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Balkinization
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu David Luban david.luban at gmail.com Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu Compendium of posts on Hobby Lobby and related cases The Anti-Torture Memos: Balkinization Posts on Torture, Interrogation, Detention, War Powers, and OLC The Anti-Torture Memos (arranged by topic) Recent Posts Human Rights in the Balance: What's at Stake in Hamdan Judicial Nominations and Elections Sexual Perversion in Rumsfeld's Pentagon What Does it Mean to Rebuild New Orleans? Why are Bush's Nominees so Moderate? Guest Blogger: Stephen Griffin The Katrina Experiment Does Church-State Separation Apply to Theories of Constitutional Interpretation? Is the Miers Nomination in Trouble? Some Data From Epstein and Segal's Advice and Consent Halftime Score: John McCain 90, Dick Cheney 9 Libertarian Conservatives Upset At Their Fundamentalist Bedfellows Meditations of a Militant Moderate It all depends on what you mean by the word "qualified" Conservative Crack-Up Over Miers Why it's so hard to have a constitutional revolution-- Part I Keeping Things in Perspective Who Is Harriet "Pit Bull" Miers? The Information Advantage The Miers Nomination What the England Courtmartial Doesn't Tell Us
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Wednesday, October 12, 2005
Human Rights in the Balance: What's at Stake in Hamdan
Guest Blogger
David Luban Tuesday, October 11, 2005
Judicial Nominations and Elections
Mark Graber
One way of thinking about judicial nominations is that, while the court has a famous tendency to follow the election returns, the court and judicial nominations are also struggles over what election returns mean. Indeed, one might interpret the present debate over Harriet Miers as a debate over the meaning of 2004 (or a set of elections from 1994 to 2004). Sunday, October 09, 2005
Sexual Perversion in Rumsfeld's Pentagon
Scott Horton
This week Capt. James Yee’s book concerning his experiences in Guantánamo will hit America’s bookstores. This morning’s Sunday Times (London) offers a fascinating set of excerpts from Yee’s work. Money quote: “It was my turn to be humiliated every time I was taken to have a shower. Naked, I had to run my hands through my hair to show that I was not concealing a weapon in it. Then mouth open, tongue up, down, nothing inside. Right arm up, nothing in my armpit. Left arm up. Lift the right testicle, nothing hidden. Lift the left. Turn around, bend over, spread your buttocks, knowing a camera was displaying my naked image as male and female guards watched. “It didn’t matter that I was an army captain, a graduate of West Point, the elite US military academy. It didn’t matter that my religious beliefs prohibited me from being fully naked in front of strangers. It didn’t matter that I hadn’t been charged with a crime. It didn’t matter that my wife and daughter had no idea where I was. And it certainly didn’t matter that I was a loyal American citizen and, above all, innocent.” Saturday, October 08, 2005
What Does it Mean to Rebuild New Orleans?
Stephen Griffin
Suppose your home and the surrounding area were wiped out in a flood. The federal government agrees to restore the status quo ante, provided it is shown that your area is crucial to the economic health of the entire United States. The job of proving this proposition is given to you. How could you accomplish this? Perhaps you would start by feverishly combing through economic statistics, searching for the right figures that would show your hometown contributes something unique to the U.S. At the end of the day, however, you might grow nervous about whether you could show that your hometown is truly special. And perhaps you would begin to question the premises of the task. Isn’t it enough that you and your neighbors are citizens of the United States and the victims of a natural disaster? Isn’t that a valid claim on the resources of your government? Why are Bush's Nominees so Moderate?
