling to educate them.  That, coupled, with the fact that it is truly delusional to believe that he is a plausible two-term president (the same is true, of course, of Joe and Mike) means that 2024 would be even more chaotic than things now, and by 2024 a smart Trumpista, instead of the ignorant oaf who now inhabits the White House, will lead to a crushing defeat of whatever remains of the Democratic Party.

But Bernie is also offering a most dubious argument when he suggests that a "first-past-the-post" plurality winner system is an accurate indicator of "the people's choice."  No!!!  Boris Johnson was not the choice of the English people.  56% of them indicated a preference for someone else, but the first-past-the-post system gave him an overwhelming victory that he has the effrontery to claim is a "mandate."  Abraham Lincoln got the White House only because of the Electoral College, having received 39.8% of the popular vote.  His argument about "ballots, not bullets," settling the issue of slavery int the territories was, alas,  demagogic gibberish.  For better or worse (I think for worse), we don'e have a national referendum system in this country, and his particular number of ballots ended up being far from majority ratification of his position on extension of slavery into the territories. (That he was morally correct is beside the point if one is using the language of popular sovereignty.)  His presidency was an artifact of a ridiculous system for choosing presidents, whatever one thinks of Lincoln substantively as a President.  I think it is clear that he was far more serious about governing than Bernie appears to be, but who knows, since another feature of our awful system is that candidates run basically to be an elective monarch without having to tell us until it is too late whom they will pick not only as VP, but, in many ways more importantly, as cabinet members.  And Lincoln did pick, or accept, the awful choice of Andrew Johnson to be his second VP, perhaps because, like too many politicians, he wanted to believe he was immortal.

If Bernie comes in with, say, 45+% of the delegates, earned by getting 45+% of the popular vote in the Democratic primaries, then he will have a good argument, even if not a knock-down one, to get the nomination, since he would undoubtedly be the second choice of enough delegates (presumably those pledged to Warren) to make a plausible claim to majority approval.  But if he has the support of, say, only 33%, it's an entirely different all game.  At that point, the super-delegates, who are actually experienced not only in practical politics, but also in discerning people who might actually have relevant political skills, should feel absolutely free to select the person they believe to be the best candidate.  My own hope is that that would be Elizabeth Warren, but who knows? In any event, the argument that serious participation by the super-delegates would contravene "the people's choice" is meretricious nonsense.  If one accepts the self-evident truth that Donald Trump was not "the people's choice" with his 46% of the popular vote, then one should be equally skeptical of self-serving arguments by Bernie and his supporters.

E.R.A. Puzzles

David Pozen


Virginia’s approval of the Equal Rights Amendment brings to the fore a tangle of legal complications.  The headline issue, of course, is whether the E.R.A. is now part of the federal Constitution, notwithstanding that Congress’s extended ratification deadline expired in 1982 and that a handful of states have voted to rescind their earlier ratifications.  Call this the ratification puzzle.  There has been lots of writing on this issue, and I have little to add except to note that a decision not to accept the state E.R.A. rescissions could have unintended spillover effects on the push for a constitutional convention to add a balanced budget amendment.  If the E.R.A. rescissions are overlooked for purposes of counting to 38, then it becomes harder to deny that the four recent rescissions of Article V applications can be overlooked for purposes of counting to 34—putting us on the brink of our first-ever Article V convention.

The puzzles don’t end there.  Imagine that the E.R.A. becomes part of the Constitution in the near future, perhaps after the next Congress passes a joint resolution waiving the prior ratification deadline and directing the Archivist of the United States to recognize the E.R.A. as the 28th Amendment, which the Archivist promptly does.  What then?
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The Easy and Not So Easy Fixes to an Election Meltdown

Guest Blogger

For the symposium on Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy (Yale University Press, 2020).

Ciara C Torres-Spelliscy


Every voter should read Professor Rick Hasen's Election Meltdown before they vote in 2020, which focuses on the how elections are run and how partisans are less and less likely to accept an electoral loss.

Election Meltdown does a good job of explaining in language accessible to a lay person some of the problems that threaten American democracy like old voting machines and feckless administrators, and just as importantly, placing phantom fears in their proper place.

Hasen, a long-time critic of what he calls the “fraudulent fraud squad,” explains how fear of in-person voter fraud has grown out of proportion to its actual occurrence, which in most elections is rare to never. But with President Trump repeating the lie of voter fraud being rampant—including at times falsely accusing millions of voting fraudulently in 2016— the myth which used to circulate among lower level elected Republicans has been given a huge bully pulpit. This myth matters because the specter of election fraud is used by Republican lawmakers to justify more restrictive laws for voters, including strict voter ID rules. Moreover, Supreme Court Justices have also upheld voter ID on the vague theory that it prevents more fraud than it disenfranchises voters who cannot jump through extra administrative hoops.

There are also great vignettes in the book, like a selection of the trial challenging Kansas’s attempt to make voters produce records of citizenship instead of taking their word under penalty of perjury in Fish v. Kobach. Under this policy, Kansas held up the voter registrations of 30,000 people alleging they might not be citizens. As Election Meltdown describes, in the Fish v. Kobach case wonder-attorney Dale Ho of the ACLU caught the state’s expert who had placed Kansans on the “hold” list in a delicious trap. Ho asked the expert what he would have done with a name like “Carlos Murguia.” The expert admitted on the stand that he would code that name as “foreign.”  But the joke was on the expert as Carlos Murguia is a U.S. District Court Judge who worked in the very courthouse where the trial was taking place. He is an American. Not surprisingly, in a victory for voters, Dale Ho won that case against Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach.