Guest Blogger
Michael E. Levine President Bush has now surprised both his friends and his enemies by nominating Supreme Court justices who are conservative but apparently not "out of the mainstream", at least as the mainstream is understood by those to the right of Nancy Pelosi and Barbara Boxer. Is the President a closet "moderate"? Has he turned his back on his base? No. He is simply maximizing his preferred choices within two constraints, one self-imposed and one imposed on him. The self-imposed constrained is easily articulated: as much of 43's presidential choices seem to have been made to avoid repeating his perception of 41's mistakes, he is unwilling to nominate someone who will be "another Souter". As I interpret this, for 43 the sin of the Souter nomination was less that he ultimately didn't turn out to be as conservative as Sunuunu had told 41 he would be, but rather that 41 took Sunuunu's word for it and nominated someone he didn't know, saying things about him that ultimately made it look to his supporters and to history that he didn't know what he was doing. This President Bush is not going to nominate anyone to the court who will surprise him or history. In Roberts' case, he chose someone he knew a little but whom many people knew a lot and who had such a distinguished profile and career that the only possible grounds he might have been rejected on were ideological. (I'll get to that in a moment.) In the case of Miers, he has chosen someone he knows extremely well personally, probably as well as any president has known a nominee since Fortas. While it may not be possible to predict how either will rule in every case, there will be no dramatic surprises with either of them. The imposed constraint is more interesting in some ways: No matter who screams and yells from either the conservative or liberal side of the Senate, the President cannot afford a donnybrook at this moment in his political life (Katrina, Iraq, budget, congressional leadership ethics, "outing" CIA agents, etc.). He can avoid one by de facto presenting his nominations not to the Judiciary Committee or to the Senate as a whole, but to a committee of 14 Senators who contain within them the deciding votes on whether the Democrats can conduct a filibuster and whether the Republicans can change the Senate rules to outlaw filibusters on judicial nominations (the so-called "nuclear" option). In modern political economy terms, the group contains within it the "median voter" on both issues (to defeat a filibuster requires 60 votes, so the "median voter" in that case is not the 51st vote but the 60th.) No candidate unsatisfactory to this group can be confirmed and no candidate acceptable to this group can be defeated. Who is the Gang of Fourteen? In a very polarized Senate, it is a group of seven Senators from the left (such as it is) of the Republican Senate delegation and seven from the right (such as it is) of the Democratic delegation who care enough about the Senate and the country not to want to see the Senate's traditional function as the more deliberative and less partisan body gutted and who recognize that when a President wins an election (pace Bush v. Gore and all that), he or she is entitled to nominate Justices who broadly represent the point of view that won. The Gang of 14 made an agreement whereby the seven Democrats would no longer vote along with their party on filibustering judicial nominees except in "extraordinary circumstances", and in turn the seven Republicans would break with the Republican leadership on voting for the "nuclear option." Just what an "extraordinary circumstance" is was left undefined, but at a minimum what it means is that the President cannot insist on a nominee so conservative that he or she will get support only from the Republican "base", requiring party discipline to hold the Republican vote for her, nor can the Democrats refight the 2004 election by insisting that nominees be broadly acceptable to them. In President Bush's current circumstances, pressed from the right and wishing to avoid a divisive fight that will highlight the disarray his administration is teetering toward, this means staying well within the boundaries defined by the Gang. There are two ways to do this: one, nominate a minimalist conservative (one who avoids legislating from the bench and would have a preference for staying within precedent where possible, in contrast to one who wants to rewrite law to enshrine an earlier, or perhaps unprecedented, view of the Constitution) who so stellar that the only possible objection to him is extreme ideology of the left or right. Enter Mr. Chief Justice Roberts. Two, nominate someone whose views are known well only to the President, allowing him to defend her to the right by saying he really knows her and they should trust him and to defend her to the left by making sure that she has left no imprint that would suggest that she is an ideologue. Enter Mme. Miers. What are President George W. Bush's "real" views on what kind of nominee or Court he wants? We'll never know. But we know what kind he can have. Friday, October 07, 2005
Guest Blogger: Stephen Griffin
JB
I'm very pleased to announce that constitutional theorist Stephen Griffin from Tulane will be guest blogging on Balkinization. Steve has said that he wants to blog in particular about the issues of governance arising out of hurricane Katrina. Please give him a warm welcome.
The Katrina Experiment
Stephen Griffin
The United States has begun a large-scale human experiment of the kind social scientists only dream about. The authorities instituted a mandatory evacuation of an old city and the surrounding region and are now attempting to literally jump-start its economy, society, culture, and politics. Can they pull it off? From the perspective of governance, looking at the many ways our constitutional and legal order interacts with politics and society, the reconstruction of southeast Louisiana is certainly the most interesting (and possibly the most important) phenomenon on the contemporary American political scene. Does Church-State Separation Apply to Theories of Constitutional Interpretation?
Brian Tamanaha
The question of whether the doctrine of separation of church and state applies to theories of constitutional interpretation may sound confused, irrelevant or implausible, or an obvious affirmative (or negative). But not so fast. Thursday, October 06, 2005
Is the Miers Nomination in Trouble? Some Data From Epstein and Segal's Advice and Consent
JB
The Miers nomination gives me an opportunity to talk about a wonderful new book, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments, by two prominent political scientists, Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal. Epstein and Segal have produced a short, accessible book with a wealth of data and historical examples that tells you virtually everything you need to know about Presidential nominations to the judiciary. Epstein and Segal demonstrate that politics in judicial nominations is nothing new. From the beginning of the Republic presidents have used the courts to promote their political ideologies, and the Senate has been influenced by politics in its decision whether to confirm. The only thing that has changed in recent years is the degree of public participation-- including a far more prominent role played by interest groups-- in federal judicial nominations. The politics of judicial appointments has become more obvious today as the process has become more participatory and, in some respects, more transparent. But, in Epstein's and Segal's view, it has not suddenly become more political. This book could not have come out at a better time, especially because Epstein and Segal give a detailed discussion of the factors that cause nominations to succeed or fail. Although many of their observations will be obvious to students of the Court, they back them up with a wealth of social science data. Epstein and Siegel use statistics to confirm that Senators are more likely to vote for a candidate who is perceived to have impeccable qualifications, and they are less likely to vote for a candidate whose ideology is perceived to be widely different from theirs. They note that stronger public support for a candidate usually increases the chances that the candidate will be confirmed, while weak public support adds to a nominee's troubles. Finally, they point out that candidates who are seen as tipping the Court in a new direction are likely to engender stronger opposition than those who are viewed as not significantly affecting the current ideological balance of power. Their most important findings, however, involve how the two dimensions of ideology and qualifications interact. Epstein and Segal looked at hundreds of Senators' votes from 1953 to the present. (There are quibbles about the categories and measurement methods employed for this data, but the larger trends are not in question). Their findings are summarized in the following chart: Senate Voting Over Supreme Court Nominees Since 1953 What this chart suggests is that if a nominee is widely perceived as highly qualified, he or she is very likely to be confirmed. The nominee will pick up votes even from Senators who are vigorously opposed to the nominee's perceived politics (as viewed at the time of confirmation). However if the President submits a nominee whose qualifications are in doubt, the nominee quickly begins to lose votes among senators who believe that the nominee's politics are likely to diverge from their own. A nominee who appears unqualified will usually hold onto votes from Senators who believe that the nominee's politics are very close to their own-- ideology trumps lack of qualifications-- but the less qualified the nominee appears, the fewer other senators who will vote in favor. This doesn't matter if a majority of the Senators have the same ideology as the candidate, but that is rarely the case. There is one apparent exception to the general rule that a widespread perception of sterling qualifications virtually guarantees confirmation, and that is Robert Bork. When Bork was nominated in 1987, most people believed that he was exceptionally well qualified to be a Justice; nevertheless he was not confirmed. My best guess is that this is because Bork's opponents successfully painted him as so extreme in his views that Senators believed that he was "off the wall" and so not really qualified despite his impeccable credentials. For example, Bork denied that Griswold v. Connecticut, which guaranteed the right of married couples to purchase and use contraceptives, was rightly decided. He also said that he could not think of a way to defend Bolling v. Sharpe, which held that the federal government could not segregate schoolchildren by race in the D.C. public schools. These statements, along with Bork's other views expressed in his previous writings, convinced a sufficient number of senators that he would not reason about constitutional issues the way that most mainstream lawyers would, and this undermined his otherwise sterling qualifications. From this chart, you can see why John Roberts was almost certain to be confirmed as Chief Justice: he was widely perceived as having stellar qualifications and few people believed that he was wildly out of the mainstream; indeed he seemed to be the epitome of an establishment conservative lawyer. And you can also see why Harriet Miers might be in for some trouble. The key issue, I repeat, is perception, not reality. If Miers is perceived as relatively unqualified (particularly in comparison to Roberts), she will not be able to count on Senators who believe that her politics differs substantially from theirs. From this chart you can also see the potential disadvantages of a stealth candidate. By definition a stealth candidate's perceived ideology is fuzzy and uncertain. As a result, more Senators from the President's own party have reason to believe that the candidate's views might differ markedly from their own. That gives them less incentive to support the candidate, all other things being equal. Put another way, the less qualified the candidate appears, the greater the chance that the uncertainty about his or her judicial positions-- the defining characteristic of a stealth candidate-- loses the nominee potential supporters he or she might otherwise have enjoyed. Note that this problem with stealth candidates arises only if their qualifications are in doubt. A nominee like David Souter