Hasen is also fair when noting mischief in American elections can come from Democrats and Republicans alike. He points to an effort in the Alabama special election for U.S. Senate between Doug Jones (D) and Roy Moore (R).  A firm called American Engagement Technology spread lies about candidate Moore including a strange effort to convince people that Moore wanted a dry Alabama. Another effort made it look like Moore was being supported by the Russians. Neither was true. Given all of the things that were actually objectionable about Moore, including some troubling accusations of his interest in young girls while he was an adult, these lies seem like unnecessary overkill. But Jones won that Senate election, and that success likely sends precisely the wrong lesson to political operatives who will throw the truth to the wind in the struggle to win the next election.

Admittedly, when I realized in 2019 that I was writing a book called Political Brands about similar topics as Professor Hasen, who runs the Election Law Blog and has an encyclopedic knowledge of legal issues that arise in our democracy, I was worried. But what I found in reading Election Meltdown is there is plenty of electoral dysfunction to go around.

Though I was particularly interested in reading the moments where our books overlapped: Russian interference in 2016 election.  In my chapter entitled “Branding Racism,” I recount how Russian intelligence officers targeted black American voters online with messages urging them to skip the 2016 presidential election. Hasen also covers these episodes in a chapter entitled “Dirty Tricks.” As Hasen wrote, “What stood out more than anything else in the Internet Research Agency’s social media efforts was Russia’s primary focus. The 2013 North Carolina Republican voter suppression law had [as a court described] ‘targeted African-American voters with almost surgical precision,’ and so did the Russians.” For me the Russian story is a testament to how porous American campaign finance laws are that the Russians could buy $100,000 in Facebook ads in rubles and no one stopped them in real time. For Hasen, the Russian anecdote is about voter suppression of a group of voters who are often targeted by domestic political actors. Of course, both interpretations of this complex topic are correct as this episode showed how a foreign government could spend money to try to depress voter turnout in an American election.

One of the only places I disagree with Professor Hasen in Election Meltdown is his assessment that “Trump is more a symptom of the American electoral system’s malfunction than a cause.” I think this underestimates the damage that Trump has done to electoral norms and laws since he announced his candidacy in 2015. And only time will tell which one of us is right. I hope that Hasen is correct because then most of the problems he points out in his book are fixable. If we want voters to have voter IDs, there are ways achieving that goal such that the necessary documents cost voters zero. If we want voting machines to have audit trails and for elections to be audited, we can mandate that in federal law. But if I’m right and democratic norms like valuing truth have been damaged, then more than administrative fixes in how we run elections will be needed.

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy is a Professor of Law at Stetson, a Brennan Center Fellow and the author of Political Brands. You can reach her by e-mail at ctorress at law.stetson.edu.

Wednesday, February 26, 2020

Arguing with Nihilists as the House Burns

Joseph Fishkin

For the symposium on Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy (Yale University Press, 2020).

One oddity of writing a book like Election Meltdown is that the worse things get, the better it is for the book. That is, the more conspicuously our election system actually does melt down, the more Rick Hasen’s book feels relevant, urgent, even prescient. Rick is a good small-d democrat and an altogether decent human being, so I’m certain he was not especially tempted to hope for anything like the Iowa Caucus meltdown. But good lord. As it happens, I had just started reading his book while the caucus was collapsing under the weight of its own incompetence and I felt like I was reading a field guide.

Election Meltdown is a story of four sources of problems in election administration: voter suppression, pockets of incompetence in administration, dirty tricks, and incendiary rhetoric about stolen or rigged elections. The book argues convincingly that these interact with and fuel one another in various ways. The sobering thing about watching the Iowa caucus meltdown through Rick’s lens was that two of his four elements were not even present (voter suppression or dirty tricks, so far as I am aware*), and yet one pocket of incompetence was enough by itself to lead to a material delay in the results, a significant loss of public confidence in their accuracy, and inevitably, some eagerly “incendiary” (to use Rick’s word) cries of a “rigged” caucus, oddly but totally unsurprisingly coming not from prominent Democrats but from prominent Trumps. This raised an obvious question: in November, when we will almost certainly have all four elements of Rick’s story in play at the same time instead of two, how much worse is it going to get? If the election is close, most likely a lot worse.

[*Update: Whoops.  It turns out that there were some dirty tricks in Iowa.  Those hourlong delays many precincts found in reporting their results were due in part to a substantial number of Trump supporters calling in to “clog the lines,” having obtained the Iowa Democratic Party results-reporting phone number from the web cesspool 4chan.  Thanks to Rick Hasen for pointing this out in an email.  The rest of my original post follows.]

Election Meltdown reads like Rick’s shorter writing in Slate and on his indispensable Election Law Blog (the book draws on some of the Slate pieces). Like those writings, the book does a good job of avoiding unnecessary complication, showing rather than telling, and generally keeping the story sharp and swift. The book also has to confront the same two paradoxes that so much of Rick’s writing on these matters must confront. The two paradoxes, as I see them, are as follows.

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