benefited greatly from his prior judicial experience, his Ivy League credentials, and the perception that he was extremely bright, studious, and able. Indeed the stealth strategy is best designed for situations when the candidate is widely perceived to have strong qualifications. If a stealth candidate's qualifications are clearly excellent, lack of clarity about his or her ideology is more likely to help a candidate than harm him or her, because it greatly increases the chances of support from Senators who suspect the candidate's ideology is quite different from their own. Harriet Miers is a stealth candidate whose qualifications have been questioned, whether fairly or unfairly. That makes her potentially far more vulnerable than John Roberts or even David Souter. She is vulnerable not because people on the left are uncertain about her judicial views-- for that uncertainty might actually gain her some votes-- but because people on the right are not certain whether she will be reliably conservative. Hence the Bush Administration has two basic strategies to secure her nomination. The first is to counteract the image that she lacks the qualifications necessary to be a Supreme Court judge. She will have to impress the Senators at her hearings with her legal acumen and her command of constitutional issues. The second strategy is to convince conservatives that she is a reliable conservative on all the issues they care about. This appears to be the strategy that the White House has settled on for the time being. The reason is simple: President Bush cannot remake Miers' credentials-- they are what they are. But what he can do is send signals that he knows what her views are and that conservatives will like those views. Thus we have already begun to see news stories that Miers is a devoted born-again Christian, that Miers is solid on the War on Terror, and that Miers will support the interests of business. Miers has a good shot at confirmation if this public relations campaign is successful and the President can convince his party to trust his assessment of Miers' likely views. On the other hand, if he cannot command virtually unanimous assent from the Republicans in the Senate, the nomination may be in for a bit of a rough ride, because he will have to rely on help from a substantial number of Democrats. And this creates a real problem for the President: The more clearly and successfully he defines Miers as a strong conservative, the less likely Democrats are to help him get her confirmed. But if the President lets Miers' views remain undefined and fuzzy, it will be far more difficult to keep members of his own party in line. Wednesday, October 05, 2005
Halftime Score: John McCain 90, Dick Cheney 9
Marty Lederman
The Senate just voted 90 to 9 (yup, ninety to nine) in favor of Senator McCain's amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill, which would prohibit all U.S. personnel from engaging in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees -- i.e., engaging in conduct that would "shock the conscience" under Due Process Clause doctrine -- anywhere in the world. The McCain Amendment, if enacted, would (among other things) close the "CIA loophole" that was created by virtue of the Department of Justice's controversial conclusion that Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture does not apply outside the U.S. Libertarian Conservatives Upset At Their Fundamentalist Bedfellows
Brian Tamanaha
Mirror of Justice, a blog dedicated to Catholic Legal Theory, has a thread on whether religious conservatives were played by the Bush Administration. The explicit quid pro quo for the overwhelming electoral support evangelicals (as well as a large proportion of Catholics) provided Republicans at the last election was the appointment of judges who were against abortion and gay rights. Evangelicals were not shy about taking credit for Bush's re-election, and demanded their due reward. At a private conference in March 2005, with appearances by Bill Frist and Tom Delay, evangelical leaders discussed a plan to "work with congressional Republicans to achieve a judiciary that sides with them on abortion, same sex marriage, and other elements of their agenda." Meditations of a Militant Moderate
Guest Blogger
Peter Schuck Jack Balkin has invited his colleagues to weigh in on Balkinization, and I hope to do so in the future. For now, he is allowing me to engage in the following bit of shameless promotion for my new book, Meditations of a Militant Moderate: Cool Views on Hot Topics (Rowman & Littlefield 2005), which is a collection of short essays (averaging around 2000 words) on a wide variety of subjects: affirmative action; Owen Fiss's flawed theory of groups and equal protection; the incoherence of Cornell West; slavery reparations; housing integration; the Pledge of Allegiance; school vouchers; military recruitment on campus; groups and expressive speech; professors and the profession; class actions; punitive damages; lying in law; civil juries; impact litigation; gun control litigation; tort reform; surrogate motherhood; preemptive strikes and Iraq; etho-racial profiling; victim compensation; the 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund; a model for adjudicating terrorism; immigration; refugee protection; reforming the 1996 immigration law; citizenship after 9/11; immigrant voting; developing giants (China and India); rethinking liberalism (written just after the 1980 election of Reagan); the virtues of diversity; punctilios for a diverse society; incivility; and the 2004 elections. So what is a militant moderate? Damned if I know * but I think that I am one. Here is my short answer in the preface to the book: Preface: Why I Am a Militant Moderate Barry Goldwater was wrong: Extremism in the pursuit of liberty * even liberty -- is indeed a vice, and moderation in its pursuit is truly a virtue. I have written these essays for those readers who lack Goldwater's strident certitude * about what liberty is, how it can best be attained, and which other values must be sacrificed to attain it. What does it mean to be a militant moderate, and why do I think that it is a good thing to be? These are important questions and thus the answers are not at all obvious. At first blush, one might even think that militant moderate is an oxymoron. When we think of militants, after all, we may conjure terrorists in Iraq, Crusader armies pillaging the Holy Land, or dead-enders holed up in Waco and Ruby Ridge. These are not pleasant images, much less icons of reasonableness. And Goldwater's motto remind us that moderation has no intrinsic merit; its value depends on what it is being moderate about. But I find no inherent contradiction in being a militant moderate. Moderation refers to an orientation to a substantive issue relative to other orientations to that issue, while militancy denotes a high level of conviction about that position and a willingness to act on it. So much for definitions. Now let us set aside militancy for a moment and consider why one might want to be a moderate in the first place. Some reasons are not particularly admirable. We all know complaisant people who are prepared to pay almost any price in order to avoid offense or controversy. Some insipid politicians seek compromise, any compromise, for its own sake. Somewhat less contemptible are those who believe that (or act as if) the truth of any matter is always located in the middle of the space between contending positions. These people are blind to certain stubborn realities: that radical evil and heroic goodness exists, that some extreme positions are actually correct, and that even incorrect extremes can exert salutary pressures on status quos resting on little more than political inertia and embedded injustice. But not all reasons for being a moderate are misguided. Approximately 2500 years ago, the Greek philosopher Aristotle offered the (literally) classic defense of moderation, arguing that the nobility of individual character depends on achieving a middle point between the antipodal excesses of human conduct and feeling to which humans are inclined. For Aristotle, cowardice and rashness are vices but courage is a virtue. Surliness and flattery are vices, friendliness a virtue. Moderate temperament and disposition, in this view, are constitutive not only of private morality but of civic virtue and social health. Aristotle's theory of the golden mean was intended to cultivate the character needed by a good society and polity. While sharing this goal, I embrace moderation for a somewhat different reason: the design of sound public policy requires it even (perhaps especially) when Aristotelian virtue is in short supply. Whether the issue is foreign relations, the war on terrorism, health care, tort reform, illegal immigration, tax simplification, Social Security, homelessness, AIDS, or deficit reduction, policymakers and ordinary citizens alike stumble in the dark, groping their way through what seems like crisis after crisis. In this daunting policy milieu, neither the simple ideology nor the simple morality of those on either end of the political spectrum provides much useful guidance for the hard work of social problem-solving. Ideology lacks the suppleness needed to apprehend and act on complicated, changing social facts, and morality in such matters almost always cuts in more than one direction. Ideology and morality may provide useful starting points for the pursuit of policy solutions, but the roads they mark quickly run out when they enter the morass of political and social complexity and conflict. This morass, of course, is the best argument for incrementalism, one of moderation's vital techniques. If we are uncertain about where to go or how to get there but know that we are in quicksand, we are well-advised to take small steps until reaching terra firma. But although incrementalism is very common, it is not exciting; it seldom makes the heart race or the spirit soar. And this timidity puts it at a severe political disadvantage. Americans are drawn, perhaps preternaturally, to novelty, boldness, self-confidence, and decisiveness. Politicians naturally try to exemplify these appealing traits. So do businesses seeking capital, scientists stalking research grants, and policy entrepreneurs looking for political openings. Indeed, all who yearn to make a big splash and be noticed tend to use a marketing style that features extreme but unsustainable claims of novelty and certainty. At this rhetorical dance, moderation is usually a wallflower. Yet most really new policy ideas are, alas, bad ones. This statement is neither cynical, churlish, nor reflexively conservative. Consider that the same policy problems, more or less, have been around for a very long time * at least since the advent of the modern administrative state in the New Deal and especially with its vast expansion during the 1960s. Unlike scientists and engineers who often discover new facts and techniques enabling them to solve problems with large social payoffs, public policymakers must work with a limited set of familiar tools. Most plausible policy ideas are not really new; they have been proposed and debated before in some form or were already tried somewhere and found wanting. They are old wine in new bottles. Indeed, if a policy idea is truly new, there is a good chance that it will be politically or administratively unworkable. Even policy ideas that are attractive in principle are often unsound, sometimes even disastrous, in practice. As numerous case studies demonstrate, implementation of a new idea in a complex, political, and decentralized policy environment inevitably produces many unforeseen consequences, some of which may perversely undermine the policy's goals. In this environment, even the most astute policymaker cannot predict most of what will actually happen once the policy is actually operating in the field. She comprehends few of the numerous implementation-relevant variables and exercises effective control over fewer still. The hard realities of implementation mean that even creative policymakers are well advised to proceed with extreme caution. They do best not by instituting large, synoptic change in a single stroke but by muddling through. This fact, which only the most unregenerate ideologue will deny, is reason enough to turn even innovative and reformist policymakers into moderates * and it should do the same to the rest of us. We moderates should grow more militant as we recognize that every policy implementation failure today dims the prospects for genuine reform tomorrow. The social value of militant moderates is also underscored by the 2004 elections. As both parties conspicuously played to their closed-minded, dug-in extremes, the broad mainstream of opinion -- Schlesinger's "vital center" -- received less attention and representation than it should have. As I explain in the final essay, the voters are more centrist on the issues than the politicians and the mass media pundits are, and this gap, which is worrisome for our democracy, can and must be remedied. Americans deserve better from their public intellectuals than axe-grinding, score-settling, and smug certitudes. The bitterness on all sides of the election testifies to our desperate need for calming, thoughtful, trustworthy interlocutors who understand complexity, respect diverse values, want to solve real problems, and (as Learned Hand put it) are not too sure that they are right. The 37 essays (and one poem) that follow are written in this pragmatic, reformist, non-ideological, empirically-minded spirit. Tuesday, October 04, 2005
It all depends on what you mean by the word "qualified"
JB
From the Washington Post: Asked by a reporter if she was "the most qualified" person he could find in the country, he said, "Yes, otherwise I would not have" named her. By the same irrefutable logic we can conclude that the Bush tax cuts will "pay for themselves," the deficit is "under control," the Administration's response to Katrina was a "success," and the war in Iraq was "justified" because of Iraq's "weapons of mass destruction." Conservative Crack-Up Over Miers
Brian Tamanaha
As everyone knows by now, conservatives are throwing a fit over Bush's nomination of Harriet Miers. In this column in the Village Voice I suggest, with some sympathy for Miers, that a crack-up among conservatives was inevitable. Try not to be distracted by the dancing image. Why it's so hard to have a constitutional revolution-- Part I
JB
I sympathize with the movement conservatives who are bemoaning the Miers nomination, even though I don't share their politics. President Bush promised them a forthright movement conservative in the mold of Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. What he delivered instead was first a rock solid establishment conservative in Chief Justice John Roberts, and now an old-fashioned Dallas, Texas business conservative in Harriet Miers. In the days to come, we are likely to get a lot of allegations that Miers is unqualified for the job. Don't be fooled. Sure, she didn't go to a fancy law school (neither did the second Justice Harlan, by the way). But in her own way she's just as qualified as lots of other people who have sat on the Court. She may not be qualified in the way that legal academics like myself might like, and not in the way that movement conservatives would like, but she fits a familiar stereotype of Supreme Court Justice-- the business lawyer with powerful connections. Following the Civil War, Republican Presidents placed a series of railroad lawyers on the Court with little or no judicial experience, but plenty of experience as counselors to business. That's what Miers is essentially, a Texas lawyer with lots of business connections who advised corporate clients, including, most importantly, George W. Bush. He liked the advice she gave him, and so she followed him during his career. Presidents don't choose this kind of nominee because they want a revolution. They choose them because they will give the executive a free hand, and, perhaps most important, because the nominee will help ensure a pro-business climate. George W. Bush has always been an interesting hybrid of the traditional business conservative who came from a powerful Republican family and a religious conservative who found God. That combination has made him appealing to many different parts of the Republican coalition. But when the chips are down in his Administration, Bush has shown his true colors as a business conservative who above all wants a smooth ride for capital. That is what Miers offers. Business conservatives are less interested in shaking up the world than in stability and in clearing a path for the promotion of their interests. Although their goals may often overlap with the goals of movement conservatives and religious conservatives, they are relatively uninterested in religious proselytization or ideological crusading. Business conservatives are pragmatists at heart, and the promotion of capital makes them more cosmopolitan in spite of themselves. Religious and social conservatives may be shocked to learn that the Republican Party is the party of big business after all-- it has been since the Civil War-- and that big business is not always interested in the same things they are. That is why the Republican revolution in the courts inevitably will be a revolution on business's terms. And what, exactly, does business want? Overturning the New Deal? The Constitution in Exile? The return of God to the public schools? The end of affirmative action? Outlawing abortion once and for all? Squashing gays and lesbians underfoot? None of these things. What business wants is stability, comfort, predictability, and an agile, productive, submissive and demobilized population. It wants a powerful executive that can protect America's interests abroad. It wants a Congress freed from federal judicial oversight that is able to dish out the pork, jiggle the tax code and deregulate the economy according to its ever shifting concerns and interests. And it wants a Supreme Court that will give a pro-business President and a pro-business Congress a free hand, a Court that will protect the rights of employers over employees, advertisers over consumer groups, and corporations over environmentalists. It wants, in short, someone very much like Harriet Miers. Keeping Things in Perspective
Mark Tushnet
Readers of this blog are likely to have a professional interest in avoiding the following thought: But, really, in the long run aren't Barry J. Marshall and Robin Warren (this year's winners of the Nobel Prize for Medicine and Physiology for their finding that ulcers are caused not by stress but by bacteria) more likely to have an impact on the lives of Americans than John Roberts and Harriet Miers? (And even the "it's science, so somebody would have found this out eventually" point -- which is basically about the contributions people make on the margins -- is true of Roberts and Miers as well.)
Monday, October 03, 2005
Who Is Harriet "Pit Bull" Miers?
Brian Tamanaha
No one seems to know much about Supreme Court nominee Harriet Miers, though this report provides a few interesting tidbits. Bush should at least be given credit for nominating a candidate who has united the right and left--in being underwhelmed.
The Information Advantage
Mark Graber
What both John Roberts and Harriet Miers have in common is that the administration knows a lot more about them than the rest of us. In this sense, Miers is very different than David Souter, who seems to have been unknown to everyone, including President Bush the Elder, when nominated. What may be most troubling about such nominations is that they are means of avoiding accountability. An increasing number of political scientists and law professors are advancing what might be called a political regime theory of the judicial function. On this view, the constitution may be plausibly interpreted in different (not infinite) ways so presidents (and senators) are authorized by election to seek federal justices who share their constitutional vision. As I have said in public numerous times, my primary objection to Scalia is my objection to Ronald Reagan and the Republicans who won the 1980 Senate elections. My objection to Bush the younger is that he steadfastly refuses to inform us of exactly what is his constitutional vision. Does he favor overruling Roe or merely narrowing the decision. What about the revival of commerce clause and 11th amendment limitations on federal power. I do not need detail, but I'd like something more than cliches about modest justices and judicial restraint. In short, President Bush is clearly moving the court in a particular direction. he just isn't telling us what that direction is other than vaguely conservative.
The Miers Nomination
JB
President Bush's nomination of Harriet Miers to replace Sandra Day O'Connor combines three important requirements for this President. First, Miers is a woman, preserving the number of women currently on the Court. Whether this means that there are now two "women's seats" on the Court is anybody's guess, but it does suggest that Bush felt considerable political pressure to maintain the number of women currently on the Court and he was not willing to oppose that pressure. Second, Miers is a long time friend of the President's whom he trusts on a personal level. This gives him information about her beliefs and values that most other people are not likely to have. It also allows Bush to have a far greater degree of comfort in making a lifetime appointment, because he will have a somewhat better ability to guess how Miers will likely respond not only to the key issues of the moment but to unknowable problems in the future. When in doubt, this President has turned to trusted aides and associates, and promoted them. The Miers nomination is yet another example. The advantage of this strategy is predictability (for the President, as opposed to the public as a whole); the disadvantage is the danger of cronyism. Although we don't know much about Miers, it's likely that, like John Roberts, she was picked with a view toward protecting executive power. Third, Miers is a "stealth" candidate, who has not written or spoken much about the key issues that fill the Supreme Court's current docket. Presidents will turn to such candidates when they have to please many different constituencies in their party and when they face the prospect of a significant confirmation fight if they choose an ideological stalwart. President Bush is often said to avoid the sorts of decisions his father made, but in this respect George Bush is taking a page from his father's playbook. Hoping to avoid the confirmation battle over Robert Bork, President George H.W. Bush chose David Souter, about whom little was known when he was first nominated. (Unlike Souter, Miers is a stealth candidate about whom the President has lots of information unavailable to the public.) Choosing a stealth candidate is a sign that the President wants to avoid a fight, either because he is in a relatively weak political position, because he fears that his supporters disagree among themselves, or because he would rather expend his energies and influence elsewhere. All three of these seem to be the case right now. Saturday, October 01, 2005
What the England Courtmartial Doesn't Tell Us
Scott Horton
"The martial law, being based upon no settled principles, is, in truth and reality, no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a law." Pollack denies a link between the Guantanamo procedures and what transpired at Abu Ghraib. However, the Fay/Jones and Taguba reports sharply contradict him on this point. General Taguba noted that among other things MG Miller had introduced the use of military dogs at Abu Ghraib and advocated the use of the military police units (such as England's unit) to "prepare" detainees for interrogation. The central story of the Fay/Jones report is one of the "migration" of the Guantanamo techniques to Abu Ghraib. Lt Gen Mark Schmidt's report thoroughly exploded the Schlesinger conclusion about "Animal House on the night shift." Schmidt repeatedly reviews cases of abuse that track the incidents at Abu Ghraib perfectly - the use of a leash to force a naked detainee perform "dog tricks," forcing a detainee to wear women's lingerie and other practices intended to sexually degrade the detainee, strip searches, the process of stacking bodies. But time and again he concludes "this was a SecDef approved technique." Consequently, no question persists as to the origin of the techniques that England, Graner and others used at Abu Ghraib. They were procedures designed for use at Guantanamo, approved by Rumsfeld, and implemented in Iraq.
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Jack M. Balkin, The Cycles of Constitutional Time (Oxford University Press, 2020)
Mark Tushnet, Taking Back the Constitution: Activist Judges and the Next Age of American Law (Yale University Press 2020).
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Ezekiel J Emanuel and Abbe R. Gluck, The Trillion Dollar Revolution: How the Affordable Care Act Transformed Politics, Law, and Health Care in America (PublicAffairs, 2020)
Linda C. McClain, Who's the Bigot?: Learning from Conflicts over Marriage and Civil Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2020)
Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction (University of Chicago Press, 2019)
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Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet, eds., Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (Oxford University Press 2018)
Gerard Magliocca, The Heart of the Constitution: How the Bill of Rights became the Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, 2018)
Cynthia Levinson and Sanford Levinson, Fault Lines in the Constitution: The Framers, Their Fights, and the Flaws that Affect Us Today (Peachtree Publishers, 2017)
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Sanford Levinson, Nullification and Secession in Modern Constitutional Thought (University Press of Kansas 2016)
Sanford Levinson, An Argument Open to All: Reading The Federalist in the 21st Century (Yale University Press 2015)
Stephen M. Griffin, Broken Trust: Dysfunctional Government and Constitutional Reform (University Press of Kansas, 2015)
Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Harvard University Press, 2015)
Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution (Harvard University Press, 2014) Balkinization Symposium on We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution
Joseph Fishkin, Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity (Oxford University Press, 2014)
Mark A. Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2013)
John Mikhail, Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment (Cambridge University Press, 2013)
Gerard N. Magliocca, American Founding Son: John Bingham and the Invention of the Fourteenth Amendment (New York University Press, 2013)
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Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (University of Chicago Press, 2012)
Sanford Levinson, Framed: America's 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2012)
Linda C. McClain and Joanna L. Grossman, Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women's Equal Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2012)
Mary Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford University Press, 2012)
Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Harvard University Press, 2011)
Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud and Other Abuses of Intellectual Property Law (Stanford University Press, 2011)
Richard W. Garnett and Andrew Koppelman, First Amendment Stories, (Foundation Press 2011)
Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World (Harvard University Press, 2011)
Gerard Magliocca, The Tragedy of William Jennings Bryan: Constitutional Law and the Politics of Backlash (Yale University Press, 2011)
Bernard Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (Harvard University Press, 2010)
Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Harvard University Press, 2010) Balkinization Symposium on The Decline and Fall of the American Republic
Ian Ayres. Carrots and Sticks: Unlock the Power of Incentives to Get Things Done (Bantam Books, 2010)
Mark Tushnet, Why the Constitution Matters (Yale University Press 2010) Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff: Lifecycle Investing: A New, Safe, and Audacious Way to Improve the Performance of Your Retirement Portfolio (Basic Books, 2010) Jack M. Balkin, The Laws of Change: I Ching and the Philosophy of Life (2d Edition, Sybil Creek Press 2009)
Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton University Press 2009) Andrew Koppelman and Tobias Barrington Wolff, A Right to Discriminate?: How the Case of Boy Scouts of America v. James Dale Warped the Law of Free Association (Yale University Press 2009) Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The Constitution in 2020 (Oxford University Press 2009) Heather K. Gerken, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is Failing and How to Fix It (Princeton University Press 2009)